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Incumbent high technology organizations’ responses when facing digital disruption present an 
important area for research in the field of strategy and innovation management. In times of 
increasing environmental dynamism and uncertainty, these firms, which previously have relied 
on strong capabilities in research and development, supported by experiential learning, find 
themselves unable to learn about new markets and technologies in a satisfactory pace. This 
study argues that these firms must learn to experiment in order to facilitate development of 
new businesses, thus enabling organizational renewal and adaptation to the changing 
environment. As little is known about how incumbents may achieve this undertaking, this 
thesis sets out to answer the following question: 
How do large established firms learn how to experiment in order to develop new businesses? 
Through an in-depth case study of a large multinational telecommunications company, I follow 
the establishment of a corporate accelerator aimed to support systematic experimentation-
driven venturing in new strategic business areas. The study draws on multiple sources of data, 
including field observations, interviews and archival data. The findings, which amount to a 
grounded model depicting the process of learning how to experiment, are discussed in the 
light of corporate entrepreneurship theory, the emerging literature on accelerators as enablers 
of experimentational learning, and organizational learning literature. 
I identify six distinct learning mechanisms that transpire partly in parallel, partly sequentially 
over three distinct phases. These learning mechanisms are referred to as (1) schematic arms-
length vicarious learning; (2) coactive vicarious learning; (3) unlearning of conflicting corporate 
practices; (4) replication across the organization; (5) deliberate learning; and (6) adaptive 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This thesis investigates a large incumbent firm’s development of business experimentation 
capabilities as a response to the emerging uncertainty and dynamism caused by a 
technological discontinuity. The effort was manifested through the establishment of a 
corporate accelerator focused on supporting corporate entrepreneurship, utilizing the lean 
startup method. 
In the area of technology and innovation management, the call for examination of incumbent 
strategy during times of digital disruption has become increasingly prominent. Incumbent 
firms’ strategic behavior in response to technological discontinuity, such as the upsurge of 
digital technology, is an important area of investigation as these discontinuities alters the 
environmental uncertainty and dynamics, structural barriers to entry and mobility between 
previously distinct industries, scale and scope benefits, and customer preferences (Lavie, 
2006; Khanagha et al., 2018). Studying this transitional period is interesting as extant research 
has demonstrated that it poses substantial challenges to incumbents, yet have so far only 
provided limited empirical examination of the factors driving variation in their ability to innovate 
in the new domain (Cohen and Tripsas, 2018). Digitization fundamentally changes the nature 
of innovation and thus the required innovation capabilities (Yoo et al., 2012). Hence, 
understanding how incumbents renew their innovation capabilities to respond to such 
technological shifts is of vital importance. To narrow down this question we must first articulate 
what exactly it is that incumbent firms need to change about their current ways of driving 
innovation. 
As organizations historically have strived for competitive advantage through technology 
leadership built on vast experience, large established firms have institutionalized efficient 
structures and processes to drive research and development (R&D) within the firms (Argyres 
and Silverman, 2004). The rate of learning and the advantages in innovation derived from 





knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Experiential learning facilitates innovation when 
production of new products that are similar to existing ones is prioritized (Egelman et al., 
2017), and when learning can be transferred between related problem domains (Schilling et 
al., 2003). 
The reliance on experiential learning has however been recognized as problematic amidst 
dynamic environments. James March and colleagues (Levitt and March, 1988; Levinthal and 
March, 1993) have repeatedly asserted the difficulty of learning from experience, which arises 
amidst several conditions, including paucity of experience (e.g. existing firm in new market or 
new firm in existing market), ambiguity of experience (e.g. existing firm in existing market with 
environmental turbulence) or a combination of the two. Experiential learning tend to lead to 
specialization (Levitt and March, 1988), as improvements of frequently used practices 
increase the performance of these practices, which in turn leads to increased proclivity to use 
these practices over others. Such reinforcing learning loops risk leading to competency traps 
(Levitt and March, 1988). 
In dynamic environments, a key challenge that incumbents face is that the context in which 
prior experience has been gained does not always match the context in which it will be applied, 
which increasingly invalidates learning from past experience (Rockart and Wilson, 2019). 
When learning environments are distant from the firm’s existing value offerings, learning 
becomes increasingly difficult (Ross, Fisch and Varga, 2018). The environmental dynamism 
also increase the difficulty of interpreting experience and the risk of bias as the frames within 
which organizations comprehend events is based on past experiences that may be irrelevant 
in the new context (Daft and Weick, 1984; Levitt and March, 1988). Learning within such 
frames can be classified as single-loop learning (Argyris, 1976). When the environmental 
turbulence renders extant cognitive frames and thus also single-loop learning invalid, 
organizations instead need to switch to double-loop learning in which such cognitive frames 





As a remedy, experimentational learning, managed in a more open and iterative manner have 
been posited as a more suitable approach during environmental dynamism. As navigating 
complex environments under times of high uncertainty demand a high degree of strategic 
flexibility, an experimental approach based on staggered investments and flexible adaptation 
to environmental changes and emergent insights have been viewed as superior to reliance on 
experiential learning, tight predictions of the future and ex-ante commitment of resources 
(Camuffo et al., 2020). Furthermore, in contrast to learning that rely heavily on prior experience 
and knowledge, experimental learning typically promotes more radical change (Kreiser, 2011). 
Such approach has especially been prominent in the field of entrepreneurship where the idea 
of running experiments followed by strategic pivots in order to effectively launch new ventures 
has become a central concept (Hampel, Perkmann and Phillips, 2020). This approach enables 
the venture team to learn in an iterative fashion by engaging in the market environment rather 
than following a traditional approach of market research and careful planning from the outset 
(Gans, Stern and Wu, 2019).  
Hence, the interest for corporate entrepreneurship (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990) and 
approaches to enhance the capabilities to support and leverage such processes has risen as 
an important complement to traditional R&D that offer a way to continuously renew the firms 
competitive advantage and achieve radical innovation (Corbett et al., 2013). 
Increasingly, corporations have adopted alternative organizational forms to support corporate 
entrepreneurship such as corporate venture capital units (Basu, Phelps and Kotha, 2016), 
incubators (Becker and Gassmann, 2006; Ford, Garnsey and Probert, 2010), accelerators 
(Shankar and Shepherd, 2019) and internal corporate venture units (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008, 
2014), models that to some extent take inspiration or are straight off adopted from the 
entrepreneurial sphere into the corporate context. 
While incubators have received increasing attention among scholars in the recent decade (e.g. 





has been described as a “new generation incubation model” (Pauwels et al., 2016, p. 13) also 
have gained much attention during the last five years (e.g. Cohen, Bingham and Hallen, 2018; 
Hallen, Cohen and Bingham, 2020), their corporate counterparts have been neglected apart 
from a limited number of studies (e.g. Ford, Garnsey and Probert, 2010; Richter, Jackson and 
Schildhauer, 2018; Shankar and Shepherd, 2019). 
The lean startup method (Blank, 2013; Ries and Euchner, 2013; Ries, 2017), which embodies 
the experimentational approach described above has become an increasingly used organizing 
framework among accelerator programs (Mansoori, Karlsson and Lundqvist, 2019; cf. Cohen, 
Bingham and Hallen, 2018). Also, other complementary learning mechanisms are supported 
by accelerators, which raison d’être is often understood as the facilitation of accelerated 
venture team learning and mitigation of bounded rationality (Cohen, Bingham and Hallen, 
2018). 
This hints at the rationale behind the adoption of acceleration practices by corporations. In this 
study, I view the infusion of such new innovation practices from the entrepreneurial realm that 
supports experimental learning, as a reconfiguration of capabilities in response to digital 
disruption. This enables firms to switch from relying on experiential learning, which is effective 
during times of stability (Levinthal and March, 1993) to experimental learning that is more 
suitable in a rapidly changing and uncertain environment (Andries, Debackere and Van Looy, 
2013). 
How then might organizations reconfigure their innovation capabilities, when switching from 
reliance on experiential learning to experimental learning? Based on prior literature, the 
learning processes that enable a firm to reconfigure its innovation capabilities in response to 
a technological discontinuity would be expected to follow a substitutional, evolutional or 
transformational pattern, which entail distinct learning mechanisms (Lavie, 2006). 
Following the Schumpeterian tradition of envisioning technological development as a process 





conceptualized as competence-enhancing or competence-destroying (Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986). While technological discontinuities, such as digital disruption, may be 
competence destroying (Tushman and Anderson, 1986), turning core competencies into core 
rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992), incumbents may maintain an advantageous market position 
by possessing complementary assets that partly make up for the effects of competence 
destruction (Tripsas, 1997). At the same time the incumbent may need to substitute 
capabilities by developing new ones and discarding old ones (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). 
Hence, a substitutional view of capability reconfiguration offers acquisition, retention and 
disposal of capabilities as the viable options (Lavie, 2006). 
By viewing capabilities as malleable, the dynamic capability literature (Teece, Pisano and 
Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007) offers an alternative path towards renewal, through which 
capabilities are evolved in an iterative manner through experience accumulation, knowledge 
articulation and codification, rather than simply retained, acquired, or discarded (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002). This leads to a path dependent process where the pre-change configuration of 
capabilities is the strongest determinant of post-change configuration (Helfat and Peteraf, 
2003; Lavie, 2006). This evolutionary perspective can be considered more incremental in 
nature, whereas the substitutional perspective offers a more radical way of changing. 
An intermediary response mechanism in which organizations engage in objective-driven 
capability transformation by acquiring and discarding as well as modifying existing routines 
and practices has also been suggested as an alternative (Lavie, 2006). In contrast to the 
evolutionary path towards renewal, this transformational mechanism also entails step-function 
learning rather than incremental learning (Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000). 
However, in the context of renewing innovation capabilities by switching learning mode in 
response to highly dynamic and uncertain environmental changes caused by digitization, none 
of these approaches appear to be effective. This is due to the combination of environmental 
characteristics and inherent nature of innovation capabilities. A highly uncertain environment 





configuration a priori (Lavie, 2006). On the other hand, an evolutionary and more probing 
approach, which is more suitable during high uncertainty may be too slow and also risk 
inhibiting more radical change that are necessary. Considering the complexity, causal 
ambiguity, interdependent and embedded nature of innovation capabilities in large high 
technology firms, the difficulty to decide on a suitable way of reconfiguring capabilities 
becomes even more evident.  
The complex interdependency between various practices and routines that make up current 
and envisioned capabilities make an evolutionary approach difficult as changes of one element 
may have chain effects on other elements, thus requiring continuous alterations of a wide 
array of practices and routines in unpredictable ways. While a substitutional approach solves 
this by changing an entire set of coherent routines and practices to another equally coherent 
set, the embeddedness of innovation capabilities and interdependencies with other 
capabilities make such radical changes difficult (Dupouët and Barlatier, 2019). Such approach 
may erode the value of interdependent complementary capabilities. This conundrum begs the 
following question, which is also the research question addressed in this study: 
How do large established firms learn how to experiment in order to develop new businesses?    
The objectives of this study are to highlight the actions taken by managers across the company 
in order to enable systematic experimentation, and the underlying rationale behind these 
actions. Attention is directed to managers with different roles in relation to the efforts of 
learning how to experiment. Anticipating the progressive nature of learning how to experiment, 
this study also set out to uncover the sequence and interplay between different learning 
mechanisms that are involved throughout this learning process and explore the inherent 
challenges that are encountered throughout this process. The learning mechanisms are 
distinguished based on the nature of how experiences are generated, the locus of knowledge, 





In an effort to answer the main research question, I study how a Swedish multinational 
telecommunications company, Telco (pseudonym), developed a corporate accelerator in 
order to support experimentation-driven exploration and new business development. Telco is 
a renowned provider of telecommunication infrastructure with a long history of technology 
leadership. In recent years however it has experienced disruptive threats to its core business, 
driven by the convergence of telecommunication and information technology (IT). At the same 
time, new opportunities have been emerging, driven by the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT), 
which is expected to lead to a vast increase in connected devices. These opportunities are 
however linked to various industries that are relatively unfamiliar to Telco. The nascent 
markets that are developing at the intersection between these industries, the 
telecommunication industry and the IT industry are associated with immense dynamism and 
uncertainty. The long-established R&D practices that have supported innovation at Telco in 
the past have been found to be inadequate in this new environment. To enable exploration in 
this field Telco has in the last years developed practices for experimentation with new 
businesses through the establishment of a corporate accelerator that supports autonomous 
corporate venture initiatives. 
This in-depth case study uncovers the learning processes involved in this endeavor by drawing 
on archival data, interviews and field observations covering a period of almost seven years 
(2013-2020). I take a broad perspective on organizational learning, considering a wide array 
of learning mechanisms that may be in the repertoire used by organizations as they 
reconfigure their capabilities to enable experimentation in new business areas. This theoretical 
lens enables an agnostic view on the organizational learning processes in action as an 
incumbent firm acquire and develop new practices for experimentation. Thus, I draw on the 
broad literature on organizational learning as well as the literature on corporate 
entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial incubators and accelerators and related 





Next, I present the three main streams of literature (Chapter 2) guiding the theoretical framing 
of this research. I then account for the in-depth case study design that have been used 
(Chapter 3) followed by a description of the research setting (Chapter 4). The findings are 
presented (Chapter 5) by chronologically accounting for observed learning mechanisms 
underlying the acquisition and development of practices for experimental learning. This is 
supported by a data structure that visualizes the analytical steps and rigorous grounding of 
the introduced theoretical concepts. Thereafter, I discuss these findings (Chapter 6) by 
outlining a grounded process model and considering its theoretical underpinnings, novelty and 
transferability. I also discuss theoretical implications for the three main streams of literature, 
as well as the implications for practitioners. Finally, I conclude (Chapter 7) by summarizing the 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In this chapter I review different literatures that together have informed this study. The 
objective of this literature review is to bring together the relevant current academic knowledge 
about 1) corporate entrepreneurship and in particular the role the corporate venture process 
play for strategic renewal; 2) entrepreneurial incubators and accelerators and corporate 
adaptation of such organizational forms and practices, and the role they play in promoting 
effective learning on the venture- and organizational level; and 3) organizational learning, and 
the characteristics of different distinct learning mechanisms.  
 
Figure 1. Overview of the reviewed literature 
The literature review begins by introducing the corporate entrepreneurship (CE) literature, 
which is a stream within the broader field of entrepreneurship. While the field of 
entrepreneurship has been defined as “the scholarly examination of how, by whom, and with 





exploited” (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000, p.218), the literature on CE constitutes a subset 
of these studies which focus on “the process whereby an individual or a group of individuals, 
in association with an existing organization, create a new organization or instigate renewal or 
innovation within that organization” (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999, p.18). CE has been 
described as a continuous, iterative process driven by autonomous, entrepreneurial behavior 
by operational level personnel and middle managers (Burgelman, 1983b, 1983c) – often 
referred to as intrapreneurs (Pinchot, 1985) and champions (Burgelman, 1983b) – and 
retroactive revisions of the entrepreneurial strategic vision by top-level managers, which 
together amounts to repeated strategic repositioning of the organization (Burgelman, 1983b, 
1983c; Ireland, Covin and Kuratko, 2009). As will be discussed, CE activities depend on a 
range of factors such as external environmental conditions, individual entrepreneurial 
cognitions, entrepreneurial strategic vision of the executive leadership and pro-entrepreneurial 
organizational design (Ireland, Covin and Kuratko, 2009). Given the topic of this research, the 
first section, begin by discussing the role CE play in strategic renewal in response to changing 
environments, it stresses the link between CE and organizational learning, and conclude by 
homing in on the relationship between CE and organizational design.  
The literature review then segues into the recent organizational responses to dynamic 
environments through the adoption of entrepreneurial practices (Weiblen and Chesbrough, 
2015; Shankar and Shepherd, 2019). By broadly reviewing the literature on incubators and 
accelerators as well as related entrepreneurial practices often used in these contexts such as 
the lean startup methodology (Ries, 2011; Blank, 2013), the section provides a deepened 
understanding of why such experimentation-based approaches are enticing to corporates 
navigating highly uncertain environments (Felin et al., 2020; Hampel, Perkmann and Phillips, 
2020). It also offers insights into how such practices may facilitate enhanced rates of venture-
level learning, through experimentation but also through other learning mechanisms (Cohen, 
Bingham and Hallen, 2018; Cohen et al., 2019). The section highlights different organizational 





The literature review then goes on to examine the extant knowledge about organizational 
learning and its links to strategic renewal and corporate venturing. The ability to strategically 
reposition is vital in dynamic business environments, which is why CE is important in such 
contexts. Strategic repositioning in turn hinges on the ability to learn, since organizational 
learning allows the firm to develop capabilities that are valuable in the new business 
environment and non-trivial for competitors to imitate, thus contributing to the firm’s 
competitive advantage (Crossan and Berdrow, 2003).  
Organizational learning, both acquisitive and experimental, has been described as a central 
element of CE (Phan et al., 2009). However, the link between organizational learning and CE 
is multifold. For example, Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) find evidence that knowledge-based 
resources are positively related to firm performance and that an entrepreneurial strategic 
orientation of the firm enhances this relationship, suggesting that entrepreneurial behaviors, 
such as innovativeness, proactiveness and risk-taking (Wiklund, 1999), may enable firms to 
make better use of acquired knowledge, in order to achieve enhanced performance. Zahra, 
Nielsen and Bogner (1999), on the other hand, emphasize a different relationship, suggesting 
that CE activities are important means of creating new knowledge that are utilized to build new 
competencies and revitalizing existing ones. In contrast, a recent study by Covin, Garrett, 
Gupta et al. (2018) promote the reversed relationship, proposing internal corporate venture 
learning proficiency as an important enabler of venture performance, in particular when 
ambiguity of the initial value proposition is substantial. Furthermore, many studies model 
corporate entrepreneurship as a learning process in itself, in which firms “engage in 
exploration followed by exploitation of resulting discoveries” (Phan et al., 2009, p. 198).  
I delve deeper into the relationship between organizational learning and CE, as well as some 
of the criticism towards our current knowledge about organizational learning. Notably, I 
highlight the need for a multifaceted understanding of learning and draw attention to several 






I also provide a more nuanced understanding of learning by distinguishing between different 
types of experiential learning, such as trial-and-error (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011), 
experimentation (Murray and Tripsas, 2004) and learning by doing (Levitt and March, 1988); 
and different types of vicarious learning, such as imitation (Denrell, 2003), replication (Winter 
and Szulanski, 2001), and translation and adoption (Bresman, 2013). 
While these processes often have been studied in isolation, I argue, based on recent studies, 
that a repertoire of learning processes may be in play when an organization develops certain 
capabilities (Keil, 2004; McDonald and Eisenhardt, 2019), which necessitates a holistic 
understanding of the interplay between different learning mechanisms. 
Finally, to sum up the literature review I bring together these extant arguments to motivate the 
research question, referring to the Venn diagram above (Figure 1. Overview of the reviewed 
literature). I also account for the extant knowledge about incumbents’ response to 
technological change to emphasize how addressing the proposed research question in the 
light of the reviewed streams of literature may further our knowledge about this important topic. 
2.1. Corporate entrepreneurship as a process of venturing and strategic renewal 
The sub stream within the field of entrepreneurship that focus on CE emerged due to the 
widely accepted view amongst theorists and practitioners alike, that traits generally associated 
with entrepreneurship, such as growth (Lin and Lee, 2009), innovation (Covin and Miles, 1999; 
Ahuja and Lampert, 2001) and flexibility (Murray, 1984; Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999) are 
essential, even for large corporations (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990). As a dynamic 
understanding of competitive advantage arose in the field of strategic management the notions 
of innovation and renewal surpassed the previous premise of sustainable competitive 
advantage, giving rise to the interest in CE as a potential way of achieving and maintaining 
competitive superiority (Corbett et al., 2013). Since then, CE has received an important role 
in the strategic management literature with studies linking it to aspects such as the 





2016); characteristics-, values-, beliefs- and behavior of strategic leaders and other 
organizational members (e.g. De Clercq, Dimov and Belausteguigoitia, 2016; Tang, Tang and 
Cowden, 2017; Boone et al., 2019); organizational characteristics such as strategy, structure, 
culture, resources, processes and reward systems (e.g. Brazeal, 1993; Morris, Avila and Allen, 
1993; De Clercq, Castañer and Belausteguigoitia, 2011; Hunt et al., 2019); and various 
measurements of organizational performance (e.g. Zahra, 1991; Zahra and Covin, 1995; see 
Guth and Ginsberg, 1990; Ireland, Covin and Kuratko, 2009).  
CE has been used as a label in studies of different but intertwined phenomena, such as the 
pursuit of new businesses by established organizations, individual championing of 
fundamentally new product concepts within a corporate context, and entrepreneurial 
characteristics and philosophy that permeates an entire organization (Covin and Miles, 1999).  
Guth and Ginsberg (1990) made the distinction between corporate venturing and innovation 
on the one hand, and strategic renewal on the other hand, which has been echoed in 
subsequent papers (e.g. Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). Innovation and corporate venturing 
activities (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990; Phan et al., 2009), refer to processes intended to creating 
new businesses and integrating them into a firm’s portfolio (Narayanan, Yang and Zahra, 
2009). 
Corporate venturing can be divided into internal and external corporate venturing (Sharma 
and Chrisman, 1999). While external corporate venturing refers to activities such as corporate 
venture capital (CVC) investments, licensing, acquisitions, joint venturing (Phan et al., 2009) 
and spin-offs (Sharma and Chrisman, 1999; cf. Phan et al., 2009), internal corporate venturing 
(ICV) refers to the creation of new businesses residing within the corporate structure. Internal 
corporate ventures (ICVs) has been recognized as important exploratory vehicles (Covin et 
al., 2018), as they offer a way of experimenting with new businesses (Garvin, 2004). It is in 
particular a common phenomenon in large established organizations, where the likelihood of 





structure as ‘intrapreneurs’ (see Pinchot, 1985) is greater compared to individuals in smaller, 
younger firms, who rather become independent entrepreneurs (Kacperczyk, 2012). 
The other side of the coin, strategic renewal, has been defined as “the corporate 
entrepreneurship phenomenon whereby the organization seeks to redefine its relationship 
with its markets or industry competitors by fundamentally altering how it competes” (Covin and 
Miles, 1999, p. 52). During this incremental process, organizations continuously explore new 
opportunities to generate change and progressive adaptation of resources and outputs in 
response to the changing environment (Albert, Kreutzer and Lechner, 2015; Pettit and 
Crossan, 2019). The strategy process literature provides a framework portraying a reciprocal 
relationship between corporate venturing activities and corporate level strategic renewal, 
which I account for below. 
2.1.1. The interplay between corporate venturing and strategic renewal 
In the field of strategy, a wide community of researchers have attended to the social processes 
in which strategies are formed, evaluated and enacted within firms (Mintzberg, 1978; 
Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992). Breaking away from the previous notion of strategy formulation 
as a task performed solely by top management, and strategy implementation as a detached 
task performed by other organizational members, scholars have argued that bottom-up 
(Burgelman, 1983b) or emergent (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) strategies is an equally 
important element of the strategy making process. Contributing to this view Mintzberg (1978), 
for instance, refer to the dyadic event of deliberate and emergent strategy, and in a similar 
vein Burgelman (1983a) refers to induced vis-à-vis autonomous strategic activities. Deliberate 
or induced strategic activities signify explicit, planned and calculated strategic endeavors in 
line with the firm’s current concept of corporate strategy (Mintzberg, 1978; Burgelman, 1983a). 
By contrast, emergent or autonomous strategic activities signify activities that are not intended 
by top management but emerge at lower levels of the hierarchy and fall outside the scope of 
the current concept of strategy. Contributing to this view Regnér (2003) finds a clear distinction 





(lower levels in the hierarchy) of organizations. He finds that strategic activities at the center 
rely on a deductive approach, focused on exploitation of prevailing resources and industry, 
whereas strategic activities at the periphery rely on an inductive approach, focused on 
exploration of new resources and industries through trial-and-error probing and 
experimentation. In this way, ideas conceived in the periphery or at lower levels in the 
organizational hierarchy may help adapt strategies to ambiguous, changing environments 
(Burgelman, 1983b; Noda and Bower, 1996; Mantere and Vaara, 2008). 
An influential and longstanding model of strategy making in large, complex firms, with clear 
ties to the CE literature is the Bower-Burgelman (B-B) process model (Noda and Bower, 1996), 
first proposed by Bower (1970) and then further developed by Burgelman (1983b). By 
depicting a set of parallel, intertwined, and sequential managerial activities at the operational, 
middle and top management levels, the B-B process model visualizes the organizational 
strategy-making process as comprising of four sub processes: “two interlocking bottom-up 
processes of ‘definition’ and ‘impetus’ and two overlaying corporate processes of ‘structural 
context determination’ and strategic context determination’” (Noda and Bower, 1996 p. 160). 
In essence, by drawing on the Darwinian variation-selection-retention framework from 
evolutionary theory (Floyd and Lane, 2000), it is proposed that organizations can maintain 
fitness despite environmental changes through an experimentation- and selection process, in 
which autonomous initiatives compete for scares resources that are allocated outside of the 
tightly defined organizational rule structure (Burgelman, 1991; Pratap and Saha, 2018). A few 
successful initiatives among these are retrospectively legitimized through adaptation of the 
corporate strategy and modification of the product-market scope (Pratap and Saha, 2018). 
In his seminal paper (1983a), contributing to the B-B process model, Burgelman investigates 
the process of transforming “R&D activities at the frontier of corporate technology into new 
businesses through internal corporate venturing (ICV)” (p. 223). He finds this process to be 
dependent on autonomous entrepreneurial activities by organizational members at the 





level managers, and the capacity of top-level managers to allow viable entrepreneurial 
ventures to serve as the foundation for corporate strategic change. Burgelman (1983b) further 
argues that, in order to maintain viability, firms need to balance diversity and order in their 
strategic activities. This is done by both enabling autonomous strategic initiatives at the 
operational level, such as the formation of a diverse range of new ventures, and creating plans, 
systems and rules by imposing a concept of strategy on the organization. By supporting 
emerging ventures, combining and leveraging various organizational capabilities and 
conceptualizing strategies for new business areas, middle managers contribute to a redefined 
strategic context in which top-level managers retroactively reformulate the strategic vision to 
accommodate the new ventures (Burgelman, 1983b). This largely goes in line with Ireland, 
Covin and Kuratko's (2009) conceptualization of a corporate entrepreneurship strategy 
process. They argue that top-managers develop and communicate a strategic vision and 
create an organizational architecture that facilitates entrepreneurial initiatives. Opportunity 
recognition and exploitation by organizational members is thus affected by the top 
management’s strategic vision via the pro-entrepreneurial organizational architecture that is 
put in place (Ireland, Covin and Kuratko, 2009), as well as directly, since a well-communicated 
strategic vision may encourage, guide and provide justification for entrepreneurial actions 
(Ireland and Hitt, 1999; Ireland, Covin and Kuratko, 2009). This increases the chances that 
entrepreneurial opportunities are identified and pursued (Kuratko, Ireland and Hornsby, 2001).  
Reversely, as ventures are formed across the organization to pursue certain opportunities, 
this may in turn reinforce top-level managers’ commitment to the entrepreneurial strategic 
vision (Ireland, Covin and Kuratko, 2009). By contrast, opportunities being pursued outside of 
the scope of the strategic vision may struggle initially but can, if they persevere and get market 
traction, convince top-management to revise the strategic vision and market scope to include 
the promising ventures (Abetti, 1997). 
Floyd and Lane (2000) put this process in the light of organizational learning theory, viewing 





foundation of the organization’s response. They stress that renewal involve not only strategic 
repositioning but also changes in core competencies. The following section (2.1.2. Strategic 
learning through corporate venturing) will go deeper into the link between organizational 
learning and corporate entrepreneurship. 
Finally, Burgelman (1983c) also argue that “managerial approaches and innovative 
administrative arrangements are required to facilitate the collaboration between 
entrepreneurial participants and the organizations in which they are active” (p. 1349). Ireland, 
Covin and Kuratko (2009) refer to such administrative arrangements as ‘pro-entrepreneurial 
organizational architecture’, putting it as a central concept in their model of corporate 
entrepreneurial strategy. They visualize a trichotomous relationship between entrepreneurial 
strategic vision of the top-level management, pro-entrepreneurial organizational architecture 
and entrepreneurial processes and behaviors of organizational members. In the last 
subsection (2.1.3. Organizational design for corporate entrepreneurship) of this theory chapter 
I will expand on the aspect of organizational design and its role in CE. 
2.1.2. Strategic learning through corporate venturing 
The conceptualization of corporate venturing as a fundamental aspect of organizational 
learning and vice versa add an important perspective to the phenomenon of strategic renewal 
and CE overall. Building on the concepts of organizational learning (March, 1991), CE in 
general, is often modelled as a learning process in its own right, in which firms engage in 
exploration followed by exploitation of the resulting knowledge assets (Phan et al., 2009). In 
this view, ICVs are seen as vehicles of exploration, replacing uncertainty with context-specific 
learning through the act of experimentation (Covin et al., 2018). Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner 
(1999) highlight the fact that entrepreneurial learning comes from both experimentation and 
acquisitive learning and model these forms of learning as the outcome of formal and informal 
CE activities, and as the basis for new knowledge that can be used during the development 





important source of potential competitive advantage as it leads to highly idiosyncratic 
knowledge. 
Advancing this view, Dess et al. (2003) offer a model focused on the causal interrelationships 
between different forms of CE (i.e. sustained regeneration, organizational rejuvenation, 
strategic renewal and domain redefinition) and acquisitive and experimental organizational 
learning. Similarly as Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner (1999), they position organizational learning 
as a mediator between CE and new organizational knowledge components, which they 
distinguish as technical-, integrative- and exploitative knowledge. Technical knowledge 
concerns insights about the properties of specific activities, which are specialized in nature, 
and which help firms to refine and extend current product lines. They are therefore vital for 
sustained regeneration (i.e. incremental innovation) (Dess et al., 2003). Integrative knowledge 
pertains to the creative and unique combinations of resources and capabilities, which firms 
have learned to generate in order to create value. Exploitative knowledge is accumulated as 
firms learn how to creatively exploit technical and integrative knowledge by finding new ways 
of commercializing goods and services that are generated through the two previously 
mentioned types of knowledge (Kreiser, 2011). 
The distinct emphasis on experimental and acquisitive learning as outcomes of CE activities 
can be compared with the explicit distinction Holcomb et al. (2009) make between experiential 
and vicarious learning as they highlight these as the cornerstones of entrepreneurial learning. 
Interestingly, however, in contrast to the models of Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner (1999) and 
Dess et al. (2003) they do not model these two forms of learning as the outcome of 
entrepreneurial activities but as antecedents of entrepreneurial action, mediated by decisions 
made based on the acquired knowledge. While all these studies model the learning process 
as a closed loop involving CE activities, learning and new knowledge, the conceptual ordering 
differs slightly (Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner, 1999; Dess et al., 2003; Holcomb et al., 2009). 





2009), instead of experimental and acquisitive (Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner, 1999; Dess et al., 
2003) is also a notable difference. 
Leaving aside the semantic differences (i.e. the use of the words experiential and vicarious 
contra experimental and acquisitive) of these conceptualizations for now1, it is worth to point 
out that learning is endogenous to the entrepreneurial process, which may explain why CE is 
usually modelled as a learning process (Phan et al., 2009). Hence, it is not straight forward to 
model the relationships between entrepreneurial activities or actions and various forms of 
learning. For instance, engaging in entrepreneurial activity has the potential of leading to 
organizational learning (Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner, 1999; Dess et al., 2003), which in turn 
can be used to develop new competencies (Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner, 1999). At the same 
time learning is also a fundamental prerequisite for identifying and pursuing an opportunity in 
the first place, as opportunities are only available for those who possess certain knowledge 
required to act, as reflected in the words by McMullen and Shepherd (2006): 
[E]ntrepreneurial action is seen as something all would engage in if they knew 
what to do, but, owing to epistemological differences, only some people (the 
entrepreneurs) “know” what to do. Accordingly, entrepreneurs are thought to 
have taken action because they somehow escaped the ignorance and paralysis 
produced by uncertainty, whereas those who have not acted entrepreneurially 
are believed either to have fallen victim to doubt or to have been blinded to the 
need for forming a belief at all (p. 137).  
Nonetheless, learning does not happen without action and the ex-ante actions that set up an 
environment for learning, such as planning and hypothesis formulation etc., play a crucial role 
in venture performance (Hopp and Greene, 2018).   
In a recent paper on ICV, Covin et al. (2018) attempt to break away from the depiction of 
planning and learning as separate activities, framing them instead as interdependent drivers 
 





of venture success. The premise of this position is that “business planning sets the stage for 
ICVs to benefit from learning” (Covin et al., 2018, p. 538).  
Although, academic knowledge about organizational learning in independent 
entrepreneurship is mostly applicable to CE as well, there are important differences between 
the two contexts that ought to be considered. This become apparent when comparing Zahra, 
Nielsen and Bogner's (1999) model of organizational learning from CE and the model of 
entrepreneurial learning presented by Holcomb et al. (2009). While both models display 
learning as dependent on the environmental context, Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner (1999), who 
are applying the narrower scope focused on CE, also include internal organizational variables 
as a factor affecting organizational learning, mediated through the formal and informal CE 
activities performed. Also, in both of their respective models organizational learning leads to 
new knowledge, but whereas Holcomb et al. (2009) sees this knowledge as the basis of 
decision making, leading to actions that in turn produce certain outcomes, Zahra, Nielsen and 
Bogner (1999) model the new knowledge as the basis of competencies that in order to bring 
about organizational performance outcomes require knowledge integration as new knowledge 
is often fragmented, vague and widely dispersed throughout the established organization.  
What essentially distinguishes corporate entrepreneurship from independent 
entrepreneurship is the immense impact that the mother organization has on the learning 
capacity of a corporate venture and the role of a corporate venture as merely one of several 
endeavors by a corporation to learn about certain opportunity landscapes. 
Addressing the first aspect, a stream of studies has explored the relationship between the 
entrepreneurial orientation of firms and their capacity to learn (Wang, 2008; Anderson, Covin 
and Slevin, 2009; Kreiser, 2011). Entrepreneurial orientation (EO), is a construct based on a 
set of characteristics that can be applied to organizations regardless of maturity. Most 
conceptualizations of EO include the three dimensions: innovativeness, risk taking and 





additional two dimensions: autonomy and competitive aggressiveness (Lumpkin and Dess, 
1996). 
For instance, Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) find that an EO positively moderates the relation 
between knowledge-based resources and firm performance. This implies that the willingness 
of a firm to be innovative, proactive and take risks increases the value of its accumulated 
knowledge as it becomes better at turning it into financial performance outcomes. A potential 
explanation for this relationship that is in line with previously mentioned theories in this chapter 
is that the willingness to act innovatively and proactively, while also taking risks may be 
inherently tied to integrative and exploitative knowledge as conceptualized by Dess et al. 
(2003). In other words, by accumulating integrative and exploitative knowledge, firms may 
become increasingly innovative, proactive and risk willing, thus better at making use of its 
technical knowledge. 
2.1.3. Organizational design for corporate entrepreneurship 
Several studies have pointed out the important role of managerial approaches, administrative 
arrangement and organizational design for facilitating CE, the premise being that it requires 
fundamentally different organizing principles than the main business operations (Burgelman, 
1983c; Ireland, Covin and Kuratko, 2009; Foss and Lyngsie, 2014; Burgers and Covin, 2016). 
In their conceptualization of a corporate entrepreneurship strategy, Ireland, Covin and Kuratko 
(2009) point to the importance of creating organizational structures, cultural norms and 
environment, resources, procedures and reward systems that foster and support 
entrepreneurial behavior, claiming that without such elements in place systematic recognition 
and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities will not take place, regardless of how 
innovative organizational members might be. Instead the organization risk losing innovation-
minded employees who may become embittered by the bureaucracy and seek entrepreneurial 
opportunities elsewhere (Kuratko, Montagno and Hornsby, 1990). Agarwal et al. (2004) 
emphasize the importance of supporting not only exploration activities but also exploitation 





lead to knowledge spillovers through spinouts. This does not only mean that the firm fail to 
take full advantage of its R&D investments but can also create unwanted competition and 
competency loss as innovative employees leave the firm and start competing businesses. By 
proactively investing in both technological and market pioneering knowhow incumbent firms 
may retain their employees and their valuable knowledge (Agarwal et al., 2004).  
Considering organizational structure, Covin and Slevin (1988) find that an entrepreneurial top 
management style only have a positive effect on organizational performance if the firm 
possess an organic structure (i.e. a proclivity towards loose, informal control systems, 
adaptable management principles, and high degree of autonomy), whereas a negative 
relationship was found when the organizational structure was mechanistic (i.e. a proclivity 
towards tight formal control, strict adherence to proven managerial principles and high degree 
of centralization and uniformity). However, in mature firms stability and efficiency is, in general, 
the main goal, which is mostly associated with a bureaucratic and mechanistic structure (Miller 
and Friesen, 1984). 
A widely recognized way of facilitating CE in mature firms is therefore to set up structures that 
provide autonomy to CE initiatives (Burgers and Covin, 2016). By providing the ICVs the 
discretion to determine their own strategic direction, their ability to make timely decisions 
without constantly seeking approval from firm-level management is increased (Garrett and 
Covin, 2015). In this way it gives the venture team a sense of freedom necessary for creativity 
to thrive (Amabile et al., 1996), and for building an ability to adapt to identified demands 
(Burgers et al., 2009), and to learn through experimentation (Garrett and Covin, 2015). 
However, due to the lack of credentials of the venture teams and lack of familiarity with the 
new ICVs, corporate management may feel the necessity to monitor such initiatives (Garrett 
and Covin, 2015). Furthermore, when ICVs are completely independent of its mother firm, it 






As structural separation creates autonomy but also knowledge flow impediments, the trade-
off between differentiation and integration is complicated. This may explain why Garrett and 
Covin (2015) does not find a positive relationship between operations independence and ICV 
performance, while Foss, Lyngsie and Zahra (2015) do find that decentralized structures are 
associated with greater rates of opportunity discovery and realization, ascribing this to the 
increased level of autonomy. 
Applying more detailed research questions may provide a more granular understanding of 
these issues and thus helping to fill some of the current knowledge gaps. For instance, it has 
been argued that in combination with informal integration mechanisms, such as a shared 
vision and common values and goals, structural differentiation may lead to increased 
ambidexterity (O’Reilly III and Tushman, 2011), and corporate venturing activities (Burgers et 
al., 2009). On the other hand, despite its benefits in terms of increased knowledge sharing, 
formal integration mechanisms may have a detrimental effect on differentiated corporate 
ventures as it results in conflicting formal architectures (Burgers et al., 2009).  
Also, in the research agenda proposed by Foss and Lyngsie (2014), the authors stress the 
importance of studying other organizational design considerations on a granular level, 
acknowledging that different organizational instruments may have different implications on 
discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities. For instance, referring to several 
studies, Kuratko, Montagno and Hornsby (1990) find a consistent perception that an adequate 
reward system for CE considers goals, feedback, individual responsibility and result-based 
rewards. However, following Foss and Lyngsie's (2014) argumentation, performance-
contingent monetary rewards may be usefully deployed to achieve opportunity exploitation but 
not suitable for stimulating explorative behaviors that lead to opportunity recognition. 
Similarly, the availability of slack resources, including time for innovation activities beyond the 
ordinary work tasks is considered a vital enabler for entrepreneurship (von Hippel, 1977; 
Kanter, 1985; Sykes, 1986; Stopford and Baden-Fuller, 1994; Hornsby, Kuratko and Zahra, 





a venture team goes into execution mode to exploit an identified opportunity the amount of 
slack is likely reduced significantly, which may limit the chances of identifying new 
opportunities that are created in the pursuit of the opportunity in focus. 
Cultural aspects such as the support and promotion of entrepreneurial activity by managers, 
including championing innovative ideas, granting resources and expertise is of course also 
important to stimulate corporate entrepreneurs (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990; Damanpour, 
1991; Kuratko et al., 1993; Pearce, Kramer and Robbins, 1997; Hornsby, Kuratko and Zahra, 
2002). This is often related to a culture in which middle managers are willing to take risks and 
where there is a tolerance for failure (Kuratko, Montagno and Hornsby, 1990; Stopford and 
Baden-Fuller, 1994; Hornsby, Kuratko and Zahra, 2002). At the same time, the risk/reward-
ratio is something that should be minimized. Hence, risk management practices may be 
crucial. 
Overall, the issue of organizational design for CE is a complicated area in which our current 
knowledge is scarce, and the empirical findings are inconclusive. Further research is 
necessary in order to gain understanding of how to effectively structure and manage 
corporations’ collective venturing efforts and how a parent corporation can best contribute 
value to its portfolio of ICVs through mechanisms such as resource provision and managerial 
oversight (Garrett and Covin, 2015). 
2.2.  Adopting entrepreneurial approaches to create a pro-entrepreneurial 
organizational architecture 
As acknowledged in the previous section, established firms may seek to manage corporate 
venturing through separate units within the corporate structure. Such organizational units have 
been referred to as corporate venture (CV) units (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008, 2014; Hill et al., 
2009). CV units can be divided into two distinct types: 1) externally directed CV units are 
mostly referred to as corporate venture capital (CVC), and focus on investments in 





(Hill et al., 2009); 2) internally directed CV units have been referred to as New (Business) 
Venture Divisions (Adams, 1969; Burgelman, 1985), New Venture Departments (Fast, 1979), 
Innovation Labs (Hampel, Perkmann and Phillips, 2020) or Internal Corporate Venture (ICV) 
Programs (Burgelman and Välikangas, 2005), and focus on new opportunities identified within 
the organization, for which the established new product development (NPD) processes and 
structures are inadequate (Hill et al., 2009). Between the 1960s and 1980s internal corporate 
venturing was mostly in fashion (Burgelman, 1985; Hill et al., 2009), whereas the popularity of 
external venturing began in the mid-1990 and is still high on the agenda (Hill et al., 2009).  
Hill and Birkinshaw (2008) goes further and classifies four types of CV units by distinguishing 
between them not only based on the locus of opportunity (i.e. internal vs. external) but also 
their strategic logic (i.e. focus on exploration in order to develop new capabilities for its parent 
firm vs. exploitation of existing unexploited capabilities). 
Close examinations in the past have shown an even greater variety among CV units, 
demonstrating that there is an abundance of considerations that may distinguish CV units from 
each other and that influence their chances of success (Fast, 1979). For NVDs for instance, 
Fast (1979) highlight the level and nature of top management support, organizational 
positioning, staff, selection criteria, integration mechanisms, functions and responsibilities, 
expectation management, and spin-off timing as considerations that lead to differences among 
NVDs and that may differ through time within the same NVD as its managers alter such 
features to proactively manage the evolution of the unit to ensure survival. Arguably, many of 
these considerations apply for CVC as well. Considering CV units in general, Hill et al. (2009) 
also emphasize financial incentives, governance structure, investment syndication, 
investment staging and degree of specialization in a certain area of related competence as 
adjustable elements that may have important implications on performance and survival.  
As established firms endeavor to act entrepreneurially, they have increasingly started to gaze 
at the entrepreneurial realm for advice about best practices. For instance, during the rise of 





widely regarded to be highly successful (Hill et al., 2009). VC practices have not only been 
adopted by externally directed CV units (i.e. CVC) but by internally directed ones as well (Hill 
et al., 2009). Many proponents of the VC model were advocating its use by corporations 
(Brody and Ehrlich, 1998; Hamel, 1999; Chesbrough, 2000). However, research indicate that 
the adoption of different elements could be beneficial for different purposes. For instance Hill 
et al. (2009) find that high-powered financial incentives, vertical autonomy and VC syndicate 
size are VC-model attributes that are positively related to a CV unit’s financial performance, 
whereas horizontal autonomy, investment staging, and investing in areas of related 
competence are positively related to a CV unit’s strategic performance. Hence, professionals 
have been recommended to understand the inner workings of VC model elements and tailor 
the model to fit the corporate circumstances without losing sight of these essentials (Brody 
and Ehrlich, 1998; Hill et al., 2009).  
Today, corporations are looking at other promising managerial approaches and forms of 
organizing, such as incubators and accelerators, that have received prominence in the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem (Shankar and Shepherd, 2019; Hallen, Cohen and Bingham, 
2020). Notably, incubation and acceleration practices offer support that complements the 
investment-centered VC-model as they focus on the provision of a different set of services, 
such as training and consultation, and target the early stages of innovation (Dutt et al., 2016; 
Hallen, Cohen and Bingham, 2020). Hence, they offer other mechanisms tied to learning, to 
increase venture performance as well as corporate innovation in general.  
Similar to the case of adopting VC practices, it is likely that corporations will adopt incubator- 
and accelerator practices to create a tailored model to suit the circumstances of their CV unit, 
rather than precisely replicating a known incubator or accelerator model. Thus far there has 
not been much research on corporate incubation and acceleration, particularly not regarding 
the process of adopting such practices. The limited studies that do exist however indicate a 
difference between the discourse around corporate incubators (Becker and Gassmann, 2006; 





Kupp, Marval and Borchers, 2017; Shankar and Shepherd, 2019). As the general literature on 
incubators involve a great variety of incubator types (e.g. private, public, university-based, and 
corporate) that have evolved throughout the last decades, the definition of corporate 
incubators has become quite wide, recognizing a variety of objectives that can be pursued 
through such type of organization. For instance, corporate incubators have been identified as 
a facilitator of exploitation of non-commercialized in-house technology through existing 
business units or spin-offs, as well as sourcing of technological knowledge through 
engagement with external startups (Becker and Gassmann, 2006). 
The accelerator model on the other hand, which have been described as a new generation of 
incubators (Pauwels et al., 2016), is more precisely defined as its roots can be traced back to 
the foundation of Y-Combinator, as the first accelerator, in 2005. As the model is yet highly 
associated with independent startups, corporate accelerators have thus far mostly been 
recognized as a means of bringing about outside-in open innovation by working closely with 
external startups (Weiblen and Chesbrough, 2015; Kohler, 2016; Shankar and Shepherd, 
2019). 
As the current study is interested in the adoption of practices from incubators and accelerators 
rather than strict replication of such models the following section intend to dissect these 
models to identify distinguishable features rather than only accounting for their definitions. 
2.2.1. Incubator and accelerator practices 
An incubator has been described as “a facility that provides affordable space, shared office 
services, and business development assistance in an environment conducive to new venture 
creation, survival, and early-stage growth” (Allen and Mccluskey, 1991, p. 61). While the first 
known incubator facility in the US dates back as far as to 1959, it was not until the second half 
of the 1980s that they started becoming increasingly common followed by a period of 
increased professionalization in the early 1990s and a significant increase of new incubators 





Various types of incubators have formed over the years. These can be distinguished based 
on their objectives, management models, including what services are provided, and their 
source of sponsorship (Pauwels et al., 2016). Typical sponsors are governmental agencies, 
non-governmental organizations, universities and research institutes, private investors, and 
corporations (Dutt et al., 2016). Each sponsor typically has different main objectives (Rudy, 
2004). Governmental agencies generally aim to support national or regional development 
(Giudici, Reinmoeller and Ravasi, 2018); universities use incubators to offer a path to 
disseminating and commercializing novel technologies and inventions through spinouts 
(Clarysse et al., 2005; Pauwels et al., 2016); private investors focus on gaining financial profit; 
and corporations typically aim to achieve strategic benefits through increased knowledge 
creation (Becker and Gassmann, 2006). 
There is a vast diversity of incubator models, which corresponds to the heterogeneity of 
objectives held but also the differences in sponsors’ experience, expertise and mental models 
as well as the environmental conditions the incubator is situated in (Dutt et al., 2016; Cohen 
et al., 2019). A major distinguishing factor is whether the incubator is for-profit or non-profit 
(Rudy, 2004; Dutt et al., 2016; Pauwels et al., 2016), but the difference in incubator design is 
more nuanced and involve elements such as the business model, selection practices, program 
duration, mediation strategies, and the services provided, including facilities, financial support, 
administration, mentorship, business support, consultation and training (Bergek and Norrman, 
2008; Hallen, Cohen and Bingham, 2020).  
Throughout the years incubators have shifted focus from the initial provision of facilities and 
administrative services at reduced rates to the provision of intangible, knowledge-based 
services (Grimaldi and Grandi, 2005). The accelerator is at the most progressive end of this 
spectrum as it often does not provide facilities and administrative services but solely focus on 
aiding business development.  
Accelerators have been described as a new generation incubation model that differ from 





increased focus on learning as the main value added to participating ventures (Hallen, Cohen 
and Bingham, 2020). This shifted focus is reflected in the accelerator design. They differ from 
previous generations of incubators by taking in cohorts of ventures rather than continuously 
onboarding individual ventures. They then provide them with mentoring, education and 
support during fixed-length programs that last for a few months rather than years, which is the 
common duration of previous incubators (Cohen, 2013; Cohen et al., 2019; Hallen, Cohen and 
Bingham, 2020). The emergence of accelerators started in 2005 with the founding of Y 
Combinator, which immediately became a success and has since served as a blueprint for 
subsequent accelerators, driving the proliferation of the accelerator model around the world 
(Hallen, Cohen and Bingham, 2020). 
Incubators in general have been observed using different selection strategies. One distinction 
is whether evaluation of the idea itself or the entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team is 
emphasized (Bergek and Norrman, 2008). Incubators can potentially go for a selection 
strategy similar to that of VCs and Angel investors. As these early stage investors look for high 
risk - high reward ventures they typically put much emphasis on the entrepreneurs’ and their 
team’s abilities (Huang and Pearce, 2015), and look for motivational cues such as enthusiasm, 
preparedness and commitment during pitches (Cardon, Mitteness and Sudek, 2017). This has 
proven to be an effective approach (Huang and Pearce, 2015). The rationale behind this is 
that due to the high uncertainty the idea may change as the team pivots, which shift the 
importance from the quality of the initial idea to the managerial and executional capabilities of 
the team. Angel investors’ decisions rely on a combination of formal analysis and intu ition 
based on their expertise, where intuition trumps formal analysis, in contrast to decision making 
in many other investment contexts (Huang and Pearce, 2015). For example, this drastically 
differ from the investment decision procedure at corporate R&D labs where high uncertainty 
and novelty are often avoided (Criscuolo et al., 2017), and the idea plays an important role 





Accelerators accept ventures in batches once or a few times per year (Cohen, 2013), and the 
top programs get between 1,000 and 2,000 applications per batch (Hallen, Cohen and 
Bingham, 2020). The high quantity of applications put substantial limitations on the due 
diligence given to teams prior to admission compared to that of VCs and angel investors who 
are more selective as they also make a bigger commitment towards fewer ventures (Hallen, 
Cohen and Bingham, 2020). However, the cohort orientation of accelerator programs seem to 
unlock scale benefits by enabling provision of basic services across the cohort and letting 
resource providers engage with large numbers of ventures in an efficient manner (Cohen et 
al., 2019). 
The selectiveness also varies depending on the incubation approach. For instance, it has been 
found that incubators supported by research institutes choose from three different spinout 
strategies: 1) a low-selective approach, which mission is to maximize the number of 
entrepreneurial ventures; 2) a supportive approach, which requires greater commitment in 
form of financing and support and thus increase the selectiveness; 3) and an incubator model 
which is used for commercializing cutting edge technology which requires significant 
investments often acquired through venture capital and rigorous testing and development, 
which may go on for up to three years (Clarysse et al., 2005). 
Corporate accelerators searching to onboard external start-ups have been observed utilizing 
different selection strategies depending on whether they emphasize strategic fit with the 
mother firm or remain industry agnostic and focus on product-market fit (Shankar and 
Shepherd, 2019). 
Incubators and accelerators are often framed as intermediary organizations that link parties to 
facilitate specific activities and transfer of knowledge and resources (Dutt et al., 2016; Clayton, 
Feldman and Lowe, 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; van Rijnsoever, 2020). Intermediaries such as 
incubators and accelerators has been found to address institutional voids in the business 
environment on behalf of their stakeholders (Dutt et al., 2016). Early incubators focused on 





such as financial capital and physical facilities. These are still a high priority in less developed 
entrepreneurial environments but has given place to intangible services such as training and 
consultation in more advanced environments (Dutt et al., 2016).  
As the entrepreneurial environment become more developed, incubators and accelerators no 
longer need to provide tangible services such as administration, financing and facilities as 
these resources are provided by other actors. Hence, they can shift to higher value services 
such as business development support (Dutt et al., 2016). Accelerators, in particular, have 
been argued to focus on learning related services such as consultation, mentoring and training 
(Hallen, Cohen and Bingham, 2020), but it has also been shown that intermediaries such as 
accelerators can increase learning by enhancing participants sensing capabilities through 
intermediation (Giudici, Reinmoeller and Ravasi, 2018). Intermediation also create value for 
the ventures in other ways than through learning, such as by providing access to resources 
held by other actors. 
Accelerators are in particular known to support new ventures by increasing their learning rates 
and complementing the venture teams expertise (Hallen, Cohen and Bingham, 2020). By 
exposing the venture teams to large amounts of feedback and mentorship early on 
accelerators have been found to mitigate bounded rationality by encouraging them to prolong 
broad search efforts and avoiding prematurely satisficing with suboptimal business model 
elements (Cohen, Bingham and Hallen, 2018). Experienced entrepreneurs, early stage 
investors and other experts are introduced to the ventures and provide feedback on their 
business models (Shankar and Shepherd, 2019). In addition to the formal training the cohort 
design also lets venture teams interact and learn from each other’s experiences and 
challenges (Cohen et al., 2019). By fostering transparency accelerators have been found to 
enable venture teams to learn from their peers, and increase their search efforts by reigniting 
search related to business model dimensions deemed good enough, encourage broader 
search and more effective search by improving entrepreneurs’ mental maps of potential 





Incubators and accelerators are programs that serve as intermediaries between new ventures 
and a plethora of critical resources which can be difficult to identify and obtain for a newly 
started company or venture team (Cohen et al., 2019). By working as intermediaries between 
individual ventures and the entrepreneurial ecosystem, incubators and accelerators can 
improve the institutional environment and the entrepreneurial ecosystems in addition to 
supporting individual ventures (Dutt et al., 2016; Goswami, Mitchell and Bhagavatula, 2018). 
Accelerators often expose ventures to investors and corporate accelerator also facilitate 
contacts with clients and corporate business units (Shankar and Shepherd, 2019). 
In addition to the formal intermediation activities incubators have been found to promote 
networking behavior among entrepreneurs within the incubator, leading to exchanges of 
services between them (Ebbers, 2014). 
Few studies have addressed how incubators and accelerators are created and developed in 
new institutional contexts. A notable exception is a recent study by Tracey, Dalpiaz and Phillips 
(2018), which investigates how a private incubator is established in a misaligned institutional 
context. They find that the incubator managers must engage in dual optimal distinctiveness 
work and authentication work on the local level and on the category level as they translate the 
misaligned organizational form to the new context. They further find that these types of work 
unfold over three discrete translation phases: 1) an improvisation phase where the 
organizational form (in this case the incubator model) is located in a misaligned institutional 
context, adjusted and explained to the local audience to gain local authenticity; 2) a converging 
phase in which the emerging organization is explained to category-level stakeholders and 
where the organization conforms to their expectations to gain category-level authentication; 
and 3) an optimization phase in which the local- and category-level legitimization pressures 
evolve as the organizational form has gained acceptance and the organization now need to 
differentiate from local rivals. 
Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi (2005) provide evidence of a less common type of incubator they term 





ventures themselves who manage the incubator to gain territorial synergy, relational 
symbiosis, and economies of scope. Another highly relevant study by Shankar and Shepherd 
(2019) address how corporations design accelerators, highlighting the diversity of approaches 
that can be adopted. However, although these studies provide a dynamic understanding of 
how these intermediary organizations function, they do not address their establishment and 
development over time.  
It can safely be argued that the development of incubators and accelerators is dependent on 
organizational learning. Several of the practices and their effectiveness may be linked to 
continuous learning from the ongoing operations. In the adjacent field of CVC programs it has 
been found that valuation and selection capabilities may be enhanced by investing in divers 
industries (Yang, Narayanan and Zahra, 2009), and that acquisitive and experiential learning 
play a role in building capabilities for external corporate venturing (Keil, 2004). 
Shankar and Shepherd (2019) study corporate accelerators that focus on nurturing external 
startups as an approach to outside-in open innovation. They find that corporate accelerators 
focus on venture emergence or strategic fit, and that the focus determines the organizational 
design choices. An important element that differs from other types of incubators, VCs and 
angel investors is that corporate accelerators first and foremost represent the interest of the 
sponsoring corporation, which means that organization-level learning is just as important as 
venture-level learning. This may require mechanisms that are not present in the independent 
accelerator model.  
2.2.2. The lean startup approach 
The lean startup approach is among the most popular frameworks in the practitioner-oriented 
entrepreneurship literature (Shepherd and Gruber, 2020). Its focus on iterative exploration and 
development through experiments and subsequent ‘pivots’, is commonly taught to aspiring 
entrepreneurs in business schools and incubators, as a highly effective way of launching 





into the corporate world (Ries and Euchner, 2013; Ghezzi, 2019), with the promise of 
benefitting the corporate venturing process by accelerating its pace, reducing unnecessary 
costs, and increasing the success rate (Hampel, Perkmann and Phillips, 2020). The lean 
startup approach have also been attributed as an important source of inspiration behind a 
plethora of currently popular ways in which corporations explore new opportunities, such as 
through jams, hackathons, innovation labs and accelerators (Hampel, Perkmann and Phillips, 
2020). 
The lean startup approach is designed according to real options reasoning to avoid committing 
significant time, effort and resources to developing a business before the value proposition 
has been thoroughly validated (Shepherd and Gruber, 2020). The real options logic limits the 
potential losses by staging investments in a way that each investment lead to new information, 
which then serve as the basis for the next investment decision (McGrath, 1999). That is, by 
committing a limited amount of resources to an experiment, the entrepreneur can test a set of 
assumptions that if they hold true increases the chances that the venture indeed may be 
valuable. Should the experiment provide a positive indication, further investments can be 
made, which is referred to as exercising the option (McGrath, 1999). Thus, experimentation is 
valuable if it can reveal important information regarding assumptions that are critical to the 
overall potential of the venture idea in a cost effective manner (Kerr, Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 
2014). 
By astutely recognizing the assumptions that the business hinge upon, translating these 
assumptions into hypotheses, and engaging the early customers in order to test these 
hypotheses, entrepreneurs may in this manner reduce uncertainty before committing to a 
business idea (Ries, 2011; Blank, 2013). Artefacts such as a business model canvas and a 
minimum viable product (MVP), which only include the fundamental elements needed to test 
the business idea, are developed to enable both conceptual feedback and realistic 





customer engagement also makes it possible to gather knowledge that enable pivoting to a 
better business idea.  
This can be contrasted to the traditional focus on elaborate planning and extensive 
development, often under stealth mode, which proponents of the lean startup method claims 
has become obsolete due to the importance of customer feedback (Blank, 2013). Critics do 
however highlight some of the potential drawbacks of the method. 
Felin et al. (2020) problematize the eagerness to quickly start experiment and to do so 
cheaply, which they claim may constrict entrepreneurs to the point where they are only able 
to produce incremental innovations. They argue that more attention needs to be given to how 
entrepreneurs formulate a novel hypothesis and then craft experiments, which they claim often 
will be costly and require significant commitment. For example, studies suggest that non-digital 
(König et al., 2019) and business-to-business (Ghezzi, 2019) offerings may not be as adapt 
to simple and costless experimentation as digital business-to-consumer ventures. 
Given the presumption that the most valuable experiments to conduct (i.e. the experiments 
that give the most vital information) may be costly, the act of experimenting may require 
irreversible commitments that limit future options (Pillai, Goldfarb and Kirsch, 2019). Hence, 
while costless and commitment free learning may be a vital first step (Bennett and Chatterji, 
2019), the entrepreneur, due to the inherent uncertainty of entrepreneurial opportunities, 
eventually has to make decisions between equally viable alternatives (Gans, Stern and Wu, 
2019).  
While this reasoning dismiss the idea of completely eliminating uncertainty and thus also 
finding an optimal decision, it gives reasons to expect there may be a tradeoff between, on 
the one hand, remaining flexible and postponing commitment and, on the other hand, taking 
a leap of faith and focusing time, effort and resources to explore one potential path forward.  
Research remain inconclusive regarding how to manage such potential tradeoff. While 





commit to a broad business model template as they further explore the opportunity, Eesley 
and Wu (2020) find that minimizing adaptability and adhering to a strong vision has initial 
benefits but a more amendable approach is better in the long-term. In a similar vein, Andries, 
Debackere and Van Looy (2013) find that focused commitment to a value proposition 
positively affects initial growth but jeopardizes long-term survival, whereas simultaneous 
experimentation leads to lower initial growth but facilitates long-term survival. Shepherd and 
Gruber (2020) also argue that the real options reasoning perspective would suggest that 
entrepreneurs need to explore multiple opportunities and that it is important to consider the 
portfolio of opportunities rather than the pursuit of a single opportunity. This could potentially 
be an even more prominent factor for corporations, as they possess the resources to handle 
relatively wide-ranging portfolios. 
The real options reasoning of the lean startup approach provides opportunities to reassess 
the business venture continuously, and the learning from each experiment may provide 
insights that facilitates pivoting to a more promising avenue. The difficulty of pivoting should 
however not be underestimated (McDonald and Gao, 2019; Hampel, Tracey and Weber, 
2020). While deemed important, recent studies have highlighted the potential hazards of 
radically changing a business venture that a certain audience of stakeholders have grown to 
accept and potentially identify with (McDonald and Gao, 2019; Hampel, Tracey and Weber, 
2020). 
Ventures may pivot quite easily at an early stage but once they have pursued a particular 
approach for some time it may require careful management of its relations to various 
stakeholders (Hampel, Tracey and Weber, 2020). By anticipating future strategic reorientation 
the original concept may be framed abstractly enough to create room for maneuvering, while 
appearing to be consistent with previous aims (McDonald and Gao, 2019; Shepherd and 
Gruber, 2020). Still there may be some tensions as the pivot is carried out, which require 
careful justification of each strategy transition towards different audiences to avoid penalties 





while also signaling continuity the stakeholders can be made to feel as a part of the transition 
and therefore continue to offer their support (McDonald and Gao, 2019). Also, by seeking 
sympathy to the venture’s challenges and frame its efforts as genuine, the venture can even 
rebuild relationships with stakeholders who initially feel estranged or even hostile because of 
feelings of betrayal caused by the pivot (Hampel, Tracey and Weber, 2020). Mismanagement 
of these challenges pose an existential threat as the venture may lose support from essential 
stakeholders such as investors, user community or employees. Hence, the ability to 
experiment may be of limited value without the ability to manage audiences during a pivot. 
Furthermore, corporations, which have a considerable legacy, may encounter additional 
difficulties as they manage new and old stakeholders and could potentially endanger more 
than their new business ventures if they mistreat such relationships. 
Besides these challenges which are inherent to the experimental approach to 
entrepreneurship, problems arise when methods are misused due to carelessness or poor 
understanding of their underlying principles. Many founders cherry pick a few of the lean 
startup principles, while omitting some of the crucial ones, which may decrease the value of 
the method substantially (Ghezzi, 2019). The understanding of the principles of lean startup, 
which rely on the scientific method of experimentation, may vary. One reason for this is the 
varying quality of lean startup training that founders may acquire (Ghezzi, 2019). 
In a recent controlled experiment by Camuffo et al. (2020), the treatment group and control 
group, consisting of a total of 116 startups, received a similar training program in the lean 
startup approach that spanned over ten sessions. The results of the study demonstrate that 
the treatment group, for which the scientific method of experimenting was emphasized for 
each part of the training, pivoted more often and performed better in terms of increased 
revenue. This suggest that a deeper theoretical understanding of the scientific principles of 
experimentation that the lean startup approach builds upon could benefit its users. 
In summary, the lean startup approach may provide several benefits for corporate venturing, 





opportunity landscapes in a cost-effective manner. However, in the corporate context one 
must consider the impact of the firm’s legacy and understand the company-wide implications 
of using the lean startup approach. 
2.3. Organizational learning 
In previous sections I have mostly discussed learning on the venture level and referred to the 
role of learning through experimentation and acquisition. The literature on organizational 
learning is intricate and entail different definitions that are at odds, as the same term are at 
times used to indicate different phenomena. This calls for a thorough review of the different 
conceptualizations of organizational learning. 
Organizational learning relates to the processes by which an organization acquire knowledge, 
distribute, interpret and sustain it, and then puts it into use (Huber, 1991). Thus, the theory 
contributes to a wider tradition of literature emphasizing the importance of knowledge 
development and maintenance, including the knowledge-based theory of the firm, and the 
theory on organizational memory, group learning and shared cognition (Madsen and Desai, 
2010).  
In the management and innovation literature, learning is seen as “a purposive quest to retain 
and improve competitiveness, productivity, and innovativeness in uncertain technological and 
market circumstances” (Dodgson 1993, p. 378). The importance of learning increases with the 
level of uncertainty of the environment in which the organization is situated.  
While some conceptualizations of organizational knowledge have emphasized its 
distinctiveness from individual knowledge, and its imperviousness against individuals leaving 
the organization (Levitt and March, 1988; De Holan and Phillips, 2004), others have stressed 
the important role of individual cognition, implying that knowledge reside in a combination of 
individual and collective memory systems (Anand, Manz and Glick, 1998; Huckman and 





This suggest that organizational knowledge encompass procedural knowledge which is 
manifested through explicit goals, routines, standard procedures and rules, and tacit 
knowledge contained through shared mental schema and culture, as well as individual 
cognition and memory (March and Olsen, 1975; Conner, 1991; Weick and Roberts, 1993; 
Grant, 1996; Simon, 1999; Madsen and Desai, 2010; Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011).  
Hence, organizational learning may be modelled as a multilevel concept in terms of where 
learning takes place – at the individual level, the group level- or the organizational level 
(Crossan, Lane and White, 1999). This is an important distinction, with the implication that 
knowledge is heterogeneously distributed within the organization and therefore may or may 
not be available at decision points where it would be relevant (Simon, 1999). 
A hierarchy of cognitive processes have also been proposed by distinguishing between single- 
and double-loop-learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978). While single-loop-learning represents a 
reactive modification of strategies within a constant normative framework, double-loop-
learning represents a reflective process by which goals, norms, strategies and knowledge 
structures (e.g. fundamental assumptions) are modified proactively or as a reaction to 
environmental change (Shrivastava, 1983; Keil, 2004). Furthermore, it is important to 
distinguish between different learning mechanisms that vary in terms of locus of where 
knowledge is derived (Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner, 1999), degree of consciousness in the 
learning process (Dutton and Thomas, 1984; Adler and Clark, 1991; Zollo and Winter, 2002; 
Nembhard and Tucker, 2011; Heimeriks, Schijven and Gates, 2012), and relatedness 
between new and to already possessed knowledge (Miner and Mezias, 1996; Schildt, Maula 
and Keil, 2005). 
The following sections discuss how the nature of learning may differ along these dimensions 





2.3.1. The varying nature of organizational learning mechanisms 
Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner (1999) stress the importance of organizational learning within CE 
and classify it into two broad categories based on the locus of where knowledge is derived 
(See also Dess et al., 2003). They define acquisitive learning as “when a firm acquires and 
internalizes knowledge that pre-exists externally to its boundaries” (p. 173). Referring to Huber 
(1991), they assort learning activities such as vicarious learning, grafting and search into this 
category. The other category, ‘experimentation’, is presented as a generative process that 
largely takes place internally, driven by individuals who enjoy the discretion to experiment. 
Experimentation thus generate new knowledge and translates individual experiences into 
organizational knowledge (Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner, 1999). 
What is evident from this reading is that deliberation and cognizance are very prominent in 
this concept of organizational learning. This is, in contrast to other conceptualizations of 
organizational learning, that often highlights the autonomous or semiautomatic nature of 
learning. For instance, experiential learning, that is learning based on experiences and 
interpretations of action- and outcome relationships, is closely associated with the concept of 
routines (Levitt and March, 1988). In this light, organizational learning takes place by adapting 
routines incrementally in response to feedback about outcomes in a trial-and-error fashion 
(Van de Ven et al., 2019). When a routine is associated with a positive outcome it is more 
likely to be used and if it is associated with a negative outcome more likely to be discarded 
(March and Olsen, 1975; Levitt and March, 1988). Such learning is often not a result of 
deliberate experimentation (i.e. explicit hypothesis formulation ex ante and systematic testing) 
but could follow from after-event reviews (Ellis and Davidi, 2005), or counterfactual thinking, 
by which past event as reconstructed and alternative events that might have occurred are 
considered (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011), or through less cognizant processes. 
Experiential learning thus involves several learning mechanisms, such as experimentation, 
learning-by-doing through trial-and-error, and deliberate learning from success and failure or 





Organizational learning both leads to discrimination among routines and refinement of 
routines, which may lead to competency traps as refined routines may be preferred over 
routines that are more adequate but which require additional learning to be implemented 
(Levitt and March, 1988). This imply a path dependent nature of organizational learning, which 
is captured in the theory of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). While being 
discernibly focused on R&D related learning, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue in their 
seminal paper that some portion of prior knowledge should be closely related to new 
knowledge to facilitate its assimilation. Hence, decisions about investments into particular area 
of knowledge allow for subsequent learning in related areas, whereas it forecloses learning 
within areas for which investment were lacking. As resources and attention are limited, 
learning involves a degree of commitment to a certain learning trajectory.  
To maintain room to maneuver and broaden the knowledgebase, organizations should avoid 
only focusing on learning that relates to their current knowledge. Instead they need to balance 
between local search or exploitative learning and distant search or explorative learning 
(March, 1991; Afuah and Tucci, 2012). 
March (1991) argue that adaptive processes may be effective in the short run as they refine 
exploitative learning processes but may be detrimental in the long run as they are less effective 
for developing exploration capabilities. As preferences for certain activities develop 
simultaneously as competencies within them, the propensity to reevaluate the purposefulness 
of engaging in certain activities are diminished as competencies at them are gained (Levinthal 
and March, 1993). Instead there is a risk that organizations gradually adopts current routines 
but the routines themselves are considered fixed properties (Levitt and March, 1988). This has 
been referred to as the competency trap (Levitt and March, 1988). 
In order to introduce new routines, current routines may need to be forgotten (De Holan and 
Phillips, 2004). Given the link between the preferences and knowledge, inability to forget 
competencies may exaggerate the competency trap (Martin De Holan, Phillips and Lawrence, 





get rid of bad habits that have been learned in the past (Martin De Holan, Phillips and 
Lawrence, 2004). Divestiture of businesses and discontinuation of routines and practices are 
some of the possible actions that can promote unlearning and thus enable learning of new 
competencies. 
2.3.2. Learning mechanisms based on first-hand experiences 
Previously in this review  Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner's (1999) distinction between acquisitive 
and experimental learning was referenced. Next, I account for different forms of acquisitive 
and experiential learning. 
Learning-by-doing is a form of experiential learning, which is most prominent in the traditional 
perspective on organizational learning (Levitt and March, 1988), and has been referred to as 
semiautomatic (Heimeriks, Schijven and Gates, 2012), autonomous (Dutton and Thomas, 
1984) and first-order learning (Adler and Clark, 1991). These epithets are based on the notion 
that this form of learning is a natural effect of repeating a routine, which explains the regularity 
of cost reductions through accumulated experience, which is captured in the concept of the 
‘learning curve’ (Adler and Clark, 1991). Hence, learning-by-doing may occur naturally, 
through a process of trial-and error (Levitt and March, 1988; Van de Ven et al., 2019), without 
the need for an explicit effort to learn systematically. Individuals simply changes their behavior 
iteratively and incrementally to avoid negative outcomes and increase positive outcomes. 
To further enhance the learning, deliberate investments in knowledge articulation and 
codification activities (i.e. second-order learning (Adler and Clark, 1991)) are needed (Zollo 
and Winter, 2002). Through articulation and codification, tacit knowledge that individuals 
acquire through experience, can be mobilized by creating explicit concepts that can be 
internalized by other organizational members, enabling them in turn to develop new tacit 
knowledge (Nonaka, 1994). While codification may lead to rigidity, it can be counteracted by 
inducing reflection, self-conscious inquiry and conscious action (Heimeriks, Schijven and 





to analyze and draw conclusions about successes and failures have been shown to accelerate 
the learning process (Ellis and Davidi, 2005). Dahlin, Chuang and Roulet (2018) refers to it as 
analytical learning and distinguish it from learning-by-doing. Whereas the latter is mostly 
automatic and tacit, analytical learning entails active decision-making and uses the existing 
information gained from previous experiences to revise and adapt future routines. This type of 
active learning is for example transpiring as organizations attempt to learn from failures 
(Dahlin, Chuang and Roulet, 2018). 
These forms of learning assume there are experiences to draw from that occur naturally. 
Furthermore, they rely on the prospect of achieving sufficient improvements through 
incremental adaptations. However, as organizational routines, norms and values are adapted 
and perfected within the current environment they may also become increasingly streamlined 
and rigid, offering limited opportunity for learning (Leonard-Barton, 1992). As past experiences 
influences the way in which organizations frame challenges and choose which problems to 
solve, it may act as a lens that narrow the search scope (West and Iansiti, 2003). While this 
may be beneficial in a stable environment, it becomes dangerous when long periods of 
incremental innovation, which motivates increasingly narrow frames, are punctuated by 
unpredictable events, induced by changes in technology or market (Anderson and Tushman, 
1990). During such circumstances, relying on naturally occurring learning-by-doing may limit 
the organizations maneuverability. 
An alternative form of learning that may enable organization to not only draw on existing 
experiences but to broaden the scope of search and thus break conceptual inertia, is 
purposeful experimentation (West and Iansiti, 2003; Murray and Tripsas, 2004). This form of 
learning refers to a deliberate act of creating an environment that is conducive to learning. 
This should be contrasted to the semiautomatic form of trial-and-error referenced above, that 
traditional organizational learning studies mostly refer to and which is sometimes also labeled 





Purposeful (Murray and Tripsas, 2004), systematic (McDonald and Eisenhardt, 2019; Hampel, 
Perkmann and Phillips, 2020), or scientific (Camuffo et al., 2020) experimentation involves 
hypothesis formulation and rigorous testing in a manner that enables the firm to postpone 
major commitment until certain key assumptions have been verified. 
Table 1: Characteristics of learning mechanisms 
Beyond experimentation on the venture level, established organizations that can afford 
several simultaneous experiments can also apply an experimental approach to its portfolio of 
projects. This approach has been explored in the entrepreneurial finance literature where 
investors have been observed to engage in parallel “experiments of manageable financial 
sizes” (p. 33) to reduce uncertainty before making big investments on a few selected ventures 
with high potential (Kerr, Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2014). This approach of parallel probing 
has also been found to be favorable for corporations investing in various entrepreneurial 
initiatives (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). Studies considering experimentation from a portfolio 
perspective mostly concerns the flexibility associated with a real options approach, which allow 
the investor to evaluate businesses in domains characterized by great uncertainty. 


























the act of pursuing a 
certain objective. 
Nature of knowledge 
acquisition 
Systematic 













Locus of knowledge 
prior to learning 
Knowledge must be 
generated. 
Knowledge must be 
generated. 
Knowledge must be 
generated. 
Relation to current 
core competencies 
and knowledge 
Can be unrelated to 
the expertise of the 
learner. 
Deep understanding 
of cause and effect. 
Not necessarily 
deep understanding 





Venture level learning through experimentation does however offer an additional source of 
flexibility. The knowledge acquired from each experiment may enable insights that can be 
used to ‘pivot’ in a new direction (see section 2.2.2. The lean startup approach). Such insights 
build on knowledge accumulation, which is another important aspect of experiential learning 
as it improves the ability to focus search efforts (West and Iansiti, 2003). 
2.3.3 Learning mechanisms based on second-hand experiences 
Table 2: Characteristics of learning mechanisms (continued) 
Acquisitive learning (learning from others’ experiences) 
Learning 
mechanism 
Vicarious learning Grafting 





generated by others. 
Experiences 
generated by others. 
Experiences 
generated by others. 












practices to fit in the 
current context. 
Could be done with 
the help of the group 
that practices are 










are hired or acquired 
respectively. 
Locus of knowledge 
prior to learning 
Knowledge is stored 
in other 
organizations (in the 
case of imitation) or 
groups within the 
same organization. 
Knowledge is stored 
in other 
organizations (in the 
case of imitation) or 





experientially in the 
process of 
adaptation. 
Knowledge is stored 
in the minds of 




Relation to current 
core competencies 
and knowledge 
Unrelated to the 
expertise of the 
learner. 
Unrelated to the 
expertise of the 
learner. 
Unrelated to the 
expertise of the 
learner. 
Besides learning from one’s own experiences, pre-existing knowledge can be acquired in 





acquire pre-existing knowledge from outside of the organization: knowledge grafting and 
vicarious learning.  
Knowledge grafting refers to acquiring new knowledge and competencies by introducing new 
organizational members with distinct expertise (Huber, 1991; Nag, Corley and Gioia, 2007; 
De Clercq et al., 2012). This can be done in large scale through acquisition of a firm or in 
smaller scale by hiring certain experts. A benefit of this approach is that it is a faster way of 
acquiring knowledge than through experience and can potentially offer more complete set of 
knowledge than imitation (Huber, 1991). However, as demonstrated by Nag, Corley and Gioia 
(2007) it is not always an easy process. Studying an attempt to graft on business knowledge 
to an engineering-oriented firm in order to switch from technology-push to a market-pull 
innovation focus, they find that new organizational knowledge may be rejected by the 
organization due to knowledge inertia that arise from the organizational identity. Hence, 
organizational learning of certain pre-existing knowledge sources may require adaptations of 
the organizational identity. 
Vicarious learning signifies learning that occurs through observing and making meaning from 
another’s experience (Myers, 2018). Early empirical work portray it as an act of finding and 
copying practices (Haunschild and Miner, 1997; Baum, Li and Usher, 2000). Levitt and March 
(1988) refers to this “diffusion” of experience and routines as a process of transferring 
“encoded experience in the form of technologies, codes, procedures, or similar routines” (p. 
329). This can be done for various reasons. Organizations may copy practices that are seen 
as highly legitimate because they have been adapted by many other organizations or they 
have been adapted by organizations that are perceived as highly successful, or because the 
practice itself is associated with a desirable performance outcome (Haunschild and Miner, 
1997). It has been noted that organizations may decide to imitate practices based on highly 
biased grounds as organizations that can be observed at any given time are the survivors of 






Apart from imitating other organizations, vicarious learning can also be used to replicate 
successful routines and practices within an organization. Winter and Szulanski (2001) suggest 
replication as a strategy, highlighting successful examples such as the McDonald’s franchise 
model and Intel’s approach of exactly copying their semi-conductor plants.  
Subsequent studies have found vicarious learning to entail more than just identifying and 
copying practices (Bresman, 2013; Myers, 2018), highlighting the role of adaptation as an 
alternative to precise replication (Williams, 2007). Bresman (2013) claim that it is rare for a 
group to find a routine developed by another group that can be copied exactly, as they most 
likely already have routines that work satisfactory and which would be expensive to replace 
completely, and as the context of the two groups probably differ, making it unrealistic to copy 
routines in their entirety. Instead, he finds that a group engaging in vicarious learning first 
identify a group with prior experience that is related to what they are trying to achieve and then 
uncovers relevant routines. They then translate the knowledge gained from studying the role 
model’s routines to suit within their own context and changes current routines in a way that 
embeds the knowledge they have gained through vicarious learning. This process may take 
the form of a one-way observation of a non-participant model through observation or via 
documents and recordings that simply enables superficial examination of artefacts resulting 
from a prior actor’s performance, which require the learner to understand the intention behind 
the model’s actions in order to emulate the vital elements and filter out the noise (Myers, 2018). 
Winter et al. (2012) however, express a note of warning, as their study of replication efforts 
finds that adapting a working formula to fit local circumstances may risk losing vital but poorly 
understood features of the original design. This is why copying a template precisely may be 
beneficial in situations of causal ambiguity where it is difficult to discern the consequences 
and interdependencies of various elements of a routine or a practice (Williams, 2007). On the 
other hand, adaptation may be crucial in order to integrate the new practice or routine with the 





An alternative remedy might be if the “model”, the individual or group that is being emulated, 
takes a more active role in the learning process (Myers, 2018). Myers (2018) conceptualize a 
“coactive” vicarious learning process as an alternative to “independent vicarious learning” (i.e. 
arm’s length observation and replication) (p. 614). In coactive vicarious learning the model 
engages as a cocreator in the learning process by reflecting on experiences and developing 
mutual understandings together with the learner. Therefore the relational context, such as the 
familiarity, quality of the relationship and history of prior interactions play an important role in 
the learning process (Myers, 2018). The strong focus on joint experiences and interpretations 
in this form of transactional learning blurs the boundaries between learning from first-hand and 
second-hand experiences. 
2.4. Learning how to learn through experimentation  
Many organizations today are facing increasing uncertainty that renders their current learning 
processes insufficient. In this context the current study aims to answer the following research 
question: How do large established firms learn how to experiment in order to develop new 
businesses? 
The following section recap some of the reviewed literatures on learning in the context of 
corporate entrepreneurship to motivate the importance of this question. It also discusses the 
current knowledge about incumbents’ approaches to learning as a response to discontinuous 
technological change. 
The reviewed literature alludes to the central role of organizational learning in all forms of 
entrepreneurial activity. From the highly concrete interlinkage between learning, knowledge, 
decision making and execution under high levels of uncertainty, which affects venture 
performance (Holcomb et al., 2009), to the more abstract notion of firm-level capability 
development through entrepreneurial learning, which affects organizational survival during 
times of rapid change (Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner, 1999). In recent years, practitioners have 





learning, which is evident by the popularity of the lean startup approach and the proliferation 
of accelerators. Corporations are trying to emulate these approaches to become increasingly 
adept and agile as their industries are presented with challenges tied to increasing levels of 
uncertainty due to convergence of technologies and erosion of industry boundaries (Shankar 
and Shepherd, 2019; Hampel, Perkmann and Phillips, 2020). 
Disruptive technologies, in particular emerging digital technologies, pose a major learning 
challenge to incumbent firms for several reasons. Firstly, feedback from their current 
customers may not lead them to invest in these technologies in a timely fashion, but rather 
ignore them until it is too late (Bower and Christensen, 1995). This is because they offer 
features and assets that are not yet valued by the mainstream market and do not, at least 
initially, compete with existing technologies on the features that are currently valued (Adner, 
2002). Digital disruptive innovations can also alter the business ecosystem of systemic 
industries in unpredictable ways, thus requiring firms to reassess established ways of doing 
business and interact with other market actors (Kumaraswamy, Garud and Ansari, 2018). 
Furthermore, these new technologies may be competence-destroying, thus erasing the 
value of current competencies of the incumbent firm (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). 
Addressing this issue, several empirical studies on incumbents responses to digital 
disruption have emphasized the importance of experimentation as a way to seize emerging 
opportunities enabled by new technology (Cozzolino, Verona and Rothaermel, 2018) and 
assess diverging interpretations of ambiguous market signals (Khanagha et al., 2018). Even 
when the importance of disruptive technologies is being recognized incumbents have been 
found to struggle with ambiguity regarding how the new technologies will impact the market 
and in what pace the new technologies may be adopted (Khanagha et al., 2018). This is an 
organizational dilemma as it requires a combination of flexibility and experimentation that 
stands in contrast to the efficient and rigid learning mechanisms, focused on incremental 





Yet, established firms can, despite their legacy of experiences, escape the ‘competency trap’ 
(Levitt and March, 1988), which threatens to lead them down paths of exclusive local search, 
and instead create path-breaking innovation (Perra, Sidhu and Volberda, 2017). A rising 
number of studies have attempted to shed light on how this can be achieved and do provide 
indications of the drivers, benefits and challenges of experimentation by incumbents. 
For instance, in their study on responses to technological disruption in heterogeneous 
market environments, Khanagha et al. (2018) find that incumbents are required to adapt a 
complex innovation process, which accommodate different approaches to experimentation. 
They argue that this is required in order to enable flexible innovation strategy, encompassing 
both focused experimentation with key customers and more diverse experimentation; 
experimentation with radical offerings and with offerings closer to the current portfolio; as 
well as exploration of paths towards new ecosystems and paths that support current 
ecosystems. In summary, they emphasize the importance of balance between exploration 
and careful maintenance of technologies, resources, business models and ecosystem 
configurations. In a similar vein, a number of studies suggest that experimentation with 
hybrid offerings that incorporate new and existing technologies let firms simultaneously fine-
tune and evolve existing technologies, acquire and develop new ones and integrate these 
into new offerings (Bergek et al., 2013). Investments in experimentation with these offerings 
can be seen as real-options (McGrath, 1999), as they provide an entry to go after 
opportunities created by the new technologies, when and if the market takes off, and still 
maintains the competitive advantage in current technologies, thus allowing for assessment 
of different competing avenues and the correct timing of transformation efforts (Cohen and 
Tripsas, 2018).  
It remains unclear whether the approach towards experimentation and the organizational 
setting that accommodate such endeavors vary over time. While some findings indicate that 
experimentation play a greater role in the early stages of a new technology’s establishment 





Rothaermel, 2018), other studies have argued that it plays a greater role in the later stages 
when components and architectures are conceivable (Furr and Snow, 2015), whereas some 
advocate the need for constant balance between contradictory approaches which involve a 
combination of collaborations and experiments of various kinds (Khanagha et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, it is unclear how the approach to facilitate experimentation, such as the 
organization architecture within which such endeavors are pursued, is shaped by 
organizational learning as experiences of experimentation is accumulated. 
The literature on corporate entrepreneurship stress the importance of organizational design 
as a fundamental element to unleash entrepreneurship and coordinate efforts in a way that 
fully take advantage of entrepreneurial activity to enable strategic renewal, growth and 
performance benefits for the firm as a whole (Marvel et al., 2007; Burgers et al., 2009; Ireland, 
Covin and Kuratko, 2009; Monsen, Patzelt and Saxton, 2010; Burgers and Covin, 2016). Yet, 
established organizations are often designed with a propensity towards efficiency (Eisenhardt, 
Furr and Bingham, 2010). As even their innovation activities (i.e. R&D) are managed in a way 
that efficiently serve their current customer base and industry by producing incremental 
improvements through the exploitation of existing capabilities, they do not provide a sufficient 
basis for new learning and adaptation to a rapidly changing environment (O’reilly and Binns, 
2019). As a response, corporations often develop CV units to enable a new form of innovation 
processes that help the firm learn and develop new capabilities that allows them to transform 
and adapt to the changing environment (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2014). These are ideally 
sufficiently autonomous to adopt other practices more suitable for entrepreneurship. 
However, such CV units are in general short lived due to several potential factors, such as 
shift of strategic priorities, which makes the CV unit obsolete (Fast, 1979), (e.g. shift of focus 
in favor of efficiency and low risk), erosion of the political position of the CV unit (Fast, 1979), 
exploration focus being too unrelated to corporate strengths for the firm to take advantage of 
the outcome or too close to the current core capabilities to create a new source of value (Hill 





yield on their investments, the corporate cycle of change is shorter (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2014), 
which is another factor that may explain the high rate of premature closure of CV units (Fast, 
1979; Burgelman and Välikangas, 2005; Hill and Birkinshaw, 2014).  
Yet, CV units tend to appear anew in a cyclical fashion often without being informed by 
potentially important learning from its predecessor (Chesbrough, 2000; Burgelman and 
Välikangas, 2005). Hence, potentially valuable experience-based knowledge is lost, and the 
organization need to rely on other sources as they develop the CV unit. 
Furthermore, while corporations often adopt practices from other contexts, in particular the 
entrepreneurial context (e.g. VC-practices, incubator practices, accelerator-practices, etc.) 
there are no clear blueprints of how to design a CV unit, which instead tend to vary significantly 
between companies as they are designed to fit in their respective corporate context (Fast, 
1979). 
Interestingly, this results in a situation where CV units to a considerable extent exist in a state 
of development that is highly dependent on organizational learning. Indeed, studies have 
noted that there is a high level of experimentation associated with choosing objectives and 
organizational profiles, and that corporations tend to adopt entrepreneurial practices (e.g. VC-
practices) in somewhat inappropriate ways (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008). This indicate that the 
development process may also be associated with organizational learning challenges.  
Yet, while some studies have adopted a dynamic perspective to understand the inner workings 
of CV units, depicting their operations over an extended period of time (Burgelman, 1985; 
Masucci, Brusoni and Cennamo, 2020), the processes by which the capabilities to manage 
such operations are developed remain obscure. In studies adopting a dynamic perspective, 
focus has revolved around the ventures, whereas the CV unit itself has been seen as a stable 
entity (e.g. Burgelman, 1985). Empirical studies that have set the scope on the CV unit have 
instead adopted a static perspective, considering various features of the model, but at a fixed 





gain insight about how the organization can learn new practices and routines to enable 
systematic learning through venturing a dynamic perspective with focus on the unit level is 
required. 
The literature on independent incubators and accelerators is informative in the sense that it 
highlights how such organizational forms can support venture level learning (Cohen, 2013; 
Cohen, Bingham and Hallen, 2018; Cohen et al., 2019; Hallen, Cohen and Bingham, 2020). 
This stream of literature has however also either applied a dynamic perspective, focusing on 
the venturing process (e.g. Dutt et al., 2016; Cohen, Bingham and Hallen, 2018), or a static 
perspective considering the variations in the organizational design elements (e.g. Bergek and 
Norrman, 2008; Cohen et al., 2019). The in-depth study of H-farm (Tracey, Dalpiaz and 
Phillips, 2018), which I have discussed above, is a notable exception. Its focus on the 
legitimization process associated with translating the incubator model to another misaligned 
institutional context would indeed be a warranted angle from which to study the adoption of 
such practices in a corporate context.  
Yet, this study adopts organizational learning as the theoretical lens. The reason for this is 
that it seems as though the challenges associated with the translation of entrepreneurial 
practices originated in a different context to the corporate context goes beyond institutional 
barriers or lack of legitimacy. The anecdotal evidence of misuse of the lean startup approach 
by digital startups (Ghezzi, 2019) and inappropriate use of VC-practices by CV units (Hill and 
Birkinshaw, 2008) suggest that there are challenges related to learning how to properly use 
these approaches even though they are seen as highly legitimate. Given that strict replication 
of a proven model is not an alternative due to the context-dependent nature of various 
innovation systems (Williams, 2007), the process of adopting practices from incubators and 
accelerators for supporting experimental entrepreneurial learning most likely depend on the 
use of a repertoire of learning mechanisms including vicarious and experiential forms of 
learning. This makes the adoption of entrepreneurial practices by CV units a highly conducive 





innovation practices as a way to respond to digital disruptions. While previous empirical 
studies on organizational learning mostly have focused on a single type of learning 
mechanism, a broader perspective that enable the study of interrelations between various 
forms of learning can provide a more complete depiction of the actions and challenges 
associated with the adoption of a fundamentally new way of driving innovation.  
To be able to provide substantial recommendations to practitioners we need to better 
understand the process and mechanisms by which firms adopt and develop new practices to 
support learning through experimentation and make this an integral part of the organization’s 
capabilities. 
The learning needed to fully take advantage of an experimentation-driven approach to 
corporate venturing goes beyond individual level learning. It also involves development of 
structures, processes and relationships that enable the diffusion of venture-level learning 
across the corporation and that increase the potential of leveraging corporate capabilities in 
the venturing process (Hill and Birkinshaw, 2008). While some capabilities might be acquired 
through vicarious learning, adaptations to the corporate context most likely hinge on 
experiential learning as well (Myers, 2018). 
Referring back to the Venn diagram (Figure 1. Overview of the reviewed literature), this 
chapter links some crucial literature streams in order to support and motivate the research 
question. The link between organizational learning and CE concerns venture level learning, 
which, as have been demonstrated, is a prerequisite for successful corporate venturing and a 
fundamental enabler for navigating in a highly dynamic environment characterized by high 
levels of uncertainty. Furthermore, CE is manifested in this chapter as a process by which 
autonomous activities may enable experimental learning that can be utilized for informed 
strategic repositioning of the firm. 
The link between organizational learning and entrepreneurial incubators and accelerators 





an entrepreneurial context. The link between CE and entrepreneurial incubators and 
accelerators concerns the phenomenon of corporations emulating these practices, a 
phenomenon, which is clearly motivated given the established link between experimental 
learning and CE. Finally, the intersection between all of these three literatures concern the 
central point of this thesis, which is the underlying learning mechanisms that enable an 
organization to develop capabilities to learn through experimentation. Hence, these literatures 







Chapter 3. Methodology 
The field of strategy and management operates under a great variety of paradigms (Wilson, 
Tranfield and Starkey, 1998). Therefore, this chapter begins by justifying the methodological 
choices based on the ontological and epistemological stance that have been adopted before 
accounting for the data collection and analysis. 
3.1. Ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the research design 
Field-based research have been used in prior studies to illuminate key mechanisms of  
corporate entrepreneurship (e.g. Burgelman, 1983b), intermediary organizations (e.g. Giudici, 
Reinmoeller and Ravasi, 2018) and organizational learning (e.g. Bresman, 2013). The current 
study uses a qualitative in-depth single case design with a processual focus. Qualitative 
research has been characterized as an interpretive and naturalistic multimethod approach that 
often study phenomena in the environment in which they naturally occur (Gephart, 2004). In 
this vein, the in-depth case study focus on a particular occurrence of the phenomenon of 
interest and offers a holistic way to study how and why it comes about in its natural context 
(Dubois and Gadde, 2002; Yin, 2003).  
By adopting a processual focus, this study is concerned with how things evolve over time and 
why they evolve in this way (Van de Ven and Huber, 1990). More concretely, the aim is set on 
developing insights about how an organization learn a new way to acquire knowledge, reduce 
uncertainty and make strategic decisions revolving innovation – namely by learning through 
experimentation. This infers that the objective also is to provide a rationale for why they learn 
it in such a way, since only accounting for the steps would not be sufficient for developing a 
meaningful theory. 
This focus differs from many studies concerned with organizational change that fixate on 
antecedents and consequences related to events of change. Mohr (1982) differentiate these 
two approaches as being driven by ‘variance theory’ or ‘process theory’. Essentially, variance 





relationships between independent and dependent variables to establish causality (Mohr, 
1982; Van de Ven and Huber, 1990; Langley, 1999). Process theory, on the other hand, offers 
ways of explaining an observed sequence of events by considering unobservable underlying 
generative mechanisms (Tsoukas, 1989; Van de Ven and Huber, 1990; Pentland, 1999; 
Gehman et al., 2018). In contrast to variance theorizing that utilizes deduction to make 
conclusions, this line of process theorizing requires an abductive approach. By connecting 
empirical observations and surprising occurrences to extant theoretical ideas, novel 
conceptual insights are generated that, due to the deep contextual understanding, may be 
applied to other settings (Langley et al., 2013). Hence, this approach uses rich details of 
particular stories in its aims for contingently transferable insights about underlying 
mechanisms rather than generalizable knowledge of cause and effect relationships (Lincoln 
and Guba, 1985). Since the aim of this study was to answer an underexplored and complex 
question this abductive line of inquiry was deemed suitable. Therefore, an important objective 
was to secure rich naturalistic empirical accounts of the process of interest. 
The single case study is an effective tool to generate such rich and contextual descriptions, 
which can give rise to insights about deep social dynamic structures (Dyer and Wikins, 1991). 
In this way the in-depth single case study design rely on a different justification than the 
multiple case study design, advocated by Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007), which often sets out to control variation in order to find generalizable insights 
and testable propositions (Welch et al., 2011). While variance theorizing usually operates 
under the paradigm of positivism, the search for unobservable underlying mechanisms relates 
to the stratified ontology of the critical realist paradigm, heavily influenced by the English 
philosopher Roy Bhaskar (Collier, 1994; Bhaskar, 2009, 2010, 2013, 2014). 
When studying organizational processes, another fundamental ontological issue regards 
whether organizations are seen as entities or processes (Van De Ven and Poole, 2005). This 
distinction, that dates back to ancient Greece philosophies of Democritus (substantive 





processual ontology (Rescher, 1996; Van De Ven and Poole, 2005; Thompson, 2011; Langley 
et al., 2013). This study is guided by a processual ontology which infer that even seemingly 
stable states are viewed as processes. As illustrated by the words of Heraclitus: “The river is 
not an object but an ever-changing flow; the sun is not a thing, but a flaming fire” (Rescher, 
1996, p. 10; in Langley et al., 2013, p. 5). As I study the change from a traditional R&D based 
innovation strategy to an experimentation-based innovation strategy, these innovation 
processes are not seen as stable entities that are being internalized and discarded but as 
reoccurring processes supported by organizational routines. Hence the analysis focus on 
processes on two distinct levels: 1) The reoccurring innovation and learning processes 
intended to develop new knowledge that can be exploited for financial gains; and 2) the 
processes that aim at changing or maintaining the former processes. This latter form of meta 
processes can be compared with the concept of meta routines (Lewin, Massini and Peeters, 
2011), although the concept of process is a wider definition that does not necessitate regular 
reoccurrence.  
3.2. Justification of research setting 
While the research setting is portrayed in greater detail in the next chapter (Chapter 4: 
Research setting), it is worthwhile to first briefly motivate the appropriateness of the selected 
case company. The study investigates Telco, a large multinational corporation in the 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) industry, which has a heritage of 
developing innovative high technology products for more than 140 years. The industry as such 
is seeing an unprecedented pace of digitization and while the market has seen a period of 
slow decline during the last few years, moderate or massive digital disruption is anticipated in 
the near future (Caylar and Ménard, 2016). This highly dynamic and uncertain environment 
put tremendous demand on the capacity for rapid learning. The investigated company was 
highly regarded in terms of its technological leadership but had recently realized that 
technology innovation was not enough and that the ability and means to experiment was 





opportunity. The company had already set in motion an initiative to experiment with new 
technology and business, which due to its open approach to innovation was publicly known. 
The explicit ambition to create an environment for experimentation and radical innovation and 
the initial progress that had been made prior to the study, which indicated commitment to this 
intent, made it a particularly interesting case. Furthermore, due to the arrangements between 
University of Leeds and Telco, there was a unique opportunity to collect rich data from within 
the company during an 18-month secondment. 
3.3. Data collection 
In April and May of 2016, I was able to familiarize myself with the company and the challenges 
it was facing due to the digital transformation of the industry as I was conducting research for 
my MSc thesis. I spent over three months at the company headquarters and conducted 
several interviews which, while being focused on an adjacent topic, offered very useful data 
regarding the struggles related to innovation management in the organization more broadly. 
These insights served as a basis for understanding the drivers and wider context of the 
phenomenon under investigation and was what woke my interest for it in the first place. In 
September of 2017, I was seconded to the company’s headquarters for 18 months and 
initiated more focused data collection. For the first three months I searched for information 
about various innovation initiatives and was eventually able to immerse myself within Telco 
Garage by the middle of December. This opportunity led me to decide to narrow my scope 
and anchor my research in Telco Garage, allowing me to sharpen the research question. 
During the following six months I was able to observe the daily activities of Telco Garage from 
within, have informal conversations as well as interviews with various members of the 
organization, and collect internal documents. In May 2018 an unexpected reorganization 
occurred and Telco ONE was created shortly thereafter by combining parts of Telco Garage 
with various other innovation initiatives. My studies took an unexpected but interesting turn 
and I kept collecting data through additional interviews, observations and collection of new 





This data was complemented with archival data (e.g. meeting protocols and documentation of 
strategy, operational procedures, etc.) covering a period that stretched back until 2013, when 
the launch of Telco Garage was first contemplated. People involved during these early years 
were traced through ‘snowball sampling’ (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), and interviewed as well. 
After a five-month period of staying in the UK, between end of March and end of August of 
2019, I returned to spend another seven months at the company, ending in March 2020. 
My level of access within the company was comparable to a regular employee, which gave 
me ample opportunity to collect rich data. This study therefore benefits from a wide variety of 
data such as interviews, observations and secondary data, including classified internal 
documents. Below follows a table of the data and its use in the analysis. A more detailed 
description of the interviews can be found in Appendix A: List of interviews. 
3.3.1. Interviews 
Interviews were conducted continuously. A strength of interviews is that they can provide 
depth and subtlety and give meaning to events and actions (Pettigrew, 1990). The 
interviewees provided their personal reflections on the current situation, future prospects and 
the past events leading up to the present. Given the processual focus of this study, questions 
revolved around events and actions, sequences and interrelationships of such, and the 
rationale behind them. 
The interviewees can roughly be divided into four groups, although there was some overlap. 
The first category consists of people that were not directly involved in the initiatives of interest 
(i.e. Telco Garage or Telco ONE) but who had insights about various aspects of the company 
in general, its ways of working and the implications of recent changes in the business 
environment. These informants helped creating contextual awareness and a deeper 
understanding of possible antecedents to the studied phenomenon.  
The second category include people who were centrally involved in the undertakings under 





Table 3: Summary of data sources and their use in the analysis. 
Data sources Type of data Use in analysis 
Interviews 
(122 interviews, 
4847 minutes of 
recordings and 
1227 pages of 
transcriptions) 
Unrelated to Garage/ONE 
33 interviews with Telco employees working with core 
business and with the new businesses around IoT 
Afforded an initial background understanding of the challenges and 
new requirements on innovation process in general due to digital 
transformation as well as the uncertainty the company was facing. 
Central in Garage/ONE 
28 interviews with informants central to the development and 
operations of Telco Garage and Telco ONE 
 
Provided subjective narratives from multiple perspectives about the 
origins, evolution, and outcomes of Telco Garage and Telco ONE. 
These interviews gave meaning to the events and highlighted 
challenges and considerations underlying critical decisions. 
Extended network of Garage/ONE 
41 interviews with local garage leaders and drivers of related 
local innovation initiatives targeting early phases of the 
innovation process. 
 
Provided understanding of the width of dispersed innovation initiatives 
across the company, the interrelationship between Garages, and how 
the innovation process was organized and managed. This included, 
for instance, concerns such as ideation and idea selection processes, 
coaching and support, tracking of KPIs, and associated challenges. 
Venture team members 
20 interviews with project-level informants, including the CEOs 
of three incubated startups, and key members of five internal 
early ventures. 
 
Deepened the understanding of the innovation process and getting 
underneath the “ideal” conceptualization of it. This included a deeper 
understanding of the strategic concerns, business model innovation 
process, organizational interdependencies, external collaborations 
and interactions, as well as experiences of the support provided. 
Observations 




6 months of observations from within Telco Garage (15 Dec 
2017 – 20 Jun 2018); 8 months of observation of the planning, 
development and execution of a startup accelerator program 
(1 Feb 2018-23 Oct 2018) 
Offered highly detailed insights about the day to day activities of 
central Telco Garage, their initiatives to expand their operations to 
engage more closely with the startup community and efforts to 
systematize and create greater oversight and accountability within the 
organization. 
Telco ONE: Early development and follow-up 
9 months observations of the development of Telco ONE (20 
Jun 2018 – 25 Mar 2019); 5 months follow-up observation of 
the new established organization (1 Sep 2019 – 8 Mar 2020) 
Provided a first-hand account of the turbulent transition from Telco 
Garage to Telco ONE and real time observations of the successive 
development of the new unit and its interactions with the rest of the 
organization.   
Visits to affiliated Garages and Hubs Gave a greater understanding of the peripheral innovation activities. 
Archives Internal documentation 
Including, strategy documentation from 2013 to 2020, Monthly 
reports from Telco Garage, repositories for shared  
Granted insights about strategies, intentions and past events and the 
successive development of the studied initiatives. 
External documentation 
Including, magazine articles and Telco yearly reports 
Enabled triangulation of recollections of past events in order to 





These informants could provide their accounts and sense making of events that had occurred 
and reflect upon the current situation. These testimonies complemented and enriched 
accounts of archival data and my own observations of the same events. 
The third category were people who had not driven the development of the central initiatives 
but were highly active contributors in the periphery of the organization, with loose ties to the 
central organization. This included affiliated Telco Garage leaders, Telco ONE Ambassadors 
and other innovation managers that were involved in these networks, contributing in various 
ways to enable dispersed experimentation across the company. Since, I had limited possibility 
to be present and do observations at these dispersed locations, I relied on these informants 
in order to gain insights of the activities taking place at their locations. Oftentimes, I received 
not only verbal accounts but also different instances of “hard data” (Eisenhardt, 1989), such 
as various forms of documentation. 
Finally, the fourth category consisted of venture team members who were affected by the 
organizational structures and processes put in place. Based on their input, I was able to 
contrast concrete experiences of experimentation within the emerging organizational 
framework intended to support such endeavors with the abstracted “ideal” view of how 
venturing within this framework was thought to transpire. The broad sampling of interviewees 
with different backgrounds, perspectives and ties to the processes of interest helped avoid a 
naïve reliance on data as a mirror of reality (Alvesson, 2003). 
Interviews were generally tape recorded, unless the informant felt uncomfortable being 
recorded, and transcribed verbatim. Transcriptions were anonymized and stored in the 
qualitative analysis software tool, NVivo, which was also used for coding. A downside with 
interviews is that the factual detail and accuracy tend to be low (Pettigrew, 1990). Hence, the 






In process studies the value of real-time observation as a way to capture ongoing processes, 
cannot be overstated. Participant observation as a research tool in organizational studies is 
typically used to capture patterns relating to how people together get things done through 
observable and repeated actions and interactions (Maanen, 1979). It allows for identification 
of the discrepancy between what people say they do and what they actually do (Pettigrew, 
1990). Observations were recorded through memo writing, in which reports of what had been 
observed was combined with reflections upon those events. These diary-like notes were kept 
in NVivo for further analysis. 
The first period of observation can be characterized as a phase of stability and concerned the 
daily activities of Telco Garage. From December of 2017 until May 2018, I was sitting in the 
Garage facilities at the headquarter together with the Telco Garage core team. I participated 
in their weekly Monday meetings, where the plans for the week and reports of relevant matters 
were shared with the team. I also took active part in two important tasks during this period. 
Firstly, starting in December I was involved in the work to map existing activities in the network 
of affiliated Garages, including activities to spur ideation and engagement in corporate 
entrepreneurship activities, ongoing experimental projects, and routines for managing and 
tracking progress. The objective was to increase the transparency of ongoing activities, 
develop KPIs and enable ways of learning and sharing best practices across the Garages. 
Secondly, I was involved in the planning of an acceleration program targeting external 
startups. This work included planning and execution of the intake processes aimed at selecting 
a cohort of startups by leveraging a dispersed panel of internal judges who also volunteered 
to support the selected startups, and the articulation of the program itself. 
The second period of observation, from June of 2018 to March of 2019, can be characterized 
as a discontinuous phase, in which the central Telco Garage team was dissolved and Telco 





momentum created by Telco Garage, introducing new practices and tools and creating a new 
organization. 
While, close contact was maintained during my stay in the UK, on-site observations were 
resumed in August of 2019 until March of 2020. During this last phase, Telco ONE had been 
established, allowing for observations of their ongoing activities. 
3.3.3. Secondary data 
In addition to real-time observation, time stamped archival data is a powerful component for 
developing an accurate depiction of how events unfold over time (Gehman et al., 2018). The 
archival data in this study include publicly accessible documents, such as yearly reports, news 
articles and LinkedIn profiles, but more importantly internal documents. The access to the 
corporate intranet and the status as an employee made it possible to collect a wide variety of 
archival documents from different repositories. This data included unit-level monthly and 
quarterly reports; strategy descriptions and recorded presentations; organizational 
announcements, various information about organizations and programs, including codified 
processes, practices and routines; artifacts, templates and tools designed to facilitate various 
elements of the innovation process; and other internal and external communication. Also, 
project-level data was accessed, such as projects descriptions and presentations, and working 
documents covering the business model and pricing, marketing and communication material, 
contractual documents, and market research. The document formats ranged from Word-
documents, PDFs, PowerPoints, and Excel spreadsheets, to pictures, videos, organizational 
charts, and internal websites. Internal documents are typically time stamped which enabled 
creating a detailed timeline of events. In this regard, the monthly reports played a significant 
role in covering the development of Telco Garage prior to the commencing of the study. 
Strategy documentation and various artefacts also helped verify retrospective accounts of 






3.4. Data analysis 
An abductive analytical approach was adopted inspired by previous processual work and 
guidance (e.g. Langley, 1999; Pentland, 1999; Langley et al., 2013; Giudici, Reinmoeller and 
Ravasi, 2018). However, as in the case of previous studies the analytical process started out 
inductively before switching to abductive reasoning in order to first process the data with an 
open mind and reduce preconceptions (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013). This was done by 
enforcing a semi-ignorance of the literature, by not studying it carefully from the outset (Gioia, 
Corley and Hamilton, 2013).   
Data analysis was done through a combination of techniques suitable for process research, 
including a grounded theorizing (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013), 
narrative strategy (Pettigrew, 1990; Pentland, 1999), visual mapping and temporal bracketing 
(Langley, 1999). This purposeful use of a diversity of analytical strategies reduce the risk of 
blind spots of any singe strategy (Langley, 1999; Gehman et al., 2018). Furthermore, the 
analysis process focused on temporal relations among events in order to develop a process 
theory.  
The secondment to the studied company allowed for great flexibility in terms of the ability to 
gather more data to make up for knowledge gaps identified during the analysis as theoretical 
concepts emerged. While data analysis was done iteratively in accordance with abductive 
reasoning the steps of the analysis are presented below in a sequential manner that captures 
the logic of the process.  
3.4.1. Step 1: Event analysis and open coding 
To make sense of the rich and multifaceted data a narrative strategy (Langley, 1999) was first 
used to create a general understanding of the history of events and their relations. Narratives 
is a helpful tool when creating theoretical constructs in the domain of process theory as it 
contains the required indicators in the same way a survey contains indicators for the 





drawing jointly on observations, interviews and archival data a comprehensive storyline was 
crafted (see Figure 2: Timeline of events). This enabled reflections about the sequence, flow 
and interlinkages of observed events (Langley, 1999). The variety of data sources enabled 
triangulation, by using various data points as cross checks (Pettigrew, 1990). Also, open 
coding was used in order to create a basis for subsequent construct development. These first-
order codes were all tied to certain events or actions and were expressed through verbs and 
nouns, which is characteristic for processual studies (Thompson, 2011). The qualitative data 
analysis software tool, NVivo, was used for this purpose as well as for simply keeping data in 
a manageable repository.  
During this step prior theoretical concepts were suspended, and focus were instead on 
developing an accurate account of the observed events as experienced by the researcher and 
the informants. This form of “willing suspension of belief” reduces the risk of confirmation bias 
(Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013). Given the iterative process of data  collection, analysis 
and theorizing, an increasing level of ‘theory-ladenness’ (Kuhn, 2012) is inevitable. However, 
a balance between knowing and not knowing have been suggested conducive of insightful 
discovery (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013). 
While written narrative lead to thick contextual descriptions, visual techniques offer a way to 
more easily show precedence of parallel processes and represent multiple dimensions 
(Langley, 1999). Hence, a timeline of key events was drawn up (see Figure 2: Timeline of 
events). This was combined with a temporal bracketing strategy, in order to distinguish 
between crucial phases of continuity separated by discontinuous events (Langley, 1999). The 












3.4.2. Step 2: Axial coding and data structure 
The second step was more influenced by prior research. First-order codes were combined to 
form second-order themes, that in turn were combined to form aggregate dimensions (Gioia, 
Corley and Hamilton, 2013), thus successively progressing towards a theory-driven 
explanation of the phenomenon (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). At this stage I had to distance 
myself from the data. Extant theoretical concepts from learning theory offered a creative 
framework and a lens to facilitate more abstract interpretations of the observed events, thus 
switching from purely inductive reasoning to abductive reasoning (Alvesson and Kärreman, 
2007; Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013).  













Figure 5: Data structure (continued) 
The narrative and timeline were crucial enablers of this step as they allowed for a holistic 
and processual view that helped draw links between lower-level codes, thus structuring them 
into higher-level constructs. The coding process utilized a typical data structure framework to 
systematically assess consistency and empirical support of the emerging categories (Gioia, 
Corley and Hamilton, 2013). The resulting aggregate themes corresponded to essential 
learning mechanisms observed in the study. The data structure is shown above in Figure 3, 





3.4.3. Step 3: Sequencing of emerging dimensions and development of a temporal model 
While a data structure provides a visual representation of the analytic steps and rigorous 
grounding of introduced theoretical concepts (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2013), it does not 
promote an intuitive understanding of the sequences, flow, and interrelations between those 
concepts. To reconcile this issue, I again turned to a visual mapping strategy combined with 
temporal bracketing, this time informed by the emerging theoretical processual macro-level 
concepts and not merely observed events (Langley, 1999). At this stage theorizing was guided 
not only by extant concepts but also expectations and assumptions based on prior research 
in order to identify surprising observations (Welch et al., 2011; Piekkari and Welch, 2018). 
When being deeply emerged in the data, observations typically make sense or are taken for 
granted but by consulting the literature it is easier to identify discrepancies between what 
would be expected based on current theory and unexplicit assumptions. This step arrived at 
a process model explaining how an established firm may learn how to experiment in order to 
develop new businesses. This contextualized explanation enabled the identification and 
articulation of causal links between different learning mechanisms and organizational 
outcomes and learning outcomes as well as the interaction between different parallel and 
sequential learning mechanisms. The final model is presented in the discussion chapter. 
3.5. Ethical considerations 
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considerations, including the approval for using the data collected at the case company for 
this thesis and further publications, were addressed in the research consortium agreement. In 
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the ESSL (Education, Social Science and Law), Environment and LUBS (AREA) for research 
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Chapter 4: Research setting 
4.1. Research setting for studying the adoption of new practices for corporate 
entrepreneurship and experimentation 
The research context of this study is the ICT industry and more precisely the mobile 
telecommunication industry. The case company, Telco (pseudonym), offers a suitable setting 
for this research endeavor as it is coping with a nascent technology, the Internet of Things 
(IoT), which can be characterized theoretically as being in an era of ferment (Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990). While the IoT appear to offer immeasurable opportunities, it also brings 
considerable disruptive forces, and is characterized by extreme market heterogeneity and 
uncertainty regarding technology and business prospects, as pointed out by an IoT marketing 
manager. 
“I think we can all envision how life would become much more convenient and how 
industries would become much more effective with IoT. But at the end, the 
monetization and commercialization of it is not very clear. Who is going to pay for it? 
And how? And where can operators and industries make money?” (Interview 13) 
As can be seen in one of Telco’s own estimates (Figure 6, p. 83) various unrelated industries 
are predicted to be affected by this technology, and this heterogeneity of users and use cases 
creates a highly fractioned market, which stand in stark contrast to how the telecommunication 
industry have been characterized historically. Telco has traditionally been one of a few 
infrastructure providers on the market and have enabled CSPs in 180 countries worldwide to 
provide services to consumers and enterprises. For decades, technological development has 
been incremental, and highly influenced by Telco and other infrastructure providers who jointly 
have developed new standards such as GSM, 3G, 4G and 5G. The technological development 
has been characterized by increases in bandwidth and speed, which have enabled mobile 
internet and made cellular media services possible. IoT entail more than communication. Also, 
data storage, processing and analytics (e.g. through AI), in the cloud or edge of the network 





radically new offerings with high financial potential that leverage these technologies. There is 
no commonly agreed path towards standardization, instead different redundant technologies 
co-exist and compete. 
The immense uncertainty and ambiguity this entail necessitate an experimental learning 
approach that offer rapid learning and flexibility when pursuing new opportunities rather than 
the linear approach described by a respondent from Telco Research’s leadership team, as the 
more common way to deal with the type of predictable innovation within Telco’s core business 
that have dominated their innovation efforts in the past. 
“Once specifications are done, you go and develop the product and then you do some testing 
and then you roll it out.” (Interview 30) 
Innovation and product development typically flow sequentially through the organization.  
Telco Research, which belongs to the technology group function headed by the CTO, engage 
in technology exploration in strategic areas with a time horizon of two to five years, and through 
cooperation with external research institutes and universities they probe new areas that may 
be relevant ten years down the line. They also drive standardization and contribute to open 





source. Outcomes from this technology research in the form of concepts, intellectual property, 
and reports are leveraged by the business units, in which development units work on 
improvements and additions to the current portfolio of offerings with a time to market horizon 
of up to two years. Market areas have responsibility for sales and customer relations in certain 
regions. Customer units that are situated within these market areas, tailor offerings to their 
respective customers by combining hardware, software and services from the different 
business units and third-party providers. The arrows in Figure 7 indicates how Telco Research 
provides the input to the business units, which output in turn is used by the market areas. 
Telco Research consist of a number of different sub-units, called research areas (sometimes 
referred to as RAs), which focus on distinct technologies. Each of the research areas are 
headed by a research director who together with the head of Telco Research and a few select 
experts constitutes Telco Research’s leadership team. On a yearly basis they launch a number 
of strategic cross research area programs. Typically, these programs recur several years in 
succession but are renewed each year. Such program was launched in 2014, called Telco 
Research Innovation Program, which was the starting point of Telco Garage. 





4.2. Telco Garage 
Telco Research Innovation Program quickly come to be renamed Telco Garage, although it 
was run as a program for three years. From 2017 it was instead run as a separate unit within 
Telco Research. The concept quickly gained traction across the company, sparking an interest 
among employees to develop a similar setup at their local site. At its peak in 2018 the Garage 
concept had proliferated, and new affiliated Garages had opened at several sites. Telco 
Research only provided resources and had formal ownership of two Garages, the global or 
central Telco Garage, situated at the headquarters in Stockholm and Garage Silicon Valley, 
situated at one of their other major research sites in California. The, so called, affiliated 
Garages at other locations were formally independent but adhered to a set of basic principles, 
reported their work each month and took part in recurring meetings hosted by the central 
Garage team. 
Telco Garage personnel engaged with aspiring intrapreneurs and venturing teams that 
approached the Garage to gain support. The type of ventures that qualified to the Garage 





were pushing innovations that were disruptive or laid adjacent to current project road maps. 
The Garage provided support by connecting both internal coaches and external resources to 
the projects. Firstly, they provided support in developing a business case. The business case 
was then pitched to an entry selection panel headed by the head of Telco Research. 
Successful ventures were admitted to the Garage for incubation during three to nine months. 
Once a minimum viable product had been developed, this was showcased in a dragon’s den 
format, where potential stakeholders from business units together with the CTO and head of 
Telco Research took decisions about how to potentially take the venture further by 
incorporating it in one of the business units depending on the interest to make more substantial 
investments to commercialize the venture. The process is outlined above in Figure 8. 
4.2. Affiliated Telco Garages 
In 2018 a total of eleven affiliated Garages had opened, in addition to the two Garages 
sponsored by Telco Research (see Figure 9: Research sponsored and affiliated Garages, in 
which the location and approximate opening date is indicated). These two types of Garages 
differed as the Telco Research sponsored Garages were officially a part of the research 





organization, whereas affiliated Garages belonged to their respective sites and only had 
informal connections to each other. 
Typically, the affiliated Garages were run by teams of, on average, seven volunteers with a 
deep passion for innovation, who beside their formal responsibilities spent time to operate the 
Garages. On average, a total of 35 manhours were spend per affiliated Garage by these 
volunteers. By hosting ideation workshops and hackathons, they promoted local innovation 
initiatives. If deemed promising enough such initiatives could become ventures that were 
incubated within the Garage. To enable some autonomy the affiliated Garages did not 
necessarily have to bring ventures through Telco Research’s formal entry selection to start a 
project. They were allowed to start projects locally. But to gain C-level attention, increased 
support and to qualify to the dragon’s den, they first had to go through the central entry 
selection procedure. Hence, projects could have two different levels of status. Either they were 
considered ‘local’ projects or ‘global’ projects. In 2018 a total of six global projects and 44 local 
projects were running simultaneously.  
In 2018, the research sponsored Garages were moved out of the Telco Research organization 
and into a new business unit called, Technology and Emerging Business. Soon after, these 
formed a new corporate accelerator, named Telco ONE. Apart from Garage Beijing, which 
also became part of the new organization, the affiliated Garages continued their activities as 
before but had to find new ways to fit into the organization without a central Garage as the 
orchestrator of the Garage network. Instead the affiliated Garages became partners to Telco 
ONE. 
4.3. Telco ONE 
In April of 2018, a business unit dedicated to growth in new strategic business areas was 
created. Business Unit Technology and Emerging Business stood out from the other business 





innovation in areas such as autonomous vehicles, smart manufacturing and connected 
logistics solutions, all fast growing areas in the IoT landscape. The new corporate accelerator, 
Telco ONE, was created in June 2018 by combining the Research sponsored Garages at the 
headquarters and in Silicon Valley, and the affiliated Garage in Beijing, which was the only 
affiliated Garage with a dedicated manager and substantial resources. These Garages were 
converted into Telco ONE Hubs, gaining increasing resources and authority. An innovation 
team that had worked together with Garage Silicon Valley joined the Silicon Valley hub, while 
new personnel was hired internally and externally to support the hubs in Stockholm and 
Beijing. The hubs were all governed by a new manager supported by a small team. Also, a 
strategic design team from Telco Research that had been closely involved with Telco Garage 
ever since the start joined as a general asset to support all the three hubs. The organization 
and the regions in which the hubs were responsible to support intrapreneurship is visualized 
in Figure 10. Apart from Garage Beijing, which also became part of the new organization, the 
affiliated Garages continued their activities as before but had to find new ways to fit into the 
organization without a central Garage as the orchestrator of the Garage network. Instead the 
affiliated Garages became partners to Telco ONE. 
Telco ONE served the role as a greenhouse within Business Unit Technology and Emerging 
Business, responsible to generate new ventures that could become future business units. 





Each of the hubs sourced entrepreneurial ideas from across the whole organization and 
supported intrapreneurs to promote a systematic process for corporate venturing. As 
visualized below in Figure 11, Telco ONE balanced activities within the strategic focus areas 
of the business unit with exploration themes that could develop into future strategic focus 
areas. A stepwise process referred to as the 5i-process (initiation, ideation, incubation, ignition 
and industrialization) was adopted by the business unit and Telco ONE had the responsibility 
for the first three phases, which inferred generation of innovative ideas, strategic insights and 
opportunity identification (initiation), business case development and creation of hypotheses 
about the market (ideation), and testing and development of early ventures, validating their 
viability as future businesses and preparing them to function as independent operating units, 
ready to commercialize their offering. In addition to the formal Telco ONE organization, a 
network of “ambassadors” that supported the early venture activities locally was created. 
Several of the former affiliated Garage teams were among the ones who took the training to 
become an ambassador for Telco ONE.  





Chapter 5: Findings 
The necessity for a systematic approach to enable experimentation in new business areas in 
addition to pure technology development within the area of expertise dawned on the 
leadership of Telco’s research organization in 2013, as the business environment appeared 
increasingly uncertain. A clear strategic intent to develop capabilities to drive business 
experimentation to pursue emerging opportunities was announced in 2014. By 2020, Telco 
had established a holistic and systematic approach for bottom-up initiated corporate venturing 
in new areas to drive business development and growth, all supported by a corporate 
accelerator. This was based on an experimentation-driven approach that had been gradually 
developed over several years, and which enabled the company to probe a wide range of 
opportunities discovered in the periphery of the organization, reduce uncertainties cost-
effectively and successively increase commitment to certain explorative paths as their 
strategic viability became increasingly evident. While the corporate accelerator, Telco ONE, 
which was central to this strategy, was established first in 2018, it would not have been 
possible without the prior discontinued efforts that had been put into its predecessor, Telco 
Garage. By covering below how Telco engaged in different efforts to learn how to experiment, 
the outcomes from these activities and how those outcomes fed into subsequent activities, I 
outline a comprehensive depiction of the learning processes that led to the experimentation 
capability finally achieved. 
This study suggest that Telco learned how to experiment through a combination of six partly 
parallel and partly sequential learning mechanisms that interacted over time, through three 
discrete phases: 1) Learning without prior experience; 2) generating experience; 3) building 
capabilities for experimentation. This chapter presents a narrative covering this process of 
learning and offers a grounded explanation of the theoretical model developed through this 
study by linking empirical evidence with the concepts underlying the model. The chapter is 
divided into three subsections, representing each of the phases. These subsections in turn 





and the aggregate dimensions constituting the drivers and learning outcomes. Furthermore, 
the written narrative is complemented with tables of selected evidence for each of the 
aggregate dimension, which constitute the learning mechanisms and outcomes that make up 
the key components of the process model presented in the discussion chapter (See Figure 
21: A grounded model of the process of learning how to experiment, page 140). For the sake 
of readability these tables are simplified and succinct, including more of the researcher’s notes 
rather than raw data. Since much of the analyzed data involve visual material and observations 
that are difficult to present and make intelligible within a reasonable space in a written format, 
my own recitations of this material are used in the tables as well as quotations from 
interviewees. More comprehensive tables, which include more of the raw visual archival data 
can be found in Appendix C: Extended data tables.  
5.1. Learning without prior experience: Launching the Telco Research Innovation 
Program (2013-2014) 
In the yearly strategy work at Telco Research in 2013, a visceral or intuitive understanding 
emerged, that extant practices for exploration were insufficient as the company entered a new 
technological landscape, the Internet of Things (IoT). IoT was seen as highly disruptive as it 
entailed a convergence of various industries, and the complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity 
that characterized this new area extended well beyond questions regarding technology. It put 
requirements on the firm’s ability to navigate strategically within this environment by 
experimenting with new businesses. This is how Telco Research’s most senior IoT expert 
expressed what Telco needed to navigate in this new environment: 
“You know the answer is fail fast, of course. You need to work on things in parallel, try out 
multiple parallel tracks and you need to get out into reality. Not just work in the labs or in the 
development units and internally but get out in the marketplace and try it out with concrete 






However, it became apparent that the organization faced problems when exploring areas 
outside of Telco’s core business. Throughout the year, as the strategic analysis and planning 
for 2014 and forward progressed, this problem became increasingly articulated. The 
organization decided to increase their commitment to exploration of new business areas and 
also increase their capabilities to do so by launching a cross organizational innovation program 
with the objective to infuse new ways to manage exploration experimentally and build a culture 
conducive of radical innovation and experimentation. As the organization lacked prior 
experience with experimentation, a search for new ways to organize and manage such 
activities was triggered. By engaging in schematic arms-length vicarious learning, in which 
they learned by drawing on multiple external sources to identify basic key practices, they were 
able to develop a broad organizational framework for actions. This framework of new structural 
and cultural elements was considered a first step to enable initial experimentation, thus also 
enabling the organization to start learning from their own experiences how to experiment 
effectively. 
5.1.1. Visceral problem and solution understanding 
Systematic analysis have been described as a rational way of learning via intensive gathering 
of information from within and outside of an organization, in order to discover key problems 
and opportunities (Miller, 1996). Telco Research leadership team engaged in this type of 
activity by gathering insights, developing alternative scenarios, identifying key issues and 
conducting SWOT-analysis to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (Hill 
and Westbrook, 1997). This systematic analysis was part of a yearly strategy planning 
procedure, which was described as particularly substantial in 2013, as Telco Research 
recently had been appointed a new head of the organization.   
While this analysis gave a positive impression of Telco Research’s ability to develop 
technology that incrementally strengthen the company’s portfolio within its core business 
areas, documentation of the strategy work shows that the organization’s abilities to learn from 





deemed weak. These shortcomings constituted a perceived threat to the organization 
according to the documents that were produced based on this analysis. Several informants of 
this study provide statements in line with these archival documents arguing that although the 
researchers in the organization identified interesting opportunities in adjacent domains, these 
seldom became more than sidelined concepts, reports, demos or invention disclosures (IVDs). 
Rarely did such ideas get momentum enough to get absorbed by the business unit and, rarer 
still, lead to commercial outcomes. The head of Telco Research also acknowledged this in a 
speech, as she recalled the motivation to start Telco Garage: 
“When we started our strategy work in [Telco] Research in 2013, we realized that innovation 
was one of the areas we needed to focus more on. And specifically, we realized that when we 
work on innovation in areas where [Telco] is strong it was pretty easy to get traction on those 
ideas but when we work in new areas where we don’t have strong business units or product 
units it was very difficult to go forward with those ideas.” (Video recorded speech at the 
inauguration of Garage Gothenburg, October 2016)  
The diagnosis by Telco Research leadership team, which resounded around the organization, 
linked these weaknesses with the high level of narrow specialization, rigorous separation 
between units and rigid ways of cooperation within the organization as well as with external 
parties. When describing the organization, respondents used metaphors such as, ‘moles 
digging different tunnels’, referring to the deep search in highly specific domains by groups 
within the organization without much transparency or oversight of neighboring groups’ 
activities; ‘the whispering game’, referring to the long way information had to travel from the 
frontline workers with direct customer contact to the developers; and ‘factory’, framing 
research as a repetitive task driven by efficiency goals. 
From Telco Research’s standpoint closer collaboration across the various separated research 
areas, between the research department and the business units and between the research 
department and external industry players were highlighted as key areas of improvement, 





These findings merely affirm current theory that homed core capabilities can inhibit innovation 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992). While the current organizational framework was efficiently supporting 
the core business, it limited the agility necessary for innovation in new domains to flourish. 
As the issue of insufficient non-core strategic innovation and linked organizational barriers 
were recognized an immediate response was planned by formulating an explorative strategic 
intent. While a majority of research activities during 2013 had been devoted to supporting 
ongoing businesses (60%, according to Telco Research strategy documentation), the plan 
was to dedicate increased effort to create new businesses the coming years. Strategy 
documentations indicate that 60% of Telco Research’s work would focus on exploring new 
businesses from 2014. In particular, next generation technology, which in this case mostly 
referred to 5G and breakthrough innovation, in particular in the field of IoT, was receiving 
significantly increased priority. 
In order to succeed in their commitments to explore these new business opportunities, the 
development of capabilities to do so was recognized as key. By launching an innovation 
program that cut across the various research areas, Telco Research took a highly cognizant 
and proactive approach towards the development of such capabilities. Hence, launching the 
innovation program was not only intended to increase exploration activities directly but also to 
enhance learning and capability development, thus increasing the conversion rate between 
exploration activities and successful business launches. Implementation and execution based 
on analytical learning is often done through detailed plans and programs as in the observed 
case. However, lower level employees are not always made aware of the underlying rationale 
and their experiences are not always taken into account (Miller, 1996). This study finds that 
Telco Research leadership did present the strategic work that had preceded the decision to 
launch said program, during meetings open for all employees at the research organization 
both in September of 2013 and January of 2014. 
The innovation program focused on enabling adjacent and disruptive innovation activities. A 





approach was envisioned in which Telco Research engaged directly with industries to learn 
about their needs through systematic experimentation and where the different research areas 
worked closely together taking a holistic perspective that included not only technology 
innovation but also innovation of services and businesses. They were also to work more 
closely with the business units, group functions and market areas to iteratively transfer ideas, 
knowledge and more tangible exploration outcomes. An excerpt from their mission statement 
presented the month before the launch of the new Telco Research strategy for 2014 reads: 
“To win we understand and interact to explore user needs and industry value of our concepts 
and solutions […] We engage with users, industry & academia, we formulate relevant research 
questions, and we are curious by exploration and experimentation” (presentation by Head of 
Telco Research at Telco Research Day 2013-12-05) 
The experience with business experimentation was relatively limited within Telco Research. 
Exploration was primarily focused on technology and the organization was divided into distinct 
areas of technology. People were mainly focusing on highly technology-centric development 
rather than exploring new business opportunities. As there was no natural direct link to the 
markets, the exploration was driven by clearly defined specifications and exploration revolved 
around how to meet such demands rather than exploring customer needs to conceive new 
solutions. The accustomedness to rigid processes made people comfortable in their functional 
roles where they became experts in clearly defined areas rather than learning more broadly. 
5.1.2. Using multiple external sources for learning 
In the time interval that exist between when a new organization is envisioned and when it is 
granted a clear mission and resources by its parent organization, the managers responsible 
for setting up the organization generally engage in search activities and may employ grafting 
and vicarious learning to build knowledge despite the lack of experiences to draw upon (Huber, 
1991). The backbone of Telco Garage was highly influenced by its sponsor’s synthesis of 





Table 4: Aggregate dimension – Schematic arms-length vicarious learning 
Second-Order 
Codes 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Codes (IN# = Interview; FO = Field observation; AD 





Emulating elements from corporate role models 
   “And then one day [...] [The program sponsor] came rumbling with a Harvard Business 
Review article about Microsoft Garage [...] and was like ‘this is what we shall have! This is 
what we need!’” (Original Telco Garage core team member, IN53) 
 
Seeking guidance from universities and incubators/accelerators 
   “To learn from other ‘innovation programs’ we had separate sessions with KTH 
Innovation, Centek at Luleå University, Innova at DUBI and [Telco] Research in San José. 
This input together with the outcome from discussions in the Innovation Core Team and 
other internal Kista-based stakeholders will be reflected in the methodology that we choose 
to use for the [Telco Research] Innovation Program” (from Telco Research, Monthly 
Report, February 2014; AD) 
  
Learning from scholars about multiple options for corporate innovation 
  “UC Berkeley (Center for Entrepreneurship & Technology) developed a first version of a 
boot camp concept for [Telco Research] All Leaders. This makes it possible to benchmark 
ourselves with innovative and modern advanced-R&D organizations, make a self-
assessment of Telco Research and set out wanted position through a framework of 
innovation measurements” (from Telco Research Monthly Report, July 2014; AD) 
 
Adopting popular practices learnt from professional literature 
   ”So, my sketch for [Telco] Garage was inspired by John Kotter, Harvard Business 
Review article, which was about, I think, ‘Accelerate!’”…“ So, these were the main two 
inspirations, the John Kotter, Accelerate, and the Steve Blank” (Research director and 





Adopting process framework 
   “A visualization of the adopted process framework (see Figure 29 in Appendix C: 
Extended data tables page 197) indicate the following process sequence:  
(1) stage 1: Opportunity Discovery (Exploratory: ‘What could be’); (2) Gate to concept 
within Telco Research; (3) stage 2: Concept Incubation – Rapid prototyping (Iterative: 
‘What should be’); (4) Gate to product with CTO and head of BUs; (5) stage 3: 
Productization (Commitment: ‘What will be’). Brackets indicate that stage 1 and 2 as well 
as the gate to stage 3 is within the scope of the Garage program” (from first presentation of 
the Garage Program to all Telco Research employees, 2014-01-31; RN/AD) 
 
Adopting structural framework 
   “The most agile innovative companies add a second operating system, built on a fluid, 
networklike structure, to continually formulate independent strategy […] staffed by 
volunteers throughout the company” (from presentation of Garage second operating model 
concept, ‘Garage team across hierarchies’; The quote is originally from Kotter (2012); AD) 
 
Adopting cultural principles 
“And then we decided that as a part of our innovation program that we started 2014 we 
wanted to establish something that we called the Telco Garage. And the idea with the 
Garage was that we would establish something that would be like a small, lean startup 
culture within the big company” (Video recorded speech by Head of Telco Research, 
October 2017; AD) 
 
Adopt methodology 
   “And also, we said that you have to work based on the lean startup methodology, which 
was again a big inspiration for me, from Steve Blank from a Harvard Business Review 





program was loosely defined but the sponsor induced some key features. The Garage 
concept, having a space where employees could go to work on more explorative projects not 
necessarily related to their ordinary line of work, was emulated from Microsoft who had 
launched such a concept just a couple of years earlier. Telco did not engage with Microsoft to 
replicate their model but rather used the Garage concept as one element among others to 
define what the innovation program was supposed to be about. Popular practices from 
professional literature were also referred to as sources of inspiration by the Garage sponsor. 
These sources were often quoted in internal presentations and in interviews with informants 
from the extended Garage network, aiming to describe the strategy and rationale behind the 
program.  
Collaboration with universities was a common and accepted way of working, since the 
research organization used to work with universities in various technology research projects. 
Engaging with business schools was seen as a way to leverage the latest theoretical ideas 
about how to organize innovation activities and learn about different options for corporate 
innovation. It was also considered important to get external validation of the methods that were 
adapted by the organization. Hence, the group driving the implementation of the innovation 
program engaged in partnerships with various business schools in the proximity of their 
research sites, mainly in Sweden and the Silicon Valley area in California. They did not only 
work with professors to develop theoretical knowledge about innovation but also with people 
from university incubators or accelerators that offered more practical insights and shared 
specific methods and ways of working. 
5.1.3. Identifying key practices 
The initial learning focused on creating a few basic principles, which were schematic in the 
sense that they offered a broad framework but lacked detail, since many of the principles were 
learned from an arms-length distance without the ambition to copy any particular practice 
precisely. Process, structure, culture and methodology were key elements that needed to be 





process framework that were set up as lightweight. The process framework included the order 
of key activities without describing exactly how to perform these activities. It resembled the 
typical acceleration process by focusing on intense iterative learning and development during 
a limited duration enclosed by an entry and an exit procedure. The entry procedure aimed at 
selecting sufficiently promising opportunities whereas the exit procedure aimed to identify 
stakeholders to support further development. Also, cultural elements were adopted from the 
startup context, promoting speed, agility and willingness to fail and learn fast. 
To drive the ventures through the acceleration process teams were to be assembled based 
on the needs of each venture, by recruiting people freely from different units and hierarchical 
positions. These people did not formally leave their current positions but volunteered to spend 
time on the innovation projects. The Telco Research leadership team encouraged lower-level 
managers to let their employees take part in such projects. Informants and observations both 
indicate the prevalence of lean startup methodology. These principles were engrained in the 
emerging organization by creating simple rules such as always to partner up with an external 
actor in Garage projects, always use rapid prototyping and developing an MVP, and to focus 
on customer pain points and validation thereof before making extensive efforts to develop 
technology and solutions. 
5.1.4. Broad organizational framework for actions 
Conceptually, the initial learning activities described resulted in a broad organizational 
framework for actions consisting of cultural and structural factors. The culture that Telco 
Garage tried to promote focused on empowering employees, encouraging them to explore 
and learn autonomously. In this regard, acceptance of failure was deemed important as the 
main objective was to learn within highly uncertain environments. Also, the drivers of the 






Table 5: Aggregate dimension – Broad organizational framework for actions 
Second-Order 
Codes 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Codes (IN# = Interview; FO = Field observation; AD 
= Archival data; RN = Researcher’s note) 
Cultural 
Factors 
Acceptance of failure 
   “Permission that its ok to fail as long as its fail quick and reuse the learning to know what 
we should not persist with.” (from first presentation of the Garage Program to all Telco 
Research employees, 2014-01-31, AD) 
 
Empowerment and autonomy 
   “So, we tried to make it that it's empowering, it's distributed and it's also autonomous. I 
believe that an innovation system in a corporate should be distributed and autonomous, 
because that's the most adaptive one.” (Research director and sponsor of Telco Garage, 
IN40) 
  
Learning mentality and curiosity 
  “To win we understand and interact to explore user needs and industry value of our 
concepts and solutions […] We engage with users, industry & academia, we formulate 
relevant research questions and we are curious by exploration and experimentation” (from 
presentation by Head of Telco Research at Telco Research Day 2013-12-05) 
 
Volunteerism and intrinsic motivation 
   “I had a discussion with a unit at the university. They had a pretty attractive model for 
how to handle researchers and researchers’ ideas to drive them all the way to become a 
business. More like the startup concept. They had to some extent the view that it’s very 
important that the idea owner needs to feel engaged and intrinsic ambition. Then the idea 
owner may need support but it’s tremendously important to have the idea owner onboard 





   “So, it’s both a physical space it’s also a support system, it’s a process, and it’s kind of 
second operating system to our big operating system in Telco” (Video recorded speech by 
Head of Telco Research, October 2017; AD) 
 
Short time acceleration 
   “As can be seen for instance in Figure 8, p. 89, in section 4.2. Telco Garage, Telco 
Garage strived towards an acceleration duration of three to nine months until the 
conclusion of the project and presentation in the Dragon’s Den” (Overall assessment 
based on several sources; RN) 
 
Entry and graduation 
“Very early it came out that pain point, external partner, MVP. Basically, that was the only 
criteria that was very, very clearly came up. And then how you pitch in […] then [Head of 
Telco Research] became the first gate keeper to pitch in. […] And then very early, thanks 
to God, we could define a Dragon's Den, with […] the CTO. So, this was basically the 
whole set up” (Research director and sponsor of Telco Garage, IN40) 
 
Second operating system 
   “And from start I was thinking about, and I was also advised, and I realized, that I cannot 
change the culture of Telco. That would be a very, very stupid goal, that would fail. So, 
always from the start, I was talking about this as a second operating system. Create 
something besides what you have and then very transparently you can move back and 






These cultural attributes were also mirrored in the structure of the new initiative. By letting 
employees approach the Garage and initiate projects themselves rather than starting top-
down driven projects, the Garage concept encouraged autonomous behavior and relied on 
volunteerism and intrinsic motivation of the employees. The aim was that the envisioned 
culture would permeate Telco Research and then diffuse to other organizations through their 
interaction in Garage projects. This was one of the reasons why no distinct unit was created, 
thus avoiding structural separation. Only a single manager was dedicated to facilitating 
Garage activities. To select, drive and support ventures employees from various positions 
within the company as well as external actors were to self-select and organize to a large 
extent. Employees were supposed to be able to move back and forth between their formal 
responsibilities and autonomous Garage engagements. This so called ‘second operating 
system’ (Kotter, 2012) was a way to bypass existing structural boundaries and create a more 
flexible approach to driving innovative projects. Instead of applying structural separation the 
second operating system was intended as a form of cultural separation where projects in the 
Garage would be run by the same people driving typical program-based innovation, but 
different rules would apply.  
The simply defined entry selection criteria forced an open approach by demanding external 
partnership. It also spurred a startup and learning mentality by requiring validation of a 
customer problem before attending to technical solutions. 
Innovativeness and creativity were to a large extent seen as the result of mixing diverse sets 
of knowledge. Hence team diversity was considered positive and constituted another reason 
why this amorphous structure of Telco Garage was promoted. 
Short-time acceleration and the strong focus on creating an MVP also forced venturing teams 
to get out of their comfort zone and create tangible outcomes that were good enough rather 
than spending time on extensive plans. This allowed for quick and early feedback, a key 
aspect of entrepreneurial lean experimentation (Ries, 2011). The dragon’s den inspired 





transfer of ventures from the Garage to the right business unit for further development and 
commercialization. 
5.2. Generating experiences (2014-2018) 
Telco Garage was officially opened in August of 2014. This is conceptualized as the start of 
the second phase of learning to experiment, which centers around the generation and 
accumulation of experience of experimentation. By replicating the broad Garage framework 
across the organization experimentation and capability development efforts spread and 
became decentralized. As the Garage concept constituted a basic framework for actions rather 
than a precise template, practices diverged among the Garages. While limited coordination 
was facilitated that enabled some extent of joint learning, each Garage typically generated 
experience locally and developed its own organizational capabilities successively.  
The learning that took place at each site is conceptualized as a loop in which experiences are 
generated in close collaboration with partners, which enable vicarious learning from these 
partners in combination with experiential learning. This form of learning is termed coactive 
vicarious learning. The experiences led to the identification of certain conflicting corporate 
practices that needed to be unlearned to reduce tensions and enable successful adoption of 
new practices. 
Through this learning loop a set of proto-capabilities, which can be described as building 
blocks to experimentation capabilities, were developed. While some impeding organizational 
tensions remained and limited the potential of these nascent capabilities, their value could be 
unlocked through organizational changes, which however required profound executive 
decisions. 
5.2.1. Diffusing key practices 
The Garage concept was initially only intended to be a part of Telco Research. The first 
Garage was created in the headquarters and a second Garage was planned to open the year 





Table 6: Aggregate dimension – Replication across the organization 
Second-Order 
Codes 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Codes (IN# = Interview; FO = Field observation; AD 
= Archival data; RN = Researcher’s note) 
Diffusing Key 
Practices 
Evangelizing new innovation mindset 
   “Be obsessed with the pain point, early technology and market validation; Build fast and 
pivot faster, lean startup principles (MVP 1.0); Opportunity for high quality investment 
decision; Build knowledge how to engage with new areas; Second operating system: 
alternative culture and career path; New type of engagement with current and new 
customers” (points from presentation to the affiliated Garage leaders, during meet up, 
2017-12-13; AD) 
 
Advertising the Garage concept and results 
   “They did lots of advertisement, so I think everyone knew what the Garage was, that you 
could go there and develop your ideas” (Telco Garage, Technology Coach, IN57) 
  
Educating about new practices 
  “There are a number of innovation workshops, then this innovation coach program was 
introduced. So, here in Ottawa myself and few others took that training. It was a very good 




Distill minimum framework and principles 
   “So, then we came up with a franchise model. I mean, how you can franchise it. 
Basically, what you had is a framework as I described. What is the three criteria, two gates, 
still you can have [the CTO] as the Dragon's Den, so everything can go though there but 
how you're solving the inflow. There I was thinking about and I wanted to make sure that 
it's empowering. So, I didn't want to put lots and lots of control functions.” (Research 
director and Garage sponsor, IN40) 
 
Creating new Garages 
   “As can be seen for instance in Figure 9, p. 90, in 4.2. Affiliated Telco Garages, Telco 
Garage expanded to thirteen sites of which only two were governed by Telco Research” 
(Overall assessment based on several sources; RN) 
 
Assemble network of volunteers 
   “So, the affiliated Garage aren't necessarily sponsored by way of dedicated staff, so it 
comes in more as a volunteer and people working together” (Garage Leader, Montreal; 
IN67) 
 
Facilitating essential coordination 
   “The other thing we had as a demand was that if you want something that you will call 
Telco Garage then we require that we will create a form of community between these 
Garages, so, a higher degree of communication is important” (Telco Garage Program 




Local development of second operating system 
   “It’s called the second operating system, by John Kotter. Yes, we really use it like that. 
Upon demand we take people from the hierarchical model of the organization” (Garage 
Leader 1, Aachen; IN68) 
It’s not easy. I mean it’s a lot of, we try to motivate and inspire people, organize events, 
and support in coaching and connect them. So, it requires a lot of activities” (Garage 
Leader 2, Aachen; IN68) 
 
Creating distinct identity and brand 
   “The Garage was made distinct by creating their own logotype, website and 
communicating without adhering to the corporate brand and policies. Informants mentioned 
that they identified more strongly to the Garage community than their formal organizations.” 





 the impression of Telco Research as a leading-edge organization and innovation partner. 
Furthermore, the Garage depended on other internal units, such as group functions, 
business units and customer units that all needed to engage in new ways for the Garage 
concept to work. The Garage needed to attract interest across the organization to develop 
cross functional teams and get support in different capacities. Hence, the Garage core team, 
incubated project teams as well as the Head of Telco Research engaged in internal and 
external advertisement of the concept and the projects they ran. For instance, half a year 
after the inauguration of the Garage, a project was demoed at the Mobile World Congress, 
the biggest yearly commercial event that Telco usually attended to showcase new 
technology. The CEO also mentioned the program and alluded to the planned expansion. 
The Garage founder and sponsor was very active in presenting the key principles of Telco 
Garage and to evangelize the new innovation mindset. Telco also brought in an external 
company to deliver formal training to people who wanted to become innovation coaches. 
The training involved aspects that was in line with the Garage practices, such as customer 
perspective and challenging latent pre-conceptions.  
As awareness of the Garage initiative spread across the organization it became apparent that 
the concept and innovation mindset that was promoted resonated with many groups outside 
of Telco Research. People from different part of the organization started to approach Telco 
Garage asking to learn more about the concept and whether this could be extended to other 
parts of the organization. This grassroot movement was the main driver of the proliferation of 
the Garage concept.  
5.2.2. Structural replication 
Replication can be used as a strategy to scale a successful organization and extend an 
offering to new regions by copying a clearly defined and proven template (e.g. the franchise 
model) (Winter and Szulanski, 2001). When Telco Research was approached by interested 
site representatives from different parts of the organization, they saw the opportunity to expand 





an early phase in its own learning curve there was no tried and tested template, neither were 
their ways of working clearly defined and codified.  
To enable replication a simple framework and a set of core principle were distilled based on 
the broad framework for actions that had been developed. Telco Research did not have the 
means to fund more Garages than the one based in the headquarters and the one in Silicon 
Valley. However, they granted sites permission to create and fund “affiliated Garages” 
themselves that could be part of the Garage network and have access to their entry selection 
and dragon’s den as well as the support functions that had been developed. The condition 
that applied was that the new Garages would adhere to the basic principles of the Garage. 
Projects should be focused on business opportunities based on verified problems, be driven 
during a short period of time with the aim of developing an MVP and be driven in concert with 
an external partner. However, each Garage had the discretion to manage their activities as 
they saw suitable. Projects could be opened and closed without involving the central Garage. 
From 2015 to 2018, eleven affiliated Garages were created. Several other sites also 
expressed their interest to do the same and there was an extensive waiting list of sites that 
planned to open Garages. The site management at these different locations provided facilities 
for the Garages but apart from Garage Beijing none of the Garages had a fulltime employed 
manager as in the Research-sponsored Garages. Instead, the Garages assembled networks 
of volunteers who dedicated parts of their time to run Garage activities. Typically, one or two 
people had a more articulate leader role and took greater responsibility in overseeing the 
activities. As the Garage network grew, the central team was extended to cater for the 
increasing workload. In 2016 and 2017 the team went from only two Garage managers and 
the sponsor to a team of a total of ten people. This expansion coincided with the transformation 
of Telco Garage from a cross research area program to a formal unit within Telco Research, 
which was officially announced in January of 2017. The central Garage team facilitated 
essential coordination by arranging recurring virtual and physical meetings, collecting and 





website where ongoing and past projects were showcased. The idea was to avoid that different 
sites drove similar projects in parallel without any cooperation among the teams. However, 
the discretion that had been given to the affiliated Garages to start and stop projects at will, 
reduced the oversight by the central team and the decentralized approach with different project 
sponsors made it difficult to synchronize the dispersed activities. 
5.2.3. Cultural legitimization 
As the Garage was highly dependent on other units an important part of the replication of the 
concept was to gain legitimacy across the company. This enabled employees to gain the 
acceptance by managers as well as colleagues to engage in Garage projects. The risk was 
that such actions would be disapproved as it could be perceived as a cause of increased 
burden on teams to manage their daily operations. It was important that the Garage activities 
was broadly recognized as serious, important and valuable. The Garages arranged local 
events to increase the awareness of their objectives and inspire to innovate. 
By having a shared identity and brand, new Garages could leverage the goodwill created by 
more established Garages. The successful outcomes, such as ventures that went commercial 
or proof of concepts shown at the big commercial events created credibility to the Garage 
network as a whole. Yet, much of the convincing was made on a local level. By establishing a 
cultural legitimacy at the local level, contributing to the Garage became normalized. Initially, 
many Garage teams had to seek out funds to be able to create simple prototypes on an ad 
hoc basis but in most cases the site sponsors eventually agreed to spare a small budget for 
such expenses to smoothen the early explorative phases.  
The brand also created a distinct recognition of Telco Garage externally, which attracted 
external partners and customers who were enticed by the concept. 
5.2.4. Developing emergent experimentation capability 
A goal of the Garage initiative was to learn a new way of driving lean business experiments. 





and agile development (Mansoori, Karlsson and Lundqvist, 2019). These methods were 
practiced at each new venture due to the framework that had been put in place.  
Being forced to onboard an external partner before commencement of a Garage project, for 
instance, usually meant that teams engaged with potential early customers of the value 
offering being developed. This way venture teams engaged in customer development to verify 
the problem that a value offering was addressing. Interview responses clearly state that the 
problem definition and validation was deemed more important initially than the technology 
itself. 
The business model canvas (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010) is a common tool used in the 
lean startup approach (O’reilly and Binns, 2019). While being fairly straight forward, it is not 
necessarily easy to use for engineers with very limited business training. The Garage 
promoted a self-made simplified version of the business model canvas (see Figure 12, p. 112) 
to develop what they called a minimum viable business model to go along with the 
development of a minimum viable product. This served as a tool to communicate the business 
model and develop it consciously. Thus, avoiding that the project driver got too caught up in 
technology details and forgot about the business aspects. By engaging in rapid prototyping 
and gathering customer feedback the business model and technology was developed in 
tandem through an iterative process. 
When ventures did not get the traction that was envisioned, project termination was not the 
only option. Many times, projects pivoted and found new paths. Pivots was also observed as 
the result of new information that came about serendipitously and which revealed 
unanticipated opportunities as well as when pursued opportunities turned out to be less 
significant than expected. Garage managers sometimes brought together people with similar 
interests and project ideas, which also could spark creative discussions which resulted in 





Table 7: Aggregate dimension – Coactive vicarious learning 
Second-Order 
Codes 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Codes (IN# = Interview; FO = Field observation; AD 





Developing and validating market and business case 
   “I needed to understand like the voice of the customer directly. […] So, I was actually 
able to talk to somebody who, you know, is an executive of the weather company who 
would purchase this data. So, very early on I was like able to capture like the voice of the 
customer” (Project 2 – Business driver, Telco Garage; IN107) 
 
Developing minimum viable product and business model 
   “As can be seen below in Figure 12, Telco Garage developed their own version of the 
business model canvas and offered this together with clear instructions for how to use it 
to intrapreneurs prior to pitching to guide them in the business modelling process” (RN) 
  
Pivoting 
   “We'd been looking more at like weather companies, like private weather companies, or 
like sewage applications […] I think claim validation was something we had thought of as 
a use case but wasn’t until […] I talked with the insurers in London that I realized, okay 






Developing collaboration procedures for different actors 
   “As can be seen in Figure 13, Figure 14, Figure 15 below, collaboration procedures 
were developed, standardized and codified for recurring types of venture-based 
collaboration” (Overall assessment based on multiple data sources, RN) 
 
Engaging with accelerators 
   “Joined cooperation with biggest startup incubator in Croatia (http://www.tehnopark.hr/) 
Official partner and mentor for accelerator program” (Telco Research Monthly Report, 
2017-11; AD) 
   “As [Telco] Poland, we have established a cooperation with Startup Spark accelerator.” 
(from Telco Research Monthly Report, 2017-12; AD) 
 
Engaging with universities 
   “In April we continued to build up the network of competence support we want to be 
able to provide to our innovation teams. Handelshögskolan (SSE) in Stockholm accepted 
to use our innovation projects as course assignments for Masters and MBA students to 
do business analysis. Stanford University in California is likely to agree on this too, as the 
course material and teachers are the same. We also spent time to detail a similar setup 





Driving pilot project 
   “I realized it very quickly that slides are not good enough, so to have the idea, and talk 
about the idea and have nothing tangible is not going to go. So, very, very quickly I 
pushed to have the first project. So, my strategy was that, instead of having work like six 
months on the policies and I don't know, the description or the framework or whatever 
you call it, or finding a place, I really pushed to get a first project” (Research director and 
Garage sponsor, IN40) 
 
Testing new practices in ventures 
   “The project is opening the development for anyone within [Telco] to contribute in an 
open source style of working, crowd development” (from Monthly Report of Project and 
Portfolio Planning within Telco Research, 2015-04; AD) 
 
Developing skills through each venture 
   “And we became much better by time at coaching the ones who would come and pitch, 
about what was important. Especially, things such as having a clearly articulated 
problem, talk about who else are looking at this problem, and in some way motivating” 






Figure 12: Minimum viable business model template for preparation before first stage gate (AD) 
5.2.5. Collaborating with experienced partners 
Recent research have argued that vicarious learning in complex environments benefit from 
sensemaking through interpersonal communication and interactions between learners and 
those whom they are trying to learn from (Myers, 2018). Telco Garage aimed to learn 
interactively from a range of actors by involving them directly in the process of 
experimentation. Through this approach ventures would be able to benefit directly from the 
knowledge of the external actors while Telco simultaneously learned how to support 
ventures by observing the provision of support made by these experienced actors. The 
monthly reports indicate how the Garage developed networks of external competence 
support by creating formal long-term relationships with universities and accelerators to 
complement the inhouse technology expertise with business know-how and entrepreneurial 
project management competency. Telco not only received help but also contributed to other 





mentorship to startups Telco was able to learn by directly observing other venturing 
procedures, while also getting access to startups. 
To enable efficient collaborations with startups and customers on a project basis, standardized 
procedures were developed to create a streamlined approach and enable structural learning 
by improving routines iteratively. For instance, Figure 13 showcase the standardized 
procedure for engaging in collaborative ventures with core customers (CSPs). Different 
collaboration procedures were developed for different types of actors to create a more 
systematic approach. When engaging with core customers, an initial meeting was held with 
customers and customer unit, in order to describe the Garage strategy and ways of working. 
The customer unit had to agree on the Garage terms, such as the aim to develop a minimum 
viable product, the importance of onboarding an external partner in addition to the core 
Figure 13: Standardized customer collaboration procedure (AD) 





customer, such as an industry player that could serve as a first friendly customer. The 
interactions with startups were arranged in a way that was more similar to entrepreneurial 
accelerator programs. Figure 14 and Figure 15 showcase the procedure for evaluation, 
screening and selection of startups, and the startup acceleration process, respectively. 
5.2.6. Collaborative learning-by-doing 
Prior research has described interactive learning-by-doing as an emergent form of learning 
where actors interact, bargain and compromise while learning about each other’s motives, and 
modifying their own actions iteratively to advance their agendas (Miller, 1996). This type of 
learning played a big role as Telco Garage did not have a strong mandate to control the 
innovation process. Due to the difficulty to foresee how internal venturing of the kind that they 
attempted to establish would fall out they quickly launched a pilot project to learn through trial-
and-error and design the program according to the learnings they obtained. 
Through each new project they developed skills and a deeper understanding of how the 
organization as a whole reacted to different approaches. While the Garage drivers sometimes 
had a strong belief of how certain elements of their framework ought to work, reality sometimes 
proved to be different since different actors and stakeholders that the Garage depended on 
did not share the same mindset or objectives.  
In particular, tensions emerged regarding new selection practices and resource allocation 
practices that were introduced through the Garage. Through continuous learning, Garage 
members developed insights into how to manage these activities and identified practices used 





by other actors that could be incorporated. However, to implement the knowledge by 
introducing these new practices other conflicting practices had to be unlearned. 
5.2.7. Unlearning selection practices 
Intentionally unlearning of obsolete or inadequate mental models, assumptions, behaviors or 
routines has been proposed as a way for learning organizations to prevent rigidity and enable 
innovation (Klammer, Grisold and Gueldenberg, 2019). As obstacles were encountered while 
trying to instigate new behavior by the development of Telco Garage, efforts had to be made 
to unlearn conflicting practices. The selection practices were one important element that 
required this line of actions. 
To create structure and transparency a clear entry gate and an exit gate was created initially. 
The entry selection panel was led by the head of Telco Research but also comprised of several 
research directors and other stakeholders. By engaging a large number of people with limited 
affiliation with the new innovation program and commitment to its objectives in the decision-
making process, it ended up being influenced by the mindset attributed to prior innovation 
logic. As research projects in general have been big and investment heavy, decision makers 
had a propensity to be restrictive and look for weaknesses in proposals. This mindset had a 
considerably negative effect on the ability to start experimenting. 
After identifying the shortcoming of the initial set up, the Garage team did a number of actions 
to alleviate the tension between the old and new decision-making practices and ensure that 
the decision makers unlearned inadequate legacy practices. By redesigning the entry 
selection panel and making sure the same people attended each time, they enabled faster 
substitution of old practices. They also changed the structure of authority by allowing the local 
managers of each Garage make their own decisions about starting and stopping projects. The 
formal and centralized entry selection gate became an optional step, but which increased the 










Selected Evidence on First-Order Codes (IN# = Interview; FO = Field observation; AD = 




Identifying dysfunctional selection practices 
   “But what became obvious during the first years, 2015, not to mention 2016, was that the pitch 
procedure to enter the Garage didn’t work […] It was that there was the entire [Telco] Research 
Leadership Team that didn’t understand innovation […] and they ended up in a mode of rather 
shooting down than giving it a chance” (Telco Garage program manager; IN55) 
 
Replacing decision makers 
   “But what we did rather quickly […] was that we reshaped the Entry Selection Board. […] And 
then it became eight people. So, we took two people from Research with the right to vote, and 
that was [the Garage Sponsor] and [the head of Telco Research] and then there were two 
people from the IoT side, there was one from [Business Unit Digital Services], two from the radio 
side and one from the CTO office.” (Telco Garage program manager; IN55) 
  
Change structure of authority to enhance autonomy 
   “There I was thinking about and I wanted to make sure that it's empowering. So, I didn't want 
to put lots and lots of control functions. So, I said that for the ideation, you have all the freedom. 
How you're collecting the ideas, it's up to the site. We're not going to tell you. […] And then after 
that we said that you can have internal, on the garage level, you can have projects yourself. So, 
I don't want to be, every time, the gatekeeper” (Research director and Garage sponsor; IN40) 
 
Creating simple criteria 
   “Entry Selection Criteria: • Satisfies a clear need – Verified problem definition;  
• Minimum Viable Product (prototype) – Clearly defined Minimum Viable Product – Feasibility;  
• The innovation extends business in new areas; • Understand the competition – Who, what;  
• What is new and innovative? – Benefit of the approach clearly described; • External partner 
onboard; • Team secured – Resources and expected time reasonable; • What values are 








Identifying problems with human resource allocation practices 
   “The following challenges were reported during the interviews by the local Telco Garage leads: 
Fading engagement due to lack of slack. Telco Garage activities are often on top of an 100% 
fulltime job. Both garage teams and project teams face this challenge. […] No dedicated time or 
money: each project and person must negotiate with line managers” (Excerpt from Telco Garage 
Report to CEO – Site assessment; AD) 
 
Gain support and remove obstacles for onboarding volunteers 
   “In order to address some of these issues we have recently: • Engaged with DNEW leadership 
to encourage employees to work on Telco Garage projects and disseminate better information 
about how to volunteer. • Begun pursuing the use of network numbers with MAs/BAs to get 
better visibility into time spent and enable minimal budgets.  
• Established an “Telco Garage Volunteer” option in O365 so employee can volunteer and be 
matched to projects in need of certain competences” (Excerpt from Telco Garage Report to CEO 







Creating minimum resource pools 
   “The department will take over the time reported, that they spent. I mean we finance a small 
equipment, let's say if they join a hackathon like raspberry pies, or smaller SD cards or these 
kinds of things.” (Garage Leader, Aachen; IN68) 
 
Gain support of innovation activities from line managers 
   “There are specific people […] that are really focusing on the garage. I mean we got support 
from the […] manager […] from the site opportunity council, that they are constantly 





to guide decision-makers’ evaluation process. To ensure that old selection practices would 
not become dominant later in the innovation process the Garage introduced bridging routines 
such as involving potential decision makers early on. Guided by a series of workshops 
provided by a university partner, the ventures conducted formal internal convincing activities. 
This contrasted to their typical over the fence approach and served as a way to unlearn this 
function driven behavior, based on a clear distinction between various units’ responsibilities. 
5.2.8. Unlearning human resource allocation practices 
Human resource allocation practices that were advocated by the Garage contrasted 
significantly to the existing practices. Although Telco Research was also separated into distinct 
research areas which limited collaboration across these, the explicit strategic intent from the 
Research leadership and the flexibility that researchers enjoyed in terms of not having to bill 
their hours to specific budgets, helped the organization to modify these practices. However, 
the problems of introducing these new practices became increasingly apparent as people from 
other organizations were to join projects, either because they had project ideas or because 
they possessed valuable competencies needed in certain projects. To deal with this problem 
the Garage needed to engage with the leadership of organizations they depended upon to 
persuade them to encourage their employees to volunteer to projects. Managers that did 
engage with Telco Garage substituted more strict human resource management practices with 
more autonomous self-selection to projects. 
The obstacles to allocate employees in a fluid and volunteer-based manner required changes 
in behavior on multiple levels and systems were put in place to enable a competency based 
human resource allocation rather than basing human resource allocation on organizational 
affiliation. The need for increasing slack persisted in many parts of the organization despite 






5.2.9. Unlearning financial resource allocation practices 
Financial allocation emerged as another issue. Typically, each manager who holds a budget 
manage this to serve their own goals. By ignoring such organizational boundaries, Telco 
Garage projects had no clear sponsor. The limitation of Telco Research’s budget precluded 
that they could sponsor the myriad of ventures that emerged across the company. Doings so 
would also have risked reducing the feeling of responsibility by other organizations to sponsor 
these activities. This type of separation and centralization would have gone against the 
Garage philosophy of empowerment and inclusion.  
To handle this issue local Garage representatives, with substantial backup from the central 
organization, influenced organizations at the sites to collaboratively form essential budgets 
that different organizational units represented at the sites jointly contributed to, while giving up 
the mandate for how these resources would be distributed. The local Garage managers had 
the prerogative to decide which ventures qualified to use the fund. These resources were 
limited and reflected the warranted low level of commitment to these early ventures. When 
ventures had reached certain milestones and were ready to exit the Garage, business units 
typically invested more substantial amounts to perform large scale trials if the venture was 
deemed promising and strategically interesting.  
5.2.10. Proto-capabilities for experimentation 
While coactive vicarious learning led to the adoption of new practices, unlearning of conflicting 
corporate practices paved the way to increase their acceptance. The replication of this new 
innovation approach across the organization strengthened the cultural acceptance. Arguably, 
a more isolated approach would not have amounted to cultural acceptance in the wider context 
but instead created a distinct culture. The replication also afforded a wide awareness and 
engagement with experimentation. New relational ties and a sense of community around 
experimental initiatives had been created across the company, which spanned across 





Table 9: Aggregate dimension – Proto-capabilities for experimentation 
Second-Order 
Codes 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Codes (IN# = Interview; FO = Field observation; AD 




Wide awareness and engagement with experimentation 
   “Meta data about all Garage projects and Garage events in 2017-2018 indicate that 
there was representation from Telco Research, all of the business units, several market 
areas and group functions in the projects and that 3000 people had attended Telco 
Garage events” (Researcher’s report based on Garage project tracker; RN/AD) 
  
Relational ties and community 
   “you can't manufacture this grassroots' enthusiasm and commitment […] you can 
launch as many campaigns as you want to, to recruit for these kinds of people. That's not 
how it works. But this sort of brought them up, gave them a platform. They found each 
other, they amplified their own message, which is why it spread so much. And so today, 
for any future innovation activities we have a very fertile sort of ground to leverage these 
people again. We activate them, we invite them into this conversation. So that's an 
enormous positive and I don't know if we could have done it without that.” (Head of Telco 
ONE Hub Sweden and former strategy advisor at Telco Garage; IN46) 
 
Exercised practices and routines 
   “Looking per site, we find that older [Telco] Garages tend to be more prolific and host 
more events. Gothenburg and Montreal are two of our most prolific garages” (Excerpt 
from Telco Garage Report to CEO – Site assessment; AD); “Overall assessment of field 
observations indicate that the older Garage’s more prolific by gaining experience and 
routinizing key activities, such as hosting ideation events, etc.” (Researcher’s notes 





Declining enthusiasm in ventures and venture support due to work overload 
   “The resource issue is another thing that would be helpful if we could solve somehow. 
We, who works in the Garage could perhaps be more dedicated to put our time here. 
Today, it is rather a guilty conscience. Something one willingly does because it is fun, but 
it is not sustainable from a personal perspective” (Garage Leader, Lund; IN64) 
 
Venturing interruptions due to lack of resources and time 
   “The project is on hold. No resources are available, neither internal nor external” (Telco 
Research Monthly Report, 2017-06; AD) 
   “I see that we have less and less slack and buffer for the people, so I see these teams 
working and taking longer to develop something” (Garage Leader, Aachen; IN76) 
 
Venturing interruptions due to hand-over 
   “we have always struggled with, what do you do when you have brought something up 
to, from a startup, to ‘now it’s time to scale this. Where should this reside?’ That hand-
over have never been resolved. So, in the early stages we’ve had ‘everything looks good 
in the pipeline’ and then when you are to move this new thing, which still is only going to 
cost, into an existing business unit, and the first thing that happens in the next financial 






had been created such as regular ideation events, mile-stone follow-ups, coaching and project 
support activities and other administrative activities. 
These assets that were created can be conceptualized as proto-capabilities, which means that 
while these did not amount to a full-fledged experimentation capability, they constituted 
building blocks to further develop the corporate experimentation capability.  However, 
remaining organizational tensions prevented the company from exploiting these nascent 
capabilities to the fullest. The identification of such impeding organizational tensions 
constituted an important learning outcome. 
Declining enthusiasm amongst venture teams and Garage volunteers were observed as a 
result of work overload. As the organizational slack was relatively restricted, extracurricular 
activities tended to extend beyond work hours, which put increasing strain on employees. 
Furthermore, the workload of ordinary responsibilities varied, and in times of increased 
urgency of such activities, the lower priority of Garage activities became evident. 
These issues were worsened as projects frequently were interrupted due to lack of resources, 
which could for instance be caused by the temporary withdrawal of a key team member. Also, 
the hand-over phase after ventures were to leave the Garage remained a sensitive period, 
where projects often halted and sometimes engaged in search for a new host organization 
rather than developing the venture. 
5.2.11. Decentralized experimentation with divergent practices 
The wide awareness and engagement with experimentation resulted in large number of 
parallel ventures. In the spring of 2018, 50 experimental ventures were running in parallel 
within the Garages while there was a big funnel of unofficial projects in the starting pits, 
working with Garage representatives to articulate their business ideas, finding external 
partners and finding a problem-solution fit. In each venture the Garage engaged with external 
collaboration partners, often new partners in each venture. This resulted in a wide range of  





However, the decentralized network of Garages also led to limited integration. Even though 
the Garage required monthly reports and regular coordination meetings there were quite 
limited transparency into what was going on in each of the Garages. This led to occasional 
double work as similar ventures started without learning from previous ones or collaborate 
with parallel initiatives in the same domain. Such forms of collaborations were difficult due to 
the geographical distance and different organizational affiliation. Also, the Garage routine 
activities to support innovation had to be learned in each new Garage and the support from 
more experienced Garages or from the central Garage was limited. Practices also diverged 
as the strategic intentions and objectives of different Garages drifted in different directions. 
The autonomy led to heterogeneity of selection regimes and support differed depending
Table 10: Aggregate dimension – Decentralized experimentation with divergent practices 
Second-Order 
Codes 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Codes (IN# = Interview; FO = Field observation; AD 
= Archival data; RN = Researcher’s note) 
Dispersed 
Experimentation 
Large number of parallel ventures 
   “Meta data of the project funnel indicate that in April of 2018, at least 44 projects were 
ongoing on a local Garage level, without having passed the global entry selection panel, 
and six more projects were ongoing and had passed the global entry selection” 
(Researcher’s notes based on overall assessment of interviews with all Garage leaders, 
RN) 
  
Inflow of new ideas 
   “The goal is to empower employees, customers and partners to explore. In light of this, 
we were happy to find that 85 events were hosted during 2017 with over 3000 
participants, resulting in 215 ideas developed. 
Our idea funnel progresses through two stages: local projects and global projects. Of the 
215 ideas 46 were pitched into local garages during the year of 2017. Including ideas that 
cannot be directly traced to the events a total of 74 ideas were pitched into local garages” 
(Excerpt from Telco Garage Report to CEO – Site assessment; AD) 
 
Large number of collaboration partners for experimentation 
   “Meta data of a total of 89 Garage projects from between 2014 and 2018, show the 
involvement of around 130 unique external partners, of which 10 were universities and 11 
were CSPs, while the rest mostly consisted of private firms from various other industries” 






Table 11: Aggregate dimension – Decentralized experimentation with divergent practices (continued) 
Second-Order 
Codes 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Codes (IN# = Interview; FO = Field observation; AD 





Dispersed double work due to lack of horizontal coordination and learning 
   “Local staff spending too much time on simple things because of inexperience. More 
central support and sharing best practices would be helpful.” (Excerpt from Telco Garage 
Report to CEO – Site assessment; AD) 
 
Lack of holistic transparency of portfolio and progress 
   “We have created an excel based tracker which will be used to monitor ideas going 
forward” … “Note that project status “unknown” means that we did not get answer on the 
status of the project, i.e. ongoing, stopped, shelved or exited. We aim to improve 
historical data by approaching specific project leads, and going forward ensure better 
population of the needed data“ (Excerpt from Telco Garage Report to CEO – Site 
assessment; AD) 
   “The excerpt above indicate that not until 2018 was systematic tracking attempted in 
response to a request from the CEO, which corresponds to field observations” (RN) 
 
Lack of inter-venture collaboration 
   “The Telco Garage program manager, reported issues of creating collaboration 
between the Garages on similar projects. For instance, disconnected drone projects have 
been observed in Beijing, Montreal, Poland and Silicon Valley.” (Insights based on field 




Heterogeneity of strategic intentions and objectives 
   “When we exploded into 13 Garages we didn't have a mission […] and if you had 
asked our founder at that time even after 13 Garages of which 11 were not Research he 
would still say the mission was to bring experimentation back to [Telco] Research. So, 
you have a fraction of the Garages speaking on behalf of the majority with a mission that 
is totally ununited. Because if you go to the other Garages, their mission was ‘we want to 
have interface with our customer’ or someone else's mission was ‘we want to have 
engagement with our staff’” (Head of Telco ONE Hub Sweden and former strategy 
advisor at Telco Garage; IN46) 
 
Heterogeneity of selection and support 
   “The number of supporting Garage volunteers and staff varied substantially from 10 to 
60 manhours per week, which was not proportional to the variation in the number of 
projects. Manhours divided with number of projects resulted in a ratio between 5 and 
13.33 manhours per project. This suggests a diversity in the support gained by Garage 
projects. Furthermore, the acceptance rate of Garage applications varied between 18% 
and 100%, which suggest great diversity in selection practices” (Researcher’s note 
based on aggregate Garage-level meta data, RN) 
 
Deviations from original intent 
   ”To call themselves a Garage they had to drive projects. It could not be an empty 
facility where people go to play but they had to do projects that then were finalized and 
demonstrated. In the end it was a bit so and so at the different Garages but overall,l it 
was working well. Several Garages were pretty bad at finalizing it and move further in 
some form of phase two. Instead, they held on to project for a very long time” (Telco 







on the local context and which individuals volunteered to support the Garage activities. To 
some degree Garages deviated from the original intent by for instance not quickly reaching a 
conclusion of the projects and by disregarding the formal entry selection and dragon’s den. 
5.3. Building experimentation capability (2018-2020) 
In 2018, Telco created a distinct business unit that exclusively catered for the development of 
fast-growing businesses in new strategic areas. A central element of this new strategy for 
innovation in emergent business areas was the introduction of Telco ONE. This unit was 
responsible for creating a great diversity of strategic ventures by stimulating, sourcing and 
supporting bottom-up initiatives from across the company, and creating and managing an 
innovation funnel to produce promising ventures. 
The development of Telco ONE is conceptualized as a learning phase in which Telco built an 
experimentation capability by centralizing and systematizing the experimentation process. The 
identified issues but also the learning outcomes, in terms of new practices from the prior 
learning phase, informed this phase of learning. It centered around the development of 
experimentation capabilities through deliberate learning from past experiences and adaptation 
of corporate practices. 
By systematically analyzing prevailing issues experienced in the Garage context, reassessing 
previously learnt practices as well as disseminating lessons learnt from both successful and 
failed ventures, Telco ONE was able to map and address capability gaps for venture level and 
portfolio level experimentation. Through reassessment and modification of previously learnt 
practices and adaptive replication of corporate practices such as centralized and hierarchical 
decision-making processes, structural separation and distinct strategic focus, and formalized 
innovation processes and incentive mechanisms, Telco ONE was able to fill these capability 
gaps. This amounted to a centralized holistic end-to-end process for corporate venturing 





Table 12: Aggregate dimension – Deliberate learning 
Second-
Order Codes 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Codes (IN# = Interview; FO = Field observation; AD = 





Conducting interviews and workshops with Garage leaders, innovation manager and other 
stakeholders 
   “In the months immediately after the discontinuation of Garage and creation of Telco ONE 
was announced, the prior Garage staff that now became part of Telco ONE and some 
additional staff that joined, began conducting interviews with Garage leaders and innovation 
managers to build a wider understanding of issues regarding the early phases of 
experimentation and venturing” (Field observations, October 2018; FO) 
   “A team from Telco ONE did a tour to different sites to collect data about people’s 
experiences of the innovation journey, using service design methods. I directly observed two 
of these visits. 637 short descriptions of issues related to different stages were collected from 
sites in Asia, North America and Europe” (Field observations, February to March 2019; FO) 
  
Analyzing innovation journey, key issues and root causes 
   “Collected issues from workshops were grouped into categories and placed along a 
‘customer journey map’ of the Telco ONE catered venturing process to identify key 
obstacles” (Field observations February to March 2019; FO) 
   “Issues observed during interviews were analyzed and linked to root causes in key areas. 
These were addressed on joint meetings among the newly formed Telco ONE Hubs, to 






Discarding dysfunctional idea sourcing practices 
   “When I joined, I swallowed these four streams that we were supposed to work with: the 
intrapreneur track or internal track, the startup incubator, universities […] and customers. And 
now there is only one left. And that is based on a number of insights and outputs that we 
have discovered that took some time to render” (Head of Telco ONE, IN48) 
 
Reconceptualizing Garage assets and artefacts to new Telco ONE features 
   “we call innovation ambassador. Okay? So, what they would do, they will become the first 
line of filtering and they also become the first line to respond to those ideas through the tool. 
They, we need those folks be very well versed in regional and local innovation ecosystem. 
They need to have a lot of experience in dealing with innovation projects and they have high-
level knowledge of business case […] we're proposing like a Telco ONE Garage member” 
(Head of Innovation Enablement, Telco ONE Hub Silicon Valley; IN42) 
   “As Telco ONE started to structure the innovation process into distinct phases, the view of 
this as a reconceptualization of the previous entry and exit gates was obvious. They often 
referred to the new gates as corresponding to prior entry and exit procedures to make sense 







Codifying and publishing lessons learnt and decision rationale 
   “As a part of the open idea management tool where anyone signed up can track progress 
of the entire Telco ONE funnel, as projects are sorted into columns of different categories 
depending on their current stage. One category including 28 projects that has been entered 
between 11 March 2019 and 21 April 2020, include descriptions of why the projects were 
discontinued and what was learnt” (Field observation, FO) 
 
Arranging alumni presentations 
   “Alumni presentations - Develop a framework for how we could engage alumni who have 
gone through certain stages to inspire and support newer projects, e.g. inspirational talks, 
coaching, etc. (Could be a part of Strategic Design teams culture program)” (Telco ONE 
team meeting protocol 2018-10-24; AD) 
 
Case study of success and failure 
   “Short and simple case studies were observed including information about progress and 
status, nature of the initiative, how it came about, what happened with it and why, and 






5.3.1. Systematic analysis of prevailing issues 
Firms learn deliberately through investment in reviews and analysis of past experiences (Ellis 
and Davidi, 2005) as well as articulation and codification activities (Zollo and Winter, 2002). 
An intense period of deliberate learning was observed to take place as Telco ONE was being 
developed, which involved these types of activities. 
To build deep knowledge about current practices and existing issues interviews were 
conducted with a wide range of stakeholders. One of the informants who had called for such 
systematic analysis as early as when Telco Garage was set up, described an ambition to bring 
in as many voices and perspectives as possible. Interviews were conducted over phone with 
Garage leaders and other innovation managers across the world, known to drive initiatives 
adjacent to the current core business. These interviews were in particular concerned with the 
issues regarding the facilitation of a variety of ideas, and steps towards creating an MVP. 
In addition to interviews, a team from the central Telco ONE organization made a tour to 
different sites around the world, combining education in new innovation practices such as 
design thinking and lean startup and advertisement of Telco ONE, with collection of insights 
through workshops of a ‘focus group’ character. Through these interactions they were able to 
collect information about the experiences of various stages of the innovation process. 
This data was analyzed both by breaking down issues and searching for the potential root 
causes, which were framed as particular areas of improvements and by connecting perceived 
problems to different phases and key events during the innovation journey. Recognized 
techniques, such as service journey mapping and service blueprint, were used to analyze 
these issues. The resulting knowledge was intended to provide a well-grounded basis for 
design decisions during the development of Telco ONE. The development was often framed 





5.3.2. Reassessing previously learnt practices 
While the launch of Telco ONE was considered an important new start and the necessity to 
structure corporate venturing in a more systematic manner and discard ineffective practices 
was underscored, members of the organization also recognized the importance to preserve 
valuable elements of the Garage model. 
The reassessment of previously learnt practices was guided by insights from the systematic 
analysis of past experiences. Some practices that had become deeply entrenched in the 
concept of the Garage were initially taken for granted as elements to preserve, such as idea 
generation and joint projects with core customers and incubation of external startups. 
However, insight garnered through systematic analysis revealed inherent problems of some 
practices, including these, which led them to be discarded, eventually.  
Other elements such as the wide reach and local presence established at multiple sites by the 
Garage network was perceived as vital assets since it encouraged corporate entrepreneurship 
across the firm. This network and sense of community was however compromised as the 
Garage was discontinued and a more centralized approach was adopted. To leverage what 
had been developed through Telco Garage and enable further development of these assets, 
Telco ONE reconceptualized the network aspect of the Garage and created a program where 
anyone could become a link between Telco ONE and their local site. This new ‘ambassador 
program’ lowered the thresholds to be a part of the network and to support and coach 
intrapreneurs. Former affiliated Garage members joined this network to substitute the prior 
link towards the headquarter through the central Garage. 
Also, the entry and exit rituals of Telco Garage, with their characteristic entrepreneurship 
inspired pitch format, had become important cultural artifacts that helped convey the narrative 
of the corporate venture process and make sense of its different phases. As Telco ONE took 
a more holistic responsibility for the process of developing new ventures into independent 





ladder of increasing investments. Catchy names such as ‘angel’s room’, ‘dragon’s den’ and 
‘pioneer’s nest’ were used for these stage gates.  
5.3.3. Dissemination of learning from venture success and failure 
Learning from ventures in a more systematic way became a priority for Telco ONE. In order 
to reduce recurring errors and share knowledge about success factors, learning and 
knowledge dissemination activities were embedded in the innovation process. By conducting 
simple case studies of past and ongoing projects knowledge about key issues could be 
articulated and shared with other employees through the platform-based ideation tool, the 
open SharePoint-site and through presentations. 
Individuals and teams submitting proposals or driving project were also given constructive 
feedback with short response time. In line with theory, this feedback was considered important 
in order to sustain the engagement from innovative employees regardless of whether their 
ideas were passing the requirements or not and to increase the quality and adequacy of 
subsequent submissions (Piezunka and Dahlander, 2018). An important part of incorporating 
learning mechanisms into Telco ONE’s operational process was to leverage alumni. Alumni 
was what the Telco ONE team called intrapreneurs with experience of driving projects through 
certain gates in Telco ONE’s stage gate process. These experienced intrapreneurs 
represented valuable sources of knowledge. While there were elaborate plans to utilize these 
people as mentors for younger projects, this was not observed in action during the time of the 
study. However, they held alumni presentations to both inspire and share their own learnings 







Table 13: Aggregate dimension – Adaptive replication of corporate practices 
Second-Order 
Codes 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Codes (IN# = Interview; FO = Field observation; AD = Archival 






Creating dedicated business unit to ensure commitment to non-core innovation and reduce 
interdependencies 
   “then when you’re about to move this thing, that is still only going to cost money, into an existing 
business unit, and the first thing that happens in the next funding cycle and the next budget period is 
that it gets shut down. So, now we have solved that problem with a whole dedicated BA, or Business 
Area for New Business, so that we can go from start-up mode, which is [Telco] ONE, to scale-up 
mode á la [Project 1], [Project #] and IoT, which still reside with [Business Unit Technology and 
Emerging Business] and is all about growth, growth, growth” (Head of Telco ONE; IN48) 
 
Creating clear strategic focus 
   “As can be seen in Figure 16, p. 130, Telco ONE defined autonomous vehicles, smart 
manufacturing and connected supply chain as their three strategic focus areas” (Researcher’s notes 







   “In the first half a year Telco ONE developed an organization with a central head and some 
functional roles catering for the three hubs, each with a head and six positions appointed by each of 
these heads. The hub setups were similar” (Assessment of organization structure; FO) 
 
Centralizing and standardizing competencies 
   “Each hub had the same set of key competencies, i.e. business coaches, ecosystem managers, 
market initiation support and marketing. Also, a central team of designers supported the three hubs 
and their ventures” (Field observations, 2019-2020; FO) 
 
Creating clear and all-encompassing regional responsibilities 
   “Telco ONE Beijing catered for ideas from and maintained a network of ambassadors in South East 
Asia, Telco ONE Silicon Valley did the same for the Americas and Australia and India, and Telco ONE 
Stockholm did the same for Europe, Africa and the Middle East” (Joint assessment of assignment of 
coaches to ideas on digital idea management tool, archival data, and observation of ambassador lists; 
FO) 
 
Formalizing and harmonizing volunteers’ roles 
   “Support and training – Basic training, content: •Introduction to ONE; •IdeaDrop; •Evaluation criteria; 
•Primer to user centered innovation; –  Recurring coaching and guidance with Hub: •Monthly 
retrospective insights and guidance call; • Coach coaching; Inspirational & educational seminars 






Creating gates with quantitative KPIs and goals 
   “2019 Key deliverables: •50/10/2-3/1 Ideation/MVP/Industrialization/Ignition projects” (Presentation 
of ONE’s objectives, AD) 
“The quote describes how many projects ONE was expected to have in each phase during 2019” 
(Researcher’s notes, RN) 
 
Creating standardized decision for a for each gate with hierarchical escalation 
   “For each of the gates a there was a chair with the ultimate decision-making power, a driver of the 
event, standing panel members and a set of optional panel member depending on the nature of the 
venture. The decision makers were for each gate: (1) Angel’s Room: Head of ONE Hub; (2) Dragon’s 
Den: Head of ONE; (3) Pioneer’s Nest: Head of Business Unit Technology & Emerging Business; (4) 
Acceleration Board: CEO” (Overall assessment of process models of the staged decision points, 
AD/RN) 
 
Standardize stage duration, support services and budget 
   “As can be seen in Figure 18, p. 132, a precise step by step, stage gate process was designed with 
clearly defined durations, budgets and scope. Support services were designed around this process” 
(Researcher’s notes; RN) 
 
Introducing gate-bounded awards for successful intrapreneurs 
   “After many questions to Telco ONE about ‘what’s in it for the intrapreneur’ an award of up to 100% 
of an employee’s yearly income was introduced for intrapreneurs responsible for bringing a venture 
through all Telco ONE’s gates and create a new independent operating unit” (Field observation, 





5.3.4. Adapting structural separation and distinct strategic focus 
The experienced problems of ambiguity about venture ownership and difficult handover 
processes, reluctance or inability of business units to drive non-core innovation projects, and 
misalignment between business unit strategy and emerging experimental ventures prompted 
the adaptation of structural separation and distinct strategic focus. Hence, Telco adapted 
similar organizational structure for managing emergent ventures as for the new product 
development within the core business.  
By creating a new business unit dedicated to creating growth in emergent business areas, the 
commitment to non-core innovation was anchored at a higher level in the organizational 
hierarchy. Yet, the initiation of new innovation projects differed to the traditional approach. It 
was not only driven by members of the same business unit. Instead, the establishment of 
Telco ONE, as a central part of the innovation strategy, offered an integration mechanism 
towards the other business units to source ideas from the entire company.  
In line with other established business units, the new business unit developed a clear strategic 
focus. To achieve scope benefits, three strategic focus areas (autonomous vehicles, smart 
manufacturing and connected logistics) were determined, targeting currently fast-growing 
verticals in the IoT space. Telco ONE adopted these strategic focus areas to guide their search 
for new opportunities. However, to stay open and still enable diversity, concepts referred to as 
“scouting and insights”, “on our radar” and “hot topics” were introduced. These sets of activities 
enabled structured explorations outside of the strategic focus areas. While new innovation 
initiatives within the strategic focus areas were encouraged through calls for ideas and 
challenges posted through the digital idea management tool, emerging themes were 
investigated by gathering insights, ideas and new perspectives through continuous 
interactions with external partners, as well as “active engagement in Telco’s innovation 







Figure 16: Telco ONE strategic focus areas (AD) 
5.3.5. Centralizing and adapting hierarchical organization 
In response to the perceived problems of the decentralized approach of Telco Garage, Telco 
ONE adopted a more traditional centralized and hierarchical organizational design (see Figure 
17, p. 131). At the top, a central team was established with functional roles catering for all of 
the three hubs. In addition to the typical roles of executive manager, assistant, business 
controller, HR and marketing, a team of strategic designers were transferred from Telco 
Research and positioned as a support function for all the hubs and as drivers of continuous 





competencies which had been recognized as important complements to support the often 
technology savvy intrapreneurs.  
To avoid the same divergence of practices encountered in the Garage network in the new 
ambassador network, the roles and responsibilities of volunteers became more formalized too. 
Procedures for onboarding new ambassadors were thoroughly codified by both explicating the 
type of persons that they sought and how to introduce and train them. Also, the ambassadors’ 
responsibilities were clearly articulated, similarly as for the formal roles of the dedicated 
personnel. The geographical areas of responsibility were clearly divided among the three 
hubs. Each hub created its own ambassador network to reach the different sites within its 
region. 
 
Figure 17: Organization structure - Telco ONE (AD) 
5.3.6. Adapting corporate processes and incentives 
In resemblance to the new product development process that Telco typically employed for its 
core business, the structured corporate venture process within Telco ONE followed a stage 
gate process (See Figure 18, p. 132). Quantitative goals were set by top management, 





around a hundred of these would be developed through rapid prototyping and business model 
development into articulated business cases that could be pitched in order to receive a more 
substantial investment. Around ten to fifteen of these were to be incubated for up to half a 
year, creating an MVP and conduct market trials to verify the business case and then if 
deemed promising receive further investment to create a commercial product, refine the 
business case and set up the venture organization to be able to scale. This approach can be 
seen as an innovation funnel with a relatively loose scope (Wang, 2017). The end goal of 
Telco ONE was to produce independent operating units that could become the seed of a new 
business unit, be incorporated as a vital part on an existing business unit or be spun out. 
The process was highly structured, with standard durations and investments as well as a set 
of predefined core activities per phase. To evaluate and select among ventures at each stage 
gate, regularly reoccurring and standardized decision fora were established. In these, 
representatives from various organizations were present to make up a more diverse group of 
evaluators. The decision escalated higher in the organization for each gate. At the first gate 
the regional head of the Telco hub had the authority to make the final decision. At the second 
gate it was, the corporate head of Telco ONE who made the decision, in the third gate it was 





the head of business unit technology and emerging business and for the final exit from Telco 
ONE the CEO made the decision.  
In contrast to Garage where pure intrinsic motivation by the intrapreneur were deemed enough 
to enable corporate entrepreneurship, Telco ONE introduced a result based financial reward 
as an incentive mechanism based on prior learning that employees were disincentivized to 
engage in innovation activities by the current organizational pressures. 
5.3.7. Capabilities for systematic experimentation 
In contrast to the dispersed Garage model where the process of advancing a venture was 
highly ambiguous and beyond the control of the Garage, the development of a dedicated 
business unit and an embedded corporate accelerator with reserved human and financial 
resources enabled a centralized end-to-end innovation process. In this set up, the 
responsibility, authority and means to drive experimentation in new business areas were 
aligned and concentrated under the same roof. This created a more transparent and 
predictable path for new ventures. The progressive increase of investment size and escalation 
of investment decision ensured the appropriate level of executive support and reduced the 
risk of discarding uncertain ventures in situations when small investments can be enough to 
reduce uncertainty and determine the value of an opportunity (Hackett and Dilts, 2004). The 
collaboration between hubs was more formalized to ensure sharing of best practices and 
creation of greater synergy. The resulting experimentation capabilities were constituted by a 
set of venture-level and portfolio-level experimentation practices.  
Corporate incentive systems typically disfavor radical innovation initiatives that are outside of 
the boundaries of the core business and corporations therefore struggle to retain 
entrepreneurship-minded people (Leifer, O’Connor and Rice, 2001). By introducing a result-
based award Telco ONE addressed this issue. Retaining innovative individuals was a high 





The imbalance of technology and business knowhow resulting from the reliance of technology 
savvy intrapreneurs was addressed by creating a dedicated line of support in important 
complementary areas such as business and design.  
To make up for the lack of knowledge among individuals about lean experimentation, the entire 
process, methods and supportive resources were designed to systematize experimentation 
and make it a natural way of working for new innovators in Telco ONE’s incubation process. 
This included routines for early problem verification, MVP development, iterative rapid 
prototyping and user trials, and validation of product-market fit. 
In terms of portfolio-level practices, the adoption of both induced strategic focus areas and 
emergent areas of exploration enabled conscious balancing between strategic order and 
diversity (Burgelman, 1983c). This type of practice may enable a balanced portfolio in terms 
of diversifying to reduce risks and focusing efforts to enable economies of scope. 
The centralized approach in combination with an open digital idea tracking tool, enabled a 
holistic view of the portfolio of ventures and their progress through the funnel. The holistic 
oversight but also the transparency afforded by the open approach enabled combination and 







Table 14: Aggregate dimension – Capabilities for systematic experimentation 
Second-Order 
Codes 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Codes (IN# = Interview; FO = Field observation; AD = 




Alignment of authority and responsibility for experimentation in new business areas 
   “With the creation of a dedicated business unit for new businesses and placing Telco 
Research right under the head of the Business unit, the same group that was in charge for 
driving more experimentation in new areas also had the authority to influence the rest of 
the organization to better cater for such activities” (Field observation, June 2018 to March 
2020, FO) 
 
Progressive escalation of investment decisions 
   “First decision point is Angel’s room, the head of the hub makes the decision, the 
investment size is around $15K and the fund is used to verify the problem over an average 
of 4-8 weeks; Second decision point is Dragon’s Den, the head of Telco ONE makes the 
decision, the investment size is around $300K and the fund is used to build an MVP and 
test feasibility over an average of 4-6 months; Third decision point is Pioneer’s Nest, the 
head of the business unit makes the decision, the investment size is up to $10M and the 
fund is used to industrialize the venture and test its ability to scale. Final decision point is 
IOU Board, the CEO makes the decision” (Synthesis of information from process 
description of Telco’s 5i process; RN) 
 
Formalized internal collaboration 
   “From the start collaboration between hubs was formalized due to the fact they belonged 
to the same organization. They worked closely to align their ways of supporting new 
ventures and spurring innovation across the organization. For instance, they launched 
coordinated Telco ONE days around the world. Also, day to day activities were coordinated 






Systematic lean experimentation 
    
“The figure show how lean 
startup (build, measure, learn 
and pivot or persevere) was a 
central part of the innovation 










Business and design coaching and support 
   “Why build your project with ONE? Validate your idea with experienced business 
coaches and industry experts; Access to early adopter customers and broader ecosystem; 
Build the dream team to grow idea into successful venture” (from presentation of Telco 
ONE; AD) 
Incentives and rewards to retain innovation-minded employees 
   “Recognition Level (% of Annual Base Salary): Dependent on role and level of 
involvement in [Independent Operating Unit] creation. 
Founder: • If active in full incubation: 100% • If active in only one incubation phase: 50% 
Core Leadership Team: • Active LT in full incubation: 50% • Active LT in 1 incubation 
phase only: 25% 
Other Members: • Only Ideation: 10% • Only Incubation MVP phase: 20% • Any two 
phases: 40%...” (AD)” (Excerpt from Pioneer Award overview document; AD) 







Table 15: Aggregate dimension – Capabilities for systematic experimentation (continued) 
Second-Order 
Codes 
Selected Evidence on First-Order Codes (IN# = Interview; FO = Field observation; AD = 




Balancing strategic focus and diversification 
   “As can be seen in Figure 16, page 130, Telco ONE complemented strategic focus areas 
with ‘Hot topics’, ‘On our radar, and ‘scouting’ to enable bottom up driven continuous 
reassessment of the strategic direction” (Researcher’s notes based on observations and 
archival documents; RN) 
 
Holistic overview of current portfolio of ventures 
 
Figure 20: Web-based idea tracking tool (AD) 
   “This figure above is a snapshot of the idea management tool. All ventures could be 
followed along its innovation journey and receive comments by users of the tool. Each 
column represents a certain stage in the process and a list of all the projects within that 
stage are listed. (Researcher’s notes regarding web-based idea management tool, RN) 
 
Formal selection procedures 
   “The evaluation and selection procedure use weighted scorecards developed based on 
design thinking theory. The score card include a set of questions that help determine a 
score for desirability, feasibility and viability. A calculator is used to weight the scores 
based on the phase. Desirability is prioritized at first and the weight of feasibility and 
viability increases successively” (Field observations of development of scorecard; FO) 
 
Enabling cross venture collaboration 
   “Information Sharing and Learnings •Teams Site for all MVP Projects: to be set up shortly 
to enhance collaboration and sharing of best practices etc.” (from internal Telco ONE 





Chapter 6: Discussion 
This study proposes that to enable learning in an increasingly uncertain and fast changing 
environment, incumbent firms, which previously have relied on experiential learning in their 
innovation processes, must learn to experiment. How firms effectively incorporate 
experimentation in the corporate innovation process has been framed as the main puzzle to 
be addressed. I have argued that the complex, interdependent, embedded and causally 
ambiguous nature of innovation capabilities, in combination with increasing environmental 
uncertainty and pace of change due to digital disruption poses a wicked dilemma for managers 
in large high technology firms, who endeavor to incorporate experimentation into the 
organization’s innovation system in order to facilitate corporate entrepreneurship. This 
dilemma, which current theory appear unable to resolve, has been the driver of this research.  
To address this knowledge gap, I have adopted an organizational learning lens. In line with 
some seminal and recent studies (e.g. Zollo and Winter, 2002; McDonald and Eisenhardt, 
2019) I have taken a broad perspective on learning, jointly considering how several different 
modes of learning, which mostly have been studied in isolation previously, interact to adopt 
and develop experimentation practices for innovation. I have used a field-based study of the 
development of a corporate accelerator within a large incumbent firm stretching over more 
than six years to start unpacking these different learning mechanisms. 
I start this chapter by articulating the theoretical underpinnings of the observations and present 
a conceptual model of the process of learning how to experiment (see Figure 21, p. 140). I 
explain the underlying rationale of these learning mechanisms and the relationships between 
them. I highlight the novelty of these findings in the light of current theory by discussing the 
theoretical implication in respect to corporate entrepreneurship, corporate accelerators and 
organizational learning. I further provide some suggestions for future research, discuss the 
practical implications for managers and conclude by summarizing and discussing the limitation 





6.1. The process of learning how to experiment 
Organizational learning theory plays an important role in the field of corporate 
entrepreneurship. Indeed, corporate entrepreneurship is often described as a learning process 
in its own right (Phan et al., 2009). Experimentation, in particular, is regarded as a vital part of 
the innovation processes of entrepreneurial ventures (Kerr, Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2014). 
Although the role of experimentation in startup firms is well researched, the same cannot be 
said about how experimentation becomes ingrained within corporations, despite the 
increasing interest it has sparked among managers in corporations (Hampel, Perkmann and 
Phillips, 2020) and despite the long tradition of corporate entrepreneurship research. In 
particular, our current understanding of how incumbent firms learn to experiment is 
underdeveloped. Uncovering this phenomenon is crucial in order to further our understanding 
of corporate responses to discontinuous technological change. My findings suggest that 
learning to experiment as a large incumbent firm is a complex and extended process and that 
the establishment of a corporate accelerator in this case is a manifestation of this learning 
process. 
In the previous chapter, I accounted for six learning mechanisms that occurred partly 
sequentially, partly in parallel over three discrete phases to achieve this end. These 
mechanisms were labeled schematic arms-length vicarious learning, replication across the 
organization, coactive vicarious learning, unlearning of conflicting corporate practices, 
deliberate learning and adaptive replication of corporate practices. I demonstrated how Telco, 
through the interaction between these disparate learning mechanisms, was able to build and 
incorporate a capability to learn through experimentation. 
In short, the process can be outlined as follows. The first phases were primarily driven by 
middle-level managers and, to some extent, other operational members. To start learning 
without any prior experience, the organization had to acquire knowledge from external 
sources. By searching broadly and synthesizing a few relevant practices a schematic blueprint 





conceptual model of how to experiment. This provided the necessary framework for further 
actions. To flesh out the details that were still missing the organization needed to learn-by-
doing. However, given their lack of experience they engaged more knowledgeable partners in 
this learning process to gain advice, affirmation, and draw on readily available practices and 
tools to solve emerging issues. This coactive vicarious learning process led to the 
development of proto-capabilities, i.e. routines, processes and practices yet to unreliable to 
qualify as capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). When implementing these new ways of 
working unanticipated inadequacies of corporate practices were revealed, which is why the 
new capabilities could not be fully developed. To alleviate the tensions between newly adopted 
entrepreneurial practices and corporate practices the organization endeavored to unlearn 
conflicting corporate practices. Tensions did however persist as the middle managers trying 
to enforce the new practices lacked the means and authority to dissolve these completely. In 
parallel, the initiative was replicated with the result that the learning loop of coactive vicarious 
learning and unlearning of conflicting corporate practices occurred at dispersed locations with 
limited coordination. This in turn led to decentralized experimentation with divergent practices 
across the organization. This triggered a response from top-management to systematize and 
centralize these efforts. Thus, a dedicated business unit for development of new businesses 
was created and within it a centralized innovation unit assigned to revamp existing 
experimentation activities and facilitating a more structured and controlled approach. As vast 
experience of experimentation had been accumulated during the last several years, the new 
organization engaged in deliberate learning by systematically analyzing prevailing issues, 
reassessing previously learnt practices and streamlining and codifying experimentation 
activities. Interestingly, in this phase corporate practices were adaptively replicated to resolve 
prevailing tensions and create capabilities for systematic experimentation. The resulting 
capabilities entailed an end-to-end approach for systematic experimentation and practices to 












Next, I explain theoretically, the rationale behind the actuation of these learning mechanisms 
and how they contributed to the development of an experimentation capability. I emphasize 
the novelty of these findings and how they contribute to theory. The conceptualization of the 
interlinkages between these learning mechanisms and temporal ordering are visualized in 
Figure 21: A grounded model of the process of learning how to experiment.  
6.1.1. Schematic arms-length vicarious learning  
Organizations commonly learn vicariously about strategies, organizational practices and 
technologies from other organizations (Huber, 1991). This is an important part of the 
substitutional approach to capability reconfiguration as it enables acquisition of capabilities 
from external domains (Lavie, 2006). Usually conceptualized as replication of an existing set 
of practices or routines, vicarious learning have been described as a viable option to obtain 
guidance under times of uncertainty (Srinivasan, Haunschild and Grewal, 2007). Vicarious 
learning tend to be more dominant relative to experiential learning in the early phase of 
establishing an organizational unit compared to when it has become more mature (Aranda, 
Arellano and Davila, 2017). Hence, it is unsurprising that Telco Research attempted to learn 
from external sources when establishing what would become Telco Garage, as they lacked 
substantial first-hand experience of experimentation-driven venturing to draw from. The 
observed choice of learning sources is more interesting from a theoretical standpoint.  
Vicarious learning has been observed to be driven by the commonality of a practice 
(frequency-based), its association with a desired outcome (outcome-based) or the utilization 
of the practice in a similar organization (trait-based) (Srinivasan, Haunschild and Grewal, 
2007). Outcome-based vicarious learning can be seen as a rational action, whereas 
frequency-based vicarious learning can be seen as a result of isomorphic pressures 
(Compagni, Mele and Ravasi, 2015). Both of these drivers are unlikely to be present when a 
practice is new since its value is difficult to determine at this stage and the adoption is yet low 
(Compagni, Mele and Ravasi, 2015). Hence, the adoption of the “Garage model” previously 





renowned innovative company and can thus be seen as a role model. The adoption of 
practices such as lean startup methodology was also seen in other prominent corporations 
such as General Electric, Qualcomm and Intuit (Blank, 2013). The awareness that such well-
known organization utilize a certain practice may provide enough legitimacy to motivate its 
adoption, even though the practice is not learned directly from these actors.  
Vicarious learning have been problematized by demonstrating the bias resulting from the fact 
that the available sample of organizations that can be observed are the survivors of a 
selection-retention process (Denrell, 2003). This is further exacerbated by an 
overrepresentation of successful firms in books and popular press (Denrell, 2003). Hence, it 
is plausible that organizations, as in the observed case, also tend to imitate practices from role 
models with high legitimacy as innovators, regardless of whether the practice that is emulated 
can be tied to their superior performance or not (Huber, 1991). This may be even more 
common in context of environmental dynamisms and rapid change, in which organizations 
may determine that they do not have time to wait for the evidence that a practice rising in 
popularity is indeed effective. 
In general, learning from second-hand experiences is associated with causal ambiguity due 
to variations between the context in which experience has been accumulated and where 
knowledge is implemented (Zollo and Winter, 2002; Nguyen and Cai, 2016; Bao, Wei and Di 
Benedetto, 2020). The similarity between the model organization and the learner in the case 
of the Garage model can be expected to have had a positive effect on Telco’s absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). As the context in which the lean startup approach was 
developed (i.e. the software-based startup scene) differs substantially from the corporate 
context of Telco, the absorptive capacity can be expected to have been low. This was also 
supported by the observation that Telco encountered several learning barriers, when trying to 
adopt lean startup methodology, whereas the Garage concept diffused in the organization 
spontaneously. Yet, a set of simple principles were derived from the lean startup approach 





experiential learning. This broad schematic framework for action allowed for flexibility in how 
to modify acquired practices, while at the same time forcing the organization to deviate 
significantly from path-dependent learning based on prior experiences and modification of 
individual routines and practices, which threatened to lead to competency traps (Levitt and 
March, 1988). 
Apart from aligning the context of where knowledge is acquired and where it is implemented 
to mitigate the issue of causal ambiguity, extant theory provides two approaches that enable 
learning from more dissimilar organizational contexts. The first approach is to copy a capability 
precisely (Winter et al., 2012), which reduces the need to understand causal mechanisms. 
This is in line with the substitutional approach (Lavie, 2006). The second approach is to 
engage the model from which a group attempt to learn as a cocreator in the learning process, 
leveraging the knowledge of the model in an iterative manner as new first-hand experiences 
are created and modifications are made by the learner (Myers, 2018). This is in line with the 
transformative approach (Lavie, 2006). Notably, in the initial phase of learning, when 
developing the broad framework for further actions, none of these approaches were utilized. 
Instead, a broad range of external sources were consulted, and the input was synthesized to 
a bundle of practices. This can be explained by the self-awareness of their lack of absorptive 
capacity, which meant that they were aware that they would not be able to instantaneously 
identify the optimal approach for experimentation, i.e. the value-maximizing capability 
configuration (Lavie, 2006). The use of multiple external sources and adoption of various 
loosely defined practices can be understood as a form of broad search, which has been 
recognized as an important measure to identify new ideas (March, 1991; Leiponen and Helfat, 
2011; Dahlander, O’Mahony and Gann, 2014). 
In summary, schematic arms-length vicarious learning may enable firms to search broadly and 
synthetize various practices in order to develop a holistic but loosely defined and flexible 
framework for action that enable subsequent experiential learning (Miller, 1996). This process 





Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000), without fundamentally substituting any capabilities. Hence, it can 
be contrasted to the evolutionary approach where adjustments happen at the micro-level by 
iteratively modifying routines, processes and practices. It can also be contrasted to the 
substitutional and transformative approach as substitution of an entire set of processes, 
practices and routines does not take place. This form of learning is rather in line with Miller's 
(1996) notion of synthetic learning as a source of relatively radical new ideas. I argue that the 
ambiguously defined framework that this learning process resulted in is more prone to 
replication compared to precisely defined practices or fully developed capabilities. Next, I 
therefore discuss the drivers, mechanisms and result of the subsequent replication. 
6.1.2. Replication across the organization 
Replication within a corporation has been viewed as a viable approach to exploit an effective 
formula (Winter and Szulanski, 2001). However, the replication process should typically be 
preceded by an exploration effort and thorough assessment of said formula (Winter and 
Szulanski, 2001), which can be done through an extended period of trial-and-error learning at 
a smaller scale (Sosna, Trevinyo-Rodríguez and Velamuri, 2010). While some experiential 
learning had occurred before the Garage concept started spreading, Telco had by no means 
tested and verified that the new organizational framework for experimental early venturing was 
effective. Making such conclusions would necessitate long periods of observation as 
innovation in general take time. Replication was instead driven primarily by a grassroot 
movement in the periphery of the organization and was not induced by central actors. This 
can be explained by the ambiguous definition of the Garage framework. Prior research have 
found that ambiguously defined practices lend themselves better to adaptation and are 
therefore more likely to be adopted (Giroux, 2006). Adaptability enables a practice to be used 
in different contexts, thus enabling it to be replicated across an organization (Ansari, Reinecke 
and Spaan, 2014). However, adaptation within an organization poses a dilemma. 
Organizations may encourage adaptation that increases a practice’s effectiveness in the local 





(Ansari, Reinecke and Spaan, 2014). If an ambiguously defined practice strikes the right chord 
in the minds of managers, they may adapt the practice to serve their own strategic goals, 
which may partly be misaligned with the original intent (Giroux, 2006). This explains the 
observation that the replication across the organization led to decentralized experimentation 
with divergent practices.  
Hence, I find that the ambiguity surrounding the new set of practices for experimentation was 
initially a natural result of the lack of experience and intention to subsequently learn and adapt 
the practices iteratively through trial-and-error. This, however, had the side effect that the 
practice became adaptable also for others and therefore more prone to diffusion. When the 
possibility of diffusion did occur, the managers who facilitated the replication across the 
organization took a proactive role as they further simplified and codified a minimum framework 
and set of principles. Such purposeful codification is known to enable replication (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002). What these observations also show is that the codification of a set of key 
principles and a framework preserved some integrity of the practices while also maintaining 
adaptability, which enabled diffusion. In this way, the paradox that ambiguity lead to diffusion 
but also risk degrading a practice’s integrity was partially mitigated (Giroux, 2006). Other 
actions, such as facilitating essential coordination, also contributed to this end. By coordinating 
activities while at the same time allowing for some local self-governance, practices may co-
evolve, thus delimitating the degree to which practices drift apart. However, as diffusion 
progresses the coordination activities become more burdensome and time consuming. At the 
same time, incentives to coordinate such activities are likely not as great for middle-level 
managers as to diffuse their practices and create a critical mass of cultural acceptance across 
the organization. This was in particular important due to the open and collaborative approach 
that was advocated, which hinged on the cooperation by several other units. Hence, diffusion 
may lead to divergence, unless coordination efforts are significantly increased, which middle-





Since replication took place before a standardized model for how to organize and conduct 
experimentation had been developed the adopters all had to learn by themselves to a large 
degree. This entailed a process of coactive vicarious learning in collaboration with the local 
ecosystem as well as unlearning of conflicting corporate practices. These learning 
mechanisms are discussed next. 
6.1.3. Coactive vicarious learning 
Schematic arms-length vicarious learning only facilitates high-level learning. Abstract 
frameworks that are learnt does however not provide a clear understanding of how the 
envisioned new practices may work in reality on a detailed level. Learning these details require 
direct experiential learning, which can only ensue from the act of doing. Hence, learning-by-
doing is a possible next step. However, to go about learning-by-doing without taking 
advantage of preexisting knowledge is an inefficient approach.  
Prior research affirm that when learning vicariously the engagement of others from whom 
learnings are acquired plays an important role (Myers, 2018). Furthermore, the importance of 
external involvement has been recognized in the process of creating new organizational 
practices, structures, processes and techniques (Mol and Birkinshaw, 2014). Yet, not knowing 
what external knowledge is applicable make external search efforts difficult. Hence, engaging 
more experienced and knowledgeable actors in the process of learning-by-doing offers a way 
to simultaneously leverage vicarious learning. The teaching actor take an active role as they 
are in a position to identify situations in which their knowledge can be applied to help the 
learning actor. 
In the previous chapter, I showed that Telco involved external experienced actors in the 
learning process as Telco Garage was being developed, thus combining learning-by-doing 
with directed collaborative vicarious learning (as opposed to the prior schematic arms-length 
vicarious learning) to solve issues as they emerged. Specifically, I find that collaboration with 





capabilities rather than developing them inhouse or acquiring them, and enabled imitation and 
validation of certain practices which were then incorporated in the new ways of organizing 
experimentation. This infers that experienced and knowledgeable partners may act as 
repositories of readily available knowledge assets that can be drawn upon when necessary to 
solve emergent issues and that by involving them closely in the innovation process, they 
themselves can identify when knowledge they possess is applicable. Likewise, they may act 
as mentors providing guidance. Also, contributing to others’ innovation processes, for example 
by participating as coaches and mentors in other incubator and accelerator programs, provide 
a way to observe an established program in operation from within and transfer learnings into 
the focal organization’s own program.  
Actively engaging and collaborating with external actors was also a natural consequence of 
the open and collaborative way of working that was envisioned. Hence, learning in 
collaboration with others may not just be a way to access external knowledge but to cocreate 
knowledge about how to collaborate in an effective manner. This form of interactive learning 
enable new knowledge to emerge spontaneously as different actors engage in social and 
political activity (Miller, 1996). By developing standardized ways of collaborating with new 
partners in innovation projects, iterative learning from each project is facilitated while also 
enabling engagement with many different collaboration partners with less effort. Through the 
repeated projects, where new methods, tools and practices are being tested experience is 
accumulated and a process of trial-and-error leads to a set of routinized practices (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002). 
While new practices may be incorporated in this way, corporate practices got in the way and 
impeded the learning process. Thus, an iterative process of learning and unlearning occurred. 





6.1.4. Unlearning conflicting corporate practices 
It has been noted that unlearning is necessary in order to discard obsolete practices when an 
organization must adapt to a new situation (Klammer, Grisold and Gueldenberg, 2019). Some 
researchers mean that it is a precondition for organizational learning (Bettis and Prahalad, 
1995; De Holan and Phillips, 2004; Tsang and Zahra, 2008), and that an unwillingness to 
unlearn therefore can have detrimental consequences to the ability to learn (Inkpen and 
Crossan, 1995). It has specifically been argued that unlearning protects beliefs and routines 
against rigidity, thus potentially enabling firms to identify and evaluate new markets and 
technologies without being inhibited by rigid product development procedures (Akgün, Lynn 
and Byrne, 2006). The notion of discarding knowledge by forgetting or disregarding it in order 
to open the way for new learning (Huber, 1991) is compatible both with the evolutionary and 
the substitutional approaches to capability reconfiguration but may manifest in different ways 
ranging from incremental to radical unlearning efforts (Lavie, 2006). 
As observed in the current study, the Garage initiative was an attempt to create an alternative 
safe space to work differently and fail fast. This type of separation as well as an error-forgiving 
culture have support in the literature as a way to facilitate unlearning (Klammer, Grisold and 
Gueldenberg, 2019). However, the initiative still relied on other organizational units. I attribute 
this to the complexity, interdependency and embeddedness of innovation systems. These 
characteristics complicates the reconfiguration process, requiring changes to multiple 
organizational practices in order to develop a new experimentation capability (Lavie, 2006). 
The findings suggest that problems may occur due to the dependency upon organizational 
actors with limited commitment to the new initiative, making unlearning increasingly difficult. 
To fully separate the initiative from the rest of the organization to alleviate these problems, as 
suggested in previous research, (Klammer, Grisold and Gueldenberg, 2019) is not possible 
as long as dependency remains. Other more drastic means of unlearning such as discharging 





not viable neither (Huber, 1991). To be able to leverage complementary capabilities that 
remain valuable other approaches are necessary (Tripsas, 1997). 
What this study suggest is that unlearning may be performed cautiously by enabling self-
selection. For example, to unlearn inadequate practices, provision of education by externals 
to widen the understanding of innovation and to question current ways of working was offered 
in an attempt to substitute knowledge of individuals in important positions. This represents one 
way of purposeful unlearning (Klein, 1989). The external infusion of ideas as well as training 
in critical thinking about current behaviors is also a way of reducing group-thinking, which can 
be an impediment to unlearning (Akgün, Lynn and Byrne, 2006)  Another method that extant 
theory offers is to discharge or replace people who behave inappropriately (Klein, 1989). This 
may however be beyond the authority of middle-level managers trying to implement new 
practices as the problematic individuals may outrank them. Also, these individuals who may 
have important roles in the maintenance of other capabilities may not necessarily need to be 
excluded from the organization but can be circumvented in other ways, in respect to the focal 
initiative. For example, consider the unlearning of selection practices by Telco Garage. By 
reshaping the selection board, once education efforts turned out to be insufficient, individuals 
more prone to discard old behaviors were selected. Furthermore, by engaging with a select 
few individuals while avoiding others, a greater commitment to the cause can be ensured by 
these individuals, which enables intensifying their learning and unlearning processes. The 
same can be seen in terms of unlearning resources allocation practices. While some 
managers took interest and interacted with the Garage and were also more willing to allow 
their employees to leave their current roles to engage in experimentation, others did not 
engage and held on tight to their employees. Nevertheless, it can be enough to win over a 
portion of the organization instead of wasting energy and political capital on those unwilling or 
unable to change. Learning which individuals to work with and which to avoid represents a 





the effectiveness of unlearning efforts. By directing learning efforts towards those more adept 
to learn, conflict can be avoided, and the efficiency of these efforts increase.  
6.1.5. Deliberate learning 
To sum up the previous sections, replication across the organization, coactive vicarious 
learning and unlearning of conflicting corporate practices led to decentralized experimentation 
with divergent practices and a set of proto-capabilities. Prior research has called for studies to 
capture evidence of nascent capabilities which may not “work in a reliable manner” (Helfat and 
Peteraf, 2003, p. 999), but which provide the basis for subsequently developed reliable 
capabilities (Keil, McGrath and Tukiainen, 2009). The findings of this study indicate that these, 
so called proto-capabilities, served as an important basis when learning deliberately as 
managers started reassessing previously learnt practices. 
The distinction between the two learning phases labeled generating new experiences and 
building experimentation capabilities may superficially appear like a discontinuation of one 
organization and establishment of another. Prior work have warned about the cyclical nature 
of initiatives to organize radical innovation such as corporate venture units, and the apparent 
lack of learning transfers between such efforts (Burgelman and Välikangas, 2005). However, 
what this distinction represents conceptually in the proposed model is a switch of theory-in-
use in a continuous learning process (Argyris, 1976). While the first phase is driven by middle-
level managers and a growing grass root movement across the organization, the second 
phase is initiated from the top in an attempt to create order in the resulting dispersed activities 
and to use the authority of the executive leadership to resolve some of the evident impeding 
organizational tensions. Hence, this can be understood as double-loop learning on the 
organizational level (Argyris, 1976). In the first phase the current line of action is hardly called 
into question, which delimits self-reflection. As the initiative grows and triggers the involvement 
of top-management the need for more systematic assessment of current ways of working and 
deliberate learning becomes emphasized and supersede the previous learning activities. 





and rather than unlearning corporate practices, the firm start adaptively replicate corporate 
practices as the new organization is established. 
Systematic analysis and reassessment of previously learnt practices can only be done after 
experiences have been gathered about these practices, which explain why deliberate learning 
is instigated in the last phase of the model. In addition to systematically analyzing issues and 
reassessing practices deliberate learning involves codification (Zollo and Winter, 2002). The 
previous phase was characterized by ambiguity of definitions of the practices and a relatively 
unstructured way of working. This is not necessarily negative as it enable modification, 
whereas codification entail rigidity (Heimeriks, Schijven and Gates, 2012). Yet, the deliberate 
efforts to codify knowledge based on past experiences into manuals and checklists, which are 
observed at this later stage, has been advocated as an important way of learning (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002; Heimeriks, Schijven and Gates, 2012). It lets firms identify the causal 
mechanisms that govern the performance outcomes. Hence, deliberate learning, as observed 
in this study, enable firms to distinguish between effective and ineffective practices, and 
discard the ineffective, while solidifying the effective ones through codification.   
Furthermore, by building in mechanisms to continually learn deliberately such as through case 
studies of successes and failures, and codification and dissemination of lessons learnt, as well 
as connecting experienced people (e.g. alumni intrapreneurs) with unexperienced people (e.g. 
first-time intrapreneurs), knowledge can systematically accumulate and spread in the 
organization. Thus, this phase of learning is much more focused on reducing the repetition of 
common errors. 
When creating this more structured and centralized approach, experiences of being a 






6.1.6. Adaptive replication of corporate practices 
Corporations are in general more used to improve existing processes, practices and routines 
than learning something completely new. While this corporate characteristic seems inhibiting 
during the prior learning phase it appears to become an advantage in this final phase. The 
experience of organizing innovation into distinct business units with clear strategic focus, in a 
hierarchical fashion and support the innovation process with clear stage gates, standardized 
decision fora, routines and incentive mechanisms is less problematic.  
Yet, this phase entails different challenges. These corporate processes must be adopted to fit 
the new experimental approach, so as not to reintroduce the impediments that triggered this 
organizational change effort in the first place. Hence, while stage gates are created, criteria 
and decision fora must be different to cater for the experimental ventures. While incentives 
and KPIs are introduced, these must be of a different character to support corporate 
entrepreneurship (Monsen, Patzelt and Saxton, 2010). And while strategic focus areas are 
articulated, these must be up for continuous discussion and not be a constraint for exploration. 
This balancing act is made possible through the experiences gathered in the preceding phases 
of learning. 
The renewed reliance on corporate practices stand in stark contrast to the previous efforts to 
unlearn corporate practices. However, unlearning of corporate practices can be seen as a 
reactive endeavor that follows from the attempt to gain experiences and test new approaches. 
The adaptive replication of corporate practices on the other hand is highly proactive. Through 
the generation of new experiences, the usefulness of some corporate experiences may 
become evident. However, to switch from unlearning corporate practices to adaptively 
replicate corporate practices require double-loop learning (Argyris, 1976). When top-
management becomes involved and ultimately prompt the creation of Telco ONE, this 
represent double-loop learning since the fundamental goal that drives decisions is changed. 
Whereas the prior phase is fundamentally concerned with exploration (i.e. learning new 





is all about exploitation (i.e. homing the current capabilities, improving and reducing errors). 
This switch does not happen on an individual level primarily but on an organizational level. 
The commando over the transpiring events is taken over by top-management, who pursue 
different goals and have different governing values (Argyris, 1976). Yet, it is the middle 
management level which is mostly responsible for the creative adaptation of corporate 
practices. Guided by previous learning they find ways to selectively combine well-established 
corporate practices and newly learnt practices to design a coherent and focused approach to 
manage experimentational ventures as well as the overall portfolio of ventures.  
6.2. Theoretical implications 
In this section I provide a discussion around the contributions of this study to the different 
streams of literature that have guided the theoretical framing. The section is divided into 
three subsections addressing corporate entrepreneurship, accelerators and organizational 
learning. 
6.2.1. Implications for research on corporate entrepreneurship 
Literature on corporate entrepreneurship view experimental learning and entrepreneurial 
behavior as closely intertwined phenomena (Zahra, Nielsen and Bogner, 1999). It has also 
highlighted the role of a pro-entrepreneurship organizational architecture in increasing 
entrepreneurial behavior (Ireland, Covin and Kuratko, 2009), and retaining innovation-minded 
individuals (Brazeal, 1993). The internal conditions of a firm has been argued to play a 
significant role for how corporate entrepreneurship is perceived and for the willingness to 
support such explorative activities (Hornsby, Kuratko and Zahra, 2002). Factors such as 
reward systems, top management support, resource availability, supportive organizational 
structure, culture of risk taking and acceptance of failure, all matter (Brazeal, 1993; Hornsby, 
Kuratko and Zahra, 2002). Historically, this structural context has been viewed as the result of 
top-level management’s vision and strategic decisions (Ireland, Covin and Kuratko, 2009). For 
example, Burgelman (1984) states, “Structural context refers to the various administrative 





strategic actors at the operational and middle levels in the organization” (p. 155).  The current 
study did indeed observe that top-level management’s involvement was crucial in order to 
create a holistic approach to support corporate entrepreneurship and experimentation across 
the organization and alleviate some of the persisting obstacles to create reliable venture- and 
portfolio level capabilities for experimentation. However, this study also reveal that such top-
management actions may be preceded by significant efforts by organizational members at 
lower levels in the hierarchy, especially middle-level managers, to proactively alter the 
structural context. These autonomous efforts enable crucial learning processes that allow the 
organization to acquire external practices and unlearn corporate behavior broadly across the 
organization, leading to decentralized experimentation with divergent practices and proto-
capabilities for experimentation. This becomes a fertile ground for a more systematic top-
down-driven change effort. The learning processes and their resulting accumulation of 
experience and knowledge-based assets influences subsequent decisions of top-level 
management, which in turn triggers new deliberate learning processes to systematize 
practices and advance proto-capabilities to a threshold where they become reliable through 
the adaptive replication of corporate practices (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). 
While autonomous strategic behavior at the lower levels of hierarchy is recognized in prior 
literature, it is in general not linked to the structural context but to the strategic context 
(Burgelman, 1983a, 1983c, 1983b, 1984). The activities that such autonomous strategic 
behavior entail is for instance identification of new business opportunities, engagement in 
project championing efforts to mobilize resources for particular ventures, and strategic forcing 
efforts to create momentum for new businesses (Burgelman, 1984). The role of middle 
managers has mostly been described as creators and advocates of new strategies based on 
synthesis of emerging bottom-up initiatives. Their actions have been described as attempts to 
circumvent selective effects of the current structural context (Burgelman, 1983b, 1984). For 
instance, operating under the radar, by-passing chain of commands and breaking rules are 





This study outlines an alternative approach in which middle-level managers and operational 
level members engage in proactive manipulation of the structural context, focusing primarily 
on managerial innovation rather than product innovation. Instead of escaping existing rules, 
reshaping them for the benefit of experimental projects, broadly. This finding can be seen in 
contrast to the Bower-Burgelman model (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983b) which depicts 
questioning of the structural context by operational-level members, and negotiation of changes 
by middle-level managers as “reactive rather than primary” (Burgelman, 1983b, p. 231). 
Instead, the observed approach is not focused on the strategic content (i.e. which new 
businesses to promote) as much as how strategy is created (i.e. organizing for 
experimentation). By creating new ways for emergent strategic initiatives to prosper, these 
efforts are aimed at changing the balance between induced and emergent strategy. Hence, 
this study broadens the perspective of the scope of middle-level managers’ activities in CE 
and strategy processes in general. It does however still acknowledge that top-level 
management ultimately play a crucial role in shaping the structural context and that middle-
managers efforts are not sufficient. 
Another clear attribute of the extant literature on CE and strategy more broadly, is that middle-
level managers, understandably so, are conceptualized as a link between the higher and lower 
echelons of the organization (e.g. Burgelman, 1983b; Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992). An implicit 
assumption is that they primarily support subordinates and influence superiors through 
vertically directed efforts such as championing, award provision, resource allocation etc., 
within their respective branches of the organizational hierarchy. Hence, upward and downward 
directed activities tend to be in focus (Floyd and Wooldridge, 1992). This is in line with the 
ideal model of how hierarchical organizations work: information travels vertically. This study, 
however, finds horizontal activities by middle-level managers to play an important part in the 
development of a structural context conducive to experimentation. By engaging in replication 
across the organization and creating an informal network, what starts out as an initiative in 





deliberate strategic intent of top-management. This may eventually trigger a response from 
the top-management in order to formalize and create order in the dispersed activities. 
Horizontally directed efforts appear to have some limitations as middle managers cannot 
implement typical organizational changes in favor of CE that require formal authority and 
resources. While, research on organizational change have recognized the positive effects of 
change that is initiated by middle management and implemented by either top- or  middle 
management (Heyden et al., 2017), this component of horizontally directed activities, that 
replication across the organization entail, have not received due attention. 
The type of horizontal activity depicted in this study is likely rarer compared to vertical activities 
in highly hierarchical organizations. However, as organizations strive towards more fluid 
organizational structure, horizontal activities may play an increasingly important role 
(Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010). Hence, this could provide avenues for future studies.  
6.2.2 Implications for research on accelerators 
The accelerator literature is yet in an early stage as the organizational form itself is a relatively 
new phenomenon. Studies on corporate accelerators that have been published in mainstream 
academic journals are few so far, which makes it difficult to define what constitutes a corporate 
accelerator. Some notable exceptions however are the studies by Shankar and Shepherd 
(2019), Kohler, (2016), Richter, Jackson and Schildhauer (2018), and Moschner et al. (2019). 
These studies all have in common that they frame corporate accelerators as a vehicle for 
tapping the external startup ecosystem through engagement in open innovation. For instance, 
Shankar and Shepherd (2019) adhere to Kohler's (2016) definition of corporate accelerators 
as “company supported programs of limited duration that supports cohorts of startups during 
the new venture process via mentoring, education and company-specific resources” (p. 348). 
Moschner et al. (2019) however, examine a large number of corporate accelerators, 
classifying them into four different types. Although they only sampled corporate accelerators 
that search for external startups, they found that some of them (i.e. hybrid accelerators) also 





of the accelerator model is likely to be underreported in the academic literature due to the 
difficulty to identify such organizations, relative to those that openly advertise to attract external 
startups, as they reside within corporations. Yet, the potential similarities motivate these types 
of organizations to be compared with startup-centric corporate accelerators and 
entrepreneurial accelerators in general. 
This study examines a form of corporate accelerator that may be classified as a “hybrid 
accelerator” (Moschner et al., 2019) and find that the focus on external and internal ventures 
may vary over time due to organizational learning as the corporate accelerator is modified to 
fit within the corporations overall innovation processes . While external startup engagement 
was a part of the strategy which was pursued intensely for a period of time, the main focus 
was on accelerating internal ventures and this eventually became the sole focus.  
I have framed the studied organization as a form of CV unit, drawing on the broad definition 
put forward by Hill and Birkinshaw (2008), who uses it as an umbrella term for ICV units and 
CVC. I argue that research on corporate accelerators may benefit from building on the 
literature within this field. This enables studying the adoption of entrepreneurial practices more 
broadly, regardless of whether they are used as a way to facilitate outside-in open innovation, 
standalone experimentation or a combination. 
By tracking the development of a corporate accelerator over time, I identify the learning 
mechanisms that underly the establishment of such an organization. In doing so, I also find 
that, as a manifestation of this learning process, the corporate accelerator is in flux for a 
significant period of time. During this time the accelerator experiment with different modes of 
collaboration, strategies for corporate entrepreneurship and various entrepreneurial practices. 
Hence, defining what entails a corporate accelerator too narrowly may inhibit a dynamic 
perspective of these organizations and how their innovation strategies and ways of organizing 
may change over time. Future studies may contribute by further investigating strategic and 
organizational considerations underlying the design of a corporate accelerator and how these 





corporate context as prior research have noted the volatile nature of CV units (Fast, 1979; 
Burgelman and Välikangas, 2005; Hill and Birkinshaw, 2014). Our understanding of how 
corporate accelerators operate and how they are developed would also benefit from a granular 
perspective on entrepreneurial practices. Hence, future studies focused on specific 
entrepreneurial practices and their adoption by established firms could help progress this field 
of research. This study did for instance highlight the modification of selection and resource 
allocation practices and the adoption of lean startup as a guiding framework for venture 
development. Future studies could opt for a narrower focus on any of these elements or on 
other ones such as reward systems, financing, product development, or ecosystem 
orchestration. Also, by considering the use of entrepreneurial practices that are used 
regardless of whether the innovation activities are primarily closed or open, as well as those 
that are specific for closed or open innovation, future research could begin to uncover the 
appropriateness and transferability of different practices across these different contexts, thus 
providing guidance for managers to achieve their intended objectives. 
Another interesting avenue for future research is to consider the combination of different 
entrepreneurial practices that are adopted. Since this study identifies the initial importance of 
schematic arms-length vicarious learning, in which established organizations draw on several 
external sources of knowledge, and since also prior research have found that CV units may 
draw on practices from for example VC units (Hill et al., 2009), future studies may for instance 
delve deeper into how corporations may synthesize practices from the entrepreneurial context 
such as angel and VC investors, incubators and accelerators to serve different purposes. 
Another important contribution of this study is the role of coactive vicarious learning and 
unlearning, which point to the need for adaptation of the accelerator model to fit in the 
corporate context. Also, the observation of adaptive replication of corporate practices indicates 
the distinct nature of corporate accelerators and that corporate experience can be valuable 
and not only a source of rigidity once the organization has learned which practices to discard 





from the corporate and entrepreneurial context, future studies may investigate different 
adaptation strategies and their associated tensions.   
Finally, as I also found that corporate accelerators may learn from established entrepreneurial 
accelerators through the process of coactive vicarious learning, future studies could advance 
our knowledge in this direction by unpacking in greater detail different ways in which these 
organizations may interact, contribute to the learning process and in other ways provide value 
to each other. 
6.2.3. Implications for research on organizational learning 
Organizational learning has been the main theoretical lens in this study, which contributes to 
research on the adaptation process of incumbent firms to technological change (Eggers and 
Francis Park, 2018). I have argued that central theories of adaptation and capability 
reconfiguration do not offer clear answers as to how established organizations learn to 
experiment in order to develop new businesses during times of increasing environmental 
dynamism and uncertainty. My findings suggest that organizations may learn in different ways 
than the patterns that the evolutionary, substitutional and transformative perspectives offer 
(Lavie, 2006). The grounded model that is presented demonstrates that firms may initially 
learn on an abstract level by synthesizing knowledge from a broad range of external sources, 
which allows for a radical departure from existing practices without substituting any of them 
initially (Miller, 1996). This holistic form of learning can also be contrasted to the semiautomatic 
learning that leads to incremental changes in existing practices (Levitt and March, 1988; Adler 
and Clark, 1991; Heimeriks, Schijven and Gates, 2012). While signifying a deliberate form of 
learning it also refrains from codification, which is otherwise typically associated with 
deliberate learning (Zollo and Winter, 2002). This is mainly because the knowledge is on such 
a high level of abstraction and because a degree of ambiguity enable later adaptation based 





The finding that both the innovation approach and the approach to learning how to organize 
experimentation were open initially and entailed many forms of collaborative experimentation 
with startups, research institutes and universities, customers and other industry players, 
contradicts prior indications that incumbents may first do stand-alone experimentation when a 
new disruptive technology emerges and shift to reliance on alliances and acquisitions once 
the technology has matured and new disruptive business models are appearing (Cozzolino, 
Verona and Rothaermel, 2018). My findings reveal that due to the limited knowledge about 
new markets in which experimentation is to be pursued and about the act of experimentation 
itself the incumbent may opt for an open approach where experimentation is done 
collaboratively. This offers an opportunity to learn from others and potentially detect if the 
corporation’s innovation efforts are aligned with other important ecosystem players. Another 
contributing factor to the choice of this open approach in the observed case could be the 
nature of Telco’s core technology. As their main offerings can be seen as an enabling 
technology that may come to play a great role in the digitalization of several different industries 
the necessity of an open approach that facilitate learning about these industries may be more 
prevalent than for companies that are expected to serve similar customers and end users after 
a digital disruption as before. 
Although prior research have argued for the importance of a mixture of experimentation with 
core customers and other new ecosystem players, with incremental and radical innovation 
and with focused and broad trials (Khanagha et al., 2018), this study go further by showing 
that a broader and more open approach to experimentation driven by peripheral actors within 
the organization may precede a more focused approach driven by top management. This is 
explained, not only as a way to allow for broad experimentation with technologies and markets 
before subsequently narrowing the search but as a way to learn how to experiment. 
Accumulating experience of a vast range of organizational practices intended to support 
experimentation served as a basis when top management driven efforts to developing 





Another reason why incumbents may try different ways to collaborate within its 
experimentation efforts is to learn to manage the multitude of challenges that are associated 
with the adaptation to discontinuous technological change. Eggers and Francis Park (2018) 
argue that incumbents’ responses to discontinuous technological change depend both on their 
ability to acquire, assimilate and reconfigure relevant new knowledge, technologies and 
complementary assets but also their ability to reconfigure such resources that they already 
possess. Experimentation may enable, not just learning from the external environment and 
acquire new knowledge but also to find ways to redeploy existing knowledge in new ways. 
Whether experimentation is aimed at learning about a new technology or finding new use 
cases for existing technology different modes of collaboration may be required. Further 
research is needed to verify this thesis and advance our understanding of the drivers behind 
various practices for collaborative experimentation. 
The study also contributes to the literature on replication by identifying its potential role as an 
intermediary stage in an extended learning process. Whereas previous studies have viewed 
replication as an effective and efficient approach to diffuse processes and practices after they 
have been developed and successively improved in a smaller scale (Winter and Szulanski, 
2001; Sosna, Trevinyo-Rodríguez and Velamuri, 2010), I find replication to be used to quickly 
provoke dispersed learning-by-doing. Instead of facilitating a homogeneous approach that 
exploits certain knowledge, this form of replication facilitates heterogeneous and decentralized 
explorative learning that leads to variety of experiences, but which may subsequently 
necessitate centralization and formalization to enable exploiting the knowledge that is 
generated. 
Finally, while the dual process of learning and unlearning has been recognized in which old 
knowledge is forgotten and new knowledge is generated (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995; De Holan 
and Phillips, 2004; Tsang and Zahra, 2008) the findings of this study suggest that a corporation 
may switch back to a learning mode in which the corporate knowledge is leveraged and newly 





analytical learning. Future studies may investigate the occurrence of a pattern of oscillation 
between these learning modes since companies potentially may depart radically in order to 
break away from path-dependent learning but then need to adopt a more moderate approach. 
Eventually, they may again become too rigid in their routines, thus inhibiting sufficiently fast 
learning and change. 
6.3. Managerial implications 
This study suggests the establishment of a corporate accelerator as a way to enable 
experimentation and leverage corporate venturing in a more systematic way, in order to gain 
benefits of rapid learning. It further outlines the learning process needed to accomplish this 
objective. 
The theory and results provided in this study bear important implications for practitioners 
observing a need to infuse experimentation into their organization in order to strategically 
navigate an increasingly dynamic and uncertain environment. These insights are valuable for 
both top- and middle-level managers. I find that initiatives to modify the structural context 
driven by middle management may provide important organizational learning opportunities 
that top management can leverage subsequently to implement relatively radical changes to 
the structural context. This implies that incumbent firms in highly dynamic and uncertain 
environment may benefit from middle level management autonomy not only in what strategic 
initiatives to drive but how they do it. In doing so, support among employees and motivation 
to pursue organization-wide changes can be mobilized and instilled (Heyden et al., 2017). 
Instead of inducing change in a top-down driven manner, it can start as a grassroot movement, 
only to be systematized and streamlined through top-management involvement later on. This 
way radical organizational change is enabled which would be difficult to conceive of in 
advance. Knowledge of what does work and what does not become available to those in 
charge of the organizational changes and awareness and acceptance of the new 






The study also suggest that organizations may not only focus on unlearning corporate 
practices and learning new ones. This dual learning mode is important and may enable a 
radical departure from existing processes, practices and routines. In particular, if abstract and 
holistic learning based on synthesis of external sources of knowledge precedes and defines 
the starting point for this learning loop. However, this may need to be complemented by 
subsequent phase of learning with almost opposite characteristics. Through this mode of 
learning corporate practices and new practices are reassessed in order to select the most 
promising new practices, discard those that does not work and adaptively replicate corporate 






Chapter 7: Conclusions 
This study draws on a longitudinal in-depth case study to provide novel insights about how 
large established firms learn to experiment. This is conceptualized as a response to digital 
disruptive forces that render experiential learning and R&D insufficient to adapt to the 
changing environment (Rockart and Wilson, 2019). The model explains the set of learning 
mechanisms and their interactions over time, which enable an established firm to learn to 
experiment through the creation of a corporate accelerator. Thus, it contributes to the 
emerging accelerator literature. More precisely the model shows that in lack of experience of 
experimentation, incumbent organizations can draw on schematic arm-length vicarious 
learning to synthesize a set of externally acquired key principles, creating an abstract 
framework for further actions. This enable the firm to depart from current practices, process 
and routines, thus avoiding competency traps (Levitt and March, 1988).  
This framework for actions enables the firm to start engaging in coactive vicarious learning, 
by which experienced external partners’ knowledge is leveraged in the process of leaning-by-
doing. This is accompanied by unlearning of conflicting corporate practices to enable new 
practices to be adopted. These efforts may also be replicated across the firm, due to the 
adaptability of the initially developed framework for actions. Through these mechanisms, 
experiences are generated, new practices become established, and decentralized 
experimentation with divergent practices occur.  
However, to centralize these activities, create order and advance nascent capabilities to 
reliable capabilities for systematic experimentation the company engage in deliberate learning 
and adaptive replication of corporate practices (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003). This results in a 
streamlined, holistic and systematic way of managing experimental venturing activities. 
Notably, the model offers a way to comprehend this learning process which cannot simply be 
explained through an evolutionary, substitutional or transformational perspective alone (Lavie, 





environmental conditions and inherent attributes of innovation capabilities accounted for in 
this thesis, the discovered model offer a nuanced understanding of different learning 
mechanisms at play that enable overcoming these seemingly paradoxical obstacles. 
The study thus contribute to existing research on incumbent adaptation to technological 
changes (Eggers and Francis Park, 2018), in particular, digital disruption. Building on the vast 
literature on organizational learning, this study takes a broad perspective by considering the 
interrelations between several learning mechanisms that mostly have been studied in 
isolation. Hence, the study also contributes to organizational learning theory. 
It contributes to corporate entrepreneurship and strategy literature as well by suggesting, in 
contrast to seminal work (e.g. Burgelman, 1983b), that middle-level managers, in particular 
innovation managers, may proactively initiate changes to the structural context in order to 
facilitate corporate venturing and experimentation. Top-management involvement is also 
found to be crucial in order to change the structural context, which correspond to prior research 
(Burgelman, 1983b; Ireland, Covin and Kuratko, 2009). This novel finding does however open 
avenues for research about the interrelation between middle-manager and top-manager 
influence on the structural context of established firms. 
As innovation capabilities such as the capability to create and develop ventures or engage in 
systematic experimentation is sometimes conceptualized as dynamic capabilities (Keil, 2004), 
it should be cautioned that the conceptualization of dynamic capabilities as higher-order 
capabilities may lead to an infinite regress in the explanation of sustainable competitive 
advantage (Collis, 1994). Dynamic capabilities, such as innovation capabilities may offer a 
competitive advantage for a significant period of time as they are difficult to imitate (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000). Yet, as this study indicate, innovation capabilities are context dependent 
and as the environment changes due to technological discontinuities even dynamic 
capabilities do not offer “the ultimate source of sustainable competitive advantage” (Collis, 
1994). As this study consider the process of learning new routinized innovation activities based 





on higher-order routines, it does not claim to unveil such ultimate source nor follow a path of 
infinite regress. I do however claim that the study contributes to our understanding of 
organizational learning as a key aspect of organizational renewal in times of technological 
discontinuities. 
As a single-case study design was used for this research the context specific nature of findings 
is an inevitable consequence (Gephart, 2004). The processual focus enabled accounts of the 
evolution of events and abductive reasoning about the rationale behind these. While this does 
not allow for generalizability the underlying mechanisms that drove this sequence of events 
should be expected to be found in other settings in which corporations endeavor to learn to 
experiment. Replication studies in different corporate contexts would not be easy to conduct 
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Appendix A: List of interviews 
Table 16: List of interviews 






  Unrelated to Garage/ONE   
1 2016/3/29 Master Researcher, Telco Research In person* 30 
2 2016/3/29 Principal Researcher, Telco Research In person* 30 
3 2016/3/29 Experienced Researcher, Telco Research In person 30 
4 2016/3/29 Senior Researcher, Telco Research In person* 30 
5 2016/3/31 Research Manager, Telco Research In person* 31 
6 2016/4/5 Strategic Product Manager, BU Networks In person 42 
7 2016/4/5 Strategic Product Manager, BU Digital Services In person 38 
8 2016/4/6 1) Senior Program Manager, BU Networks; 
2) External Consultant 
In person 
52 








11 2016/4/11 Project Manager, GF Business Excellence In person 42 
12 2016/4/11 1) Radio Base Station Site Solution Manager 1, 
BU Networks; 








14 2016/4/11 Senior Consultant, BU Digital Services Call 33 
15 2016/4/12 Portfolio Manager, BU Networks In person 37 




17 2016/4/13 Price Manager, BU Networks In person 22 
18 2016/4/15 Senior Researcher, Telco Research In person* 60 
19 2016/4/18 Senior Business Analyst, BU Media Call 53 
20 2016/4/18 Product Quality Leader, BU Networks Call 35 
21 2016/4/18 Senior Consultant, GF Business Excellence In person 37 




23 2016/4/20 Senior Specialist, BU Digital Services In person 43 
24 2016/4/25 Price Manager, BU Networks In person 50 




26 2016/5/18 Strategy Development, Telco Research In person 50 




28 2016/5/19 Director, Government and Industry Relations, GF 







29 2016/5/19 Director, Government and Industry Relations, GF 
Marketing & Corporate Relations 
In person 
40 
30 2016/5/24 Fellow Researcher, Telco Research In person 52 
31 2016/5/26 Business Analyst, Telia (Customer, CSP) Call* 30 
32 2016/5/31 Director, Government and Industry Relations, 
Group Function Marketing & Corporate Relations 
In person 
51 




Central in Garage/ ONE 
34 2017/10/3 Business Model Expert, Telco Garage In person 50 




36 2017/12/15 Program Manager 2, Telco Garage In person* 30 








39 2018/5/16 Ecosystems Manager, Telco Garage In person 34 
40 2018/9/24 Garage Founder and Sponsor (Research Director, 
Telco Research) – (second interview) 
In person 
60 




42 2018/10/15 1) Head of Telco ONE Silicon Valley;  




43 2019/2/18 Strategic Design Director, Telco ONE In person 48 
44 2019/2/18 Head of Operations, Telco ONE In person* 60 
45 2019/2/25 Head of Telco ONE Beijing Call 57 
46 2019/2/28 Head of Telco ONE Sweden In person 56 
47 2019/3/4 Head of Telco ONE Silicon Valley Call 58 
48 2019/3/14 Head of Telco ONE In person 45 
49 2019/3/27 Head of Innovation Enablement Telco ONE 
Silicon Valley (third interview) 
Call 
40 
50 2019/4/1 Head of Telco ONE Sweden In person 26 
51 2019/4/23 Program Manager 2, Telco Garage In person 48 
52 2019/4/26 Design Lead, Telco ONE In person 35 
53 2019/4/29 Head of Design and Technology, Telco ONE In person 116 
54 2019/5/3 Telco Garage Initial Core Team Member 
(Experienced Researcher, Telco Research) 
In person 
89 




56 2019/6/13 Telco Garage Initial Core Member (Senior 
Researcher, Telco Research) 
In person 
30 
57 2019/6/24 Technology Coach, Telco Garage In person 25 
58 2019/7/3 Business Coach, Telco Garage In person 45 
59 2019/8/19 Program Manager 1, Telco Garage Call 23 
60 2019/8/19 Business Coach, Telco ONE Silicon Valley In person 79 
61 2019-08-
19 




Extended Network of Garage/ONE 









64 2018/3/6 Three leaders of Garage Lund: 
1) Research Leader, Telco Research;  
2) Partner Manager Ecosystems, BU Technology 
& Emerging Business;  
3) System Designer, BU Networks 
Call 
40 
65 2018/3/7 Leader of Garage Poland – Kráków (1) and Lódz 
(2): 
1) Line Manager, BU Networks;  
2) Program Manager, BU Networks 
Call 
30 
66 2018/3/7 Two leaders of Garage Gothenburg  
1) Product Development Leader, BU Digital 
Services; 




67 2018/3/7 Two leaders of Garage Montreal:  
1) ICT Security Analyst, BU Networks; 




68 2018/3/8 Two leaders of Garage Aachen: 
1) Project Manager, BU Networks;  
2) Operational Group Leader, BU Digital Services 
Call 
30 
69 2018/3/8 1) Leader of Garage Budapest (Research 
Manager, Telco Research); 
Two garage team members: 
2) Solution Manager, BU Managed Services;  
3) Research Manager, Telco Research 
Call 
24 
70 2018/3/9 Leader of Garage (later ONE) Beijing (Head of 
R&D, MA North East Asia) 
Call 
39 




72 2018/3/14 Head of Garage Paris (Strategy & Innovation 
Enablement Manager)  
Call 
40 




74 2018/4/23 Head of Garage Zagreb (Innovation, Strategy & 




75 2018/9/12 Two leaders of Garage Gothenburg – (second 
interview):  
1) Product Development Leader, BU Digital 
Services); 




76 2018/9/17 Two leaders of Garage Aachen – (second 
interview) 
1) Project Manager, BU Networks;  
2) Operational Group Leader, BU Digital Services  
Call 
52 
77 2018/9/17 Head of Garage Linköping (Line Manager, 
Business Unit Networks) – (second interview) 
Call 
40 
78 2018/9/17 Three leaders of Garage Lund – (second 
interview): 







2) Partner Manager Ecosystems, BU Technology 
and Emerging Business;  
3) System Designer, BU Networks) 
79 2018/9/17 Head of Garage Paris (Strategy & Innovation 
Enablement Manager) – (second interview) 
Call 
54 
80 2018/9/18 Head of Garage Zagreb (Innovation, Strategy & 
Business Development Manager, MA Europe & 
Latin America) – (second interview) 
Call 
58 
81 2018/9/18 Leader of Garage (later ONE) Beijing (Head of 
R&D, MA North East Asia) – (second interview) 
Call 
53 
82 2018/9/18 Leader of Garage Poland – Kráków (1) and Lódz 
(2) – (second interview): 
1) Line Manager, BU Networks;  
2) Program Manager, BU Networks 
Call 
52 




84 2018/9/24 Leader of Garage Silicon Valley (third interview) Call 44 
85 2018/9/25 1) Leader of Garage Budapest (Research 
Manager, Telco Research); 
Two garage team members: 
2) Solution Manager, BU Managed Services;  
3) Research Manager, Telco Research 
Call 
65 
86 2018/9/25 Leaders of Garage Montreal (new ones): 
1) Head of IoT, BU Technology and Emerging 
Business;  
2) Service Exploration Manager, BU Digital 
Services;  
3) Developer, BU Digital Services; 
4) Development Manager, BU Digital Services 
Call 
51 
87 2018/10/15 Head of Garage Zagreb (Innovation, Strategy & 
Business Development Manager, MA Europe & 
Latin America) – (second interview) 
Call 
29 
88 2018/10/15 Innovation Leader Brazil, Extended Garage 




89 2018/10/15 Leaders of Garage Montreal – (second interview): 
1) Head of IoT, BU Technology and Emerging 
Business;  
2) Service Exploration Manager, BU Digital 
Services;  
3) Developer, BU Digital Services; 
4) Development Manager, BU Digital Services 
Call 
30 
90 2018/10/16 1) Leader of Garage Budapest (Research 
Manager, Telco Research); 
Two garage team members: 
2) Solution Manager, BU Managed Services;  
3) Research Manager, Telco Research 
Call 
29 
91 2018/10/16 Two leaders of Garage Gothenburg – (third 
interview):  
1) Product Development Leader, BU Digital 
Services); 








92 2018/10/23 Three Innovation Leaders, Extended Garage 
Network: 
1) Innovation Leader Nanjing (Site Lead, BU 
Networks);  
2) Innovation Leader Guangzhou (Head of 
Technology & Innovation, BU Digital Services) 
3) Innovation Leader Shanghai (Head of 
Technology Portfolio, BU Digital Services); 
4) Head of Telco ONE Beijing.  
Call 
35 




94 2018/11/5 Innovation Leader, Guangzhou (Head of 
Technology & Innovation, BU Digital Services) 
Call 
59 
95 2018/11/6 Innovation Leader, Shanghai (Head of 
Technology Portfolio, BU Digital Services) 
Call 
54 
96 2019/3/6 Leader of Garage Gothenburg (Performance 
Manager, Telco ONE Sweden) – (fourth interview) 
Call 
55 
97 2019/3/11 Leader of Garage Gothenburg (Product 
Development Leader, BU Digital Services) 
Call 
72 




99 2019/3/25 Leader of Garage Budapest (Research Manager) Call 48 
100 2019/3/25 Site Innovation Leader, Garage Montreal Sponsor 
(Line Manager, BU Networks) 
Call 
40 






2019/4/2 Leader of Garage Ottawa (Senior Customer 








104 2018/3/2 Startup 1 – Founder, CEO Call 38 
105 2018/3/5 Startup 2 – CEO Call 67 
106 2018/3/8 Startup 3 – Founder, CEO In person 26 
107 2018/6/25 Project 2 – Business Driver, Telco Garage In person 38 
108 2019/1/11 Project 2 - Head of Network Management 
Customer Adaptations, BU Digital Services 
Call 
59 








111 2019/1/16 Project 2 – Technical Account Manager, BU 
Technology & Emerging Business 
Call 
59 
112 2019/1/21 Project 3 – Senior Product Designer, BU 
Technology & Emerging Business 
In person 
39 
113 2019/1/24 Project 2 – Director Technical Product 








115 2019/2/7 Project 3 – UX Design Consultant Call 53 
116 2019/2/15 Project 3 – Senior Program Director, BU 







117 2019/2/21 Project 3 – Channel Project Director, BU 
Technology & Emerging Business 
Call 
53 
118 2019/3/5 Project 3 – Leader 1, CTO of [project 2], BU 
Technology & Emerging Business 
In person 
58 
119 2019/7/9 Project 3 – Leader 2, Head of Advanced 
Industries, BU Technology & Emerging Business 
Call 
23 
120 2019/9/12 Project 4 – COE (and founder) of [Project 4], BU 
Technology & Emerging Business 
Call 
49 
121 2019/12/2 Project 3 – Smart Manufacturing Portfolio 
Manager, BU Technology & Emerging Business 
In person 
49 
122 2019/12/9 Project 3 – Market Development Manager, BU 




Appendix B: Extended table of data sources 
Table 17: Extended table of data sources 
Data sources/Type of data Use in analysis 
Interviews 
(122 interviews, 4847 minutes of recordings 
and 1227 pages of transcriptions) 
 
Unrelated to Garage/ONE 
33 interviews with Telco employees 
working with core business and with the 
new businesses around IoT 
Afforded an initial background understanding 
of the challenges and new requirements on 
innovation process in general due to digital 
transformation as well as the uncertainty the 
company was facing. 
Central in Garage/ONE 
28 interviews with informants central to the 
development and operations of Telco 
Garage and Telco ONE, including sponsor, 
manager and core team of Telco Garage 
throughout the years, as well as Head of 
Telco ONE and leaders and staff from the 
three hubs. 
Provided subjective narratives from multiple 
perspectives about the origins, evolution, and 
outcomes of Telco Garage and Telco ONE. 
These interviews gave meaning to the events 
and highlighted challenges and considerations 
underlying critical decisions. 
Extended network of Garage/ONE 
41 interviews with local garage leaders and 
drivers of related local innovation initiatives 
targeting early phases of the innovation 
process. 
 
Provided understanding of the width of 
dispersed innovation initiatives across the 
company, the interrelationship between 
Garages, and how the innovation process was 
organized and managed. This included, for 
instance, concerns such as ideation and idea 
selection processes, coaching and support, 





Venture team members 
20 interviews with project-level informants, 
including the CEOs of three incubated 
startups, and key members of five internal 
early ventures. 
 
Deepened the understanding of the innovation 
process and getting underneath the “ideal” 
conceptualization of it. This included a deeper 
understanding of the strategic concerns, 
business model innovation process, 
organizational interdependencies, external 
collaborations and interactions, as well as 
experiences of the support provided. 
 
Observations (25 months of on-site 
observations) 
 
6 months of observations of the daily 
activities of Telco Garage, including weekly 
Monday morning meetings, ongoing 
Garage projects, coordination meetings 
with affiliated Garages, meetings with 
aspiring intrapreneurs presenting ideas and 
external ventures, as well as improvement 
work in terms of introducing practices for 
tracking progress, increasing transparency 
and improve learning rates. (15 Dec 2017 – 
20 Jun 2018) 
 
Contributed with general insights about the 
ways in which Telco Garage was working and 
in particular their efforts to develop and 
improve the organization. The on-site 
observation gave a processual view of Telco 
Garage as I could witness the activities made 
to increase the awareness of the unit, the early 
conversation with employees with ideas, the 
ongoing work within the Garage and attempts 
to find ways forward after Telco Garage. By 
being particularly involved in the improvement 
work I could witness learning processes on the 
organizational level, such as attempts to 
articulate and codify practices, identify areas in 
need of improvement and addressing these. 
5 months participant observation of the 
screening and selection process of external 
startups, including planning and 
preparation, ending with a ‘Dragon’s den’-
like pitch session with the CEO as one of 
the judges (1 Feb 2018 – 24 April 2018). 
Provided insights about the development of 
screening and selection procedures of external 
startups through weekly pitch sessions before 
a selection panel of Telco volunteers, who 
rated each venture and later on provided their 
support as mentors. 
6 months of observations of the planning 
and execution of startup onboarding, 
training and matchmaking during a 6-month 
acceleration program ending with a demo 
day (15 May 2018 – 23 Oct 2018) 
 
Gave insight in how they created an 
accelerator program with tailored coaching and 
match making to find internal stakeholders 
within the organization, formal milestone 
meetings and training seminars in IPR 
protection, business model innovation, 
technology insights, execution and VC 
investments. 
9 months of participant observations of the 
development of Telco ONE, including 
handover of activities from Telco Garage, 
coordination meetings, team development, 
development of new relationships and the 
Telco ONE Ambassador program, 
introduction of a new idea sourcing tool, 
and learning and improvement activities. 
(20 Jun 2018 – 25 Mar 2019) 
Provided a detailed account of the turbulent 
transformation from Telco Garage to Telco 
ONE, including attempts to preserve the 
momentum and valuable resources from the 
previous set up to the new one, such as 
various hand over activities, while also creating 
renewal by learning from past experiences and 





5 months of observations of the continuous 
work at Telco ONE after having been up 
and running for over a year (1 Sep 2019 – 8 
Mar 2020). 
Granted a depiction of the resulting ways of 
working as Telco ONE was relatively advanced 
and settled in. This enabled taking note of the 
rapidly growing number of ideas and new 
ventures through a transparent tool for tracking 
and contributing to ventures, posting calls and 
challenges, and finding team members. I was 
also able to see the result as some of the 
issues early on had been solved through 
various new practices. 
Visits to affiliated Garages in Gothenburg (4 
Feb 2019) Lund (5 Feb 2019), and two 
visits to Garage/ONE Hub Silicon Valley 
(25 Oct 2017 – 3 Nov 2017 and 4 Mar 2019 
– 7 Mar 2019)  
 
Granted a more intuitive understanding of how 
these Garages and hubs worked and fitted in 
at the different sites. By seeing the sites, 
meeting active members of the local 
communities and being told about the ways in 
which they were working it was easier to 
understand the grander perspective of the links 
between peripheral employees, the garages/ 
hubs and the headquarters. 
Archival data  
Telco Research strategy documentation 
from 2013 to 2020 
 
These documents included early proofs of the 
strategic recognition that technology research 
was not enough and that the current 
organization could not handle ideas that 
involved business model innovation. They also 
enabled tracing the strategic development over 
the years and Telco Garage’s role in the 
overall strategy. 
Monthly reports from Telco Garage from 
February 2014 to March 2018. 
 
These documents gave fine grained and 
precise depictions of the actions and progress 
of Telco Garage through its development and 
served as a basis for triangulation and 
crosschecking with interviewees’ recollection 
of events. 
Briefing documents addressed to the new 
CEO concerning various aspect of Telco 
Garage. 
 
Provided a comprehensive and succinct 
depiction of Telco Garage’s strategy to utilize 
the network of affiliated Garages, engage the 
startup community, and co-innovate with 
customers. It also gave a snapshot overview of 
the current situation in early 2018. 
Documentation from Telco Garage network 
coordination meetings between September 
of 2017 and May of 2018. 
Gave a sense of the coordination meetings in 
addition to the ones that were attended and 
observed. 
Telco Garage’s repository for shared 
documents 
Entailed information about new tools being 
used in the innovation process, kept  
Telco ONE’s repository for shared 
documents (and other circulated 
documents through email), including 73 
documents 
Involved codified depiction of Telco ONE’s 
strategy, structure, process and ways of 





28 venture pitch presentations (Garage 
entry selection pitch decks from 17 internal 
Garage ventures and Dragon’s den 
presentation decks from 11 internal Garage 
ventures). And 1670 submitted ideas with 
brief descriptions for Telco ONE, which 
were accessed in a digital idea collection 
and tracking tool. 
Offered a way to gaze how pitches were 
structured at different times and what type of 
ventures were accepted through different 
stage gates. 
Project 1’s and Project 2’s repositories for 
shared documents, including 142 and 197 
documents, respectively. 
Included working document, including gantt-
charts, market research material, business- 
and pricing model descriptions, contractual 
documents, marketing and communication 
material, etc. This gave a good idea of the 
priorities and actions early on in the venturing 
process. 
4 news magazine articles about Telco 
Garage. 
 
Useful for triangulation of certain interview 
data. 
Telco Annual Reports from 2008 to 2020 Enabled tracking the reorganizations during 
the time period of the study and further back 






Appendix C: Extended data tables 
Table 18: Aggregate dimension – Visceral problem and solution understanding [extended] 
Second-Order Category: Problem Definition (IN# = interview; FO = field observation; AD = archival document; RN = researcher’s notes) 
First-Order Code: Identifying need for increased non-core strategic innovation First-Order Code: Identifying need for inter- and 
intraorganizational collaboration 
[Analysis made by Telco Research leadership team, 2013-09-09]: 
 
Figure 22: Urgency-impact XY-plot, 2013-09-09 (AD) 
“The figure shows that ‘non-core & strategic innovation’ was top rated as both an urgent 
issue and one with potential substantial impact (highlighted in red)” (RN) 
[Researcher’s comment on the Urgency-Impact XY-Plot]: 
“Collaboration within Telco Research across research areas, 
with the business units and in external partnerships scored 
high in urgency and impact in the strategic analysis of key 
issues for the organization (highlighted in blue).” (RN) 
 
[Original core member of Telco Garage involved in setting up 
the organization]: “… it was necessary to break up and think 
differently and find an alternative way to create things at 
Research, because Research was very silofied, one could 
say.” (IN53) 
First-Order Code: Identifying lack of flexibility and inability to learn from other industries 
as major threats 
First-Order Code: Identifying technology transfer problem 
[From SWOT Analysis by Telco Research 
leadership team, 2013]: “In a SWOT 
analysis made by Telco Research’s 
leadership team during the strategic 
planning in 2013, the lack of flexibility and 
inability to learn from other industries were 
identifies as key threats.” (RN) 
[Video recorded inauguration speech for Garage Gothenburg 
by Head of Telco Research, October 2017]: “When we 
started our strategy work in Telco Research in 2013 we 
realized that innovation was one of the areas we needed to 
focus more on. And specifically, we realized that […] when 
we work in new areas where we don’t have strong business 
units or product units it was very difficult to go forward with 
those ideas.” (AD) 







Table 19: Aggregate dimension – Visceral problem and solution understanding (continued) [extended] 
Second-Order Category: Explorative Strategic Intent 
First-Order Code: Formulating vision First-Order Code: Launching program to enhance 
innovation capabilities 
First-Order Code: Increasing commitment to 
exploration 
[Strategic vision for Telco Research, 2014-02-
05]:  
 
Figure 24: Telco Research - Strategic Vision 2014 (AD) 
[Focus of the Telco Research Innovation program 
explained: to strengthen capabilities for adjacent 
and disruptive innovation, 2014-01-31]:
 
Figure 25: Focus of Telco Research Innovation Program, 2014 
(AD) 
[Announcing the shift from 40% to 60% commitment to 
activities aimed to create new businesses contra 
supporting ongoing businesses, 2014-02-05]:
 
Figure 26: Telco Research - Activity distribution (AD) 
Second-Order Category: Lack of Experience with Experimentation 
First-Order Code: Technology-biased 
exploration practices 
First-Order Code: Lack of natural direct market 
interfaces 
First-Order Code: Accustomedness to a rigid 
innovation process 
[Original core member of Telco Garage 
involved in setting up the organization]: “The 
conclusion had been made that [Telco] 
Research was good at innovation that was 
incremental within core areas such as radio, 
and things like that […] Sort of, the innovation 
that revolves around building more efficient 
algorithms and things like that, which should 
lead to the next mobile network.” (IN53) 
[Telco Research Strategy Expert]: “So, sales 
people talk to product management and product 
management might talk to someone else, then in 
the end talks to R&D and you have the whispering 
game, and you know what happens in the 
whispering game, the information gets distorted. 
So, when it comes to R&D the kind of message is 
so distorted, so R&D doesn’t understand the full 
context, but they get the spec. So, they deal with 
the spec, they code according to the spec.” (IN26) 
[Telco Research leadership team member and IoT 
expert]: “I think one thing that we should get more of is 
entrepreneurship. We don’t have that inside the 
company, we are a large industrial player that is using 
traditional industrial thinking when it comes to solving 
problems, buildings solutions and building 
organizations. You need something that is much more 
agile, something that is much more entrepreneurial 
oriented. Also, I think that, not boxed up, because now 
we have an organization that is built around functions. 





Table 20: Aggregate dimension – Schematic arms-length vicarious learning [extended] 
Second-Order Category:  Using Multiple External Sources for Learning 
First-Order Code: Emulating elements from corporate role models First-Order Code: Seeking guidance from universities and incubators/accelerators 
[Original Garage program core team member]: “And then one day [...] [The 
program sponsor] came rumbling with a Harvard Business Review article 
about Microsoft Garage [...] and was like ‘this is what we shall have! This is 
what we need!’” (IN53) 
[Telco Research, Monthly Report February 2014]: “To learn from other ‘innovation 
programs’ we had separate sessions with KTH Innovation, Centek at Luleå 
University, Innova at DUBI and [Telco] Research in San José. This input together 
with the outcome from discussions in the Innovation Core Team and other internal 
Kista-based stakeholders will be reflected in the methodology that we choose to 
use for the [Telco Research] Innovation Program. (AD) 
First-Order Code: Learning from scholars about multiple options for 
corporate innovation 
First-Order Code: Adopting popular practices learnt from professional literature 
 
[Telco Research, Monthly Report July 2014]: “UC Berkeley (Center for 
Entrepreneurship & Technology) developed a first version of a boot camp 
concept for [Telco Research] All Leaders. This makes it possible to 
benchmark ourselves with innovative and modern advanced-R&D 
organizations, make a self-assessment of Telco Research and set out 
wanted position through a framework of innovation measurements.” (AD) 
[Garage Sponsor and Founder]: “So, my sketch for Telco Garage was inspired by 
John Kotter, Harvard Business Review article, which was about, I think, 
‘Accelerate!’”…“And also, we said that you have to work based on the lean startup 
methodology, which was again a big inspiration for me, from Steve Blank from a 
Harvard Business Review article. So, these were the main two inspirations, the 
John Kotter, Accelerate, and the Steve Blank.” (IN) 
[Internal Telco Garage presentation, 2016-09-21]: 
 
Figure 28: Referenced HBR articles from which key practices have been adopted (AD) Figure 27: Alternative corporate innovation approaches, 





Table 21: Aggregate dimension – Schematic arms-length vicarious learning (continued) [extended] 
Second-Order Category: Identifying Key Practices 
First-Order Code: Adopting process framework First-Order Code: Adopting structural framework 
[First presentation of Garage Program, 2014-01-31]: 
 
Figure 29: Process model for Telco Research Innovation Program (AD) 
[Internal Telco Garage presentation, 2016-09-21]: 
 
Figure 30: Description of the second operating system (AD) 
First-Order Code: Adopting cultural principles First-Order Code: Adopting methodology 
[Video recorded inauguration speech for Garage Gothenburg by Head of 
Telco Research, October 2017]: “And then we decided that as a part of our 
innovation program that we started 2014 we wanted to establish something 
that we called the Telco Garage. And the idea with the Garage was that we 
would establish something that would be like a small, lean startup culture 
within the big company. So, it’s both a physical space it’s also a support 
system, it’s a process, and it’s kind of second operating system to our big 
operating system in Telco.” (AD) 
 
[Internal Telco Garage presentation, 2016-09-21]: 
 





Table 22: Aggregate dimension – Broad organizational framework for actions [extended] 
 
  
Second-Order Category:  Cultural Factors 
First-Order Code: Acceptance of failure First-Order Code: Empowerment and autonomy First-Order Code: Learning mentality and curiosity 
[Description of culture from first presentation of 
the Garage program]: “Permission that its ok to 
fail as long as its fail quick and reuse the 
learning to know what we should not persist 
with.” (AD) 
 
[CEO brief]: “Local garage presence creates an 
opportunity to run core and adjacent projects in 
a space and cultural environment that is 
friendly to exploration, experimentation, and 
failure.” (AD) 
[Telco Garage Sponsor and Founder]: “So, we 
tried to make it that it's empowering, it's 
distributed and it's also autonomous. I believe 
that an innovation system in a corporate should 
be distributed and autonomous, because that's 
the most adaptive one.” (IN40) 
[Telco Garage Sponsor and Founder]: “…the first two 
phases of innovation is [sic] about learning and 
knowledge. […] they have to learn a lot by themselves. 
Because the mindset is very important. The behavioral 
change is very important” (IN) 
 
[Head of Telco Research, at Telco Research Day 2015-
12-05]: “To win we understand and interact to explore 
user needs and industry value of our concepts and 
solutions in the Networked Society. We engage with 
users, industry & academia, we formulate relevant 
research questions and we are curious by exploration 
and experimentation.” (AD) 
First-Order Code: Openness and diversity 
 
First-Order Code: Volunteerism and intrinsic 
motivation 
First-Order Code: Startup mentality 
[Garage Brief to CEO]: “An exciting finding is 
that half of the local project teams, and 64% of 
global projects, were cross functional (i.e., 
coming from different organizations in the 
sites). We believe that cross-pollination sparks 
innovation and the Garage can help create 
fluidity across our local silos.” (AD) 
[Original Telco Garage core team member]: “We 
had, I had a discussion with a unit at the 
university. They had a pretty attractive model for 
how to handle researchers and researcher’s 
ideas to drive them all the way to become a 
business. More like the startup concept. They 
had to some extent the view that it’s very 
important that the idea owner needs to feel 
engaged and intrinsic ambition. Then the idea 
owner may need support but it’s tremendously 
important to have the idea owner onboard all the 
way” (IN56) 
[Garage Brief to CEO]: “The main responsibilities of the 
Telco Garages are […] to drive culture change by 
introducing experimentation and lean startup 
methodology into core and adjacent business 
development.” (AD) 
 
[Interview with Garage core team member]: So, I think 
the biggest motivation was to do something else outside 
of Research. And then to get this agile or be able to 
show a minimum viable product in six months. Then I 
though, this is something I want to be part of. To try this 





Table 23: Aggregate dimension – Broad organizational framework for actions (continued) [extended] 
 
Second-Order Category: Structural Factors 
First-Order Code: Garage format First-Order Code: Short time acceleration 
[Video recorded inauguration speech for Garage Gothenburg by Head of 
Telco Research, October 2017]: “And then we decided that as a part of our 
innovation program that we started 2014 we wanted to establish something 
that we called the Telco Garage. And the idea with the Garage was that we 
would establish something that would be like a small, lean startup culture 
within the big company. So, it’s both a physical space it’s also a support 
system, it’s a process, and it’s kind of second operating system to our big 
operating system in Telco.” (AD) 
[Process description from Telco Garage internal website]: 
 
Figure 32: Telco Garage process description (AD) 
First-Order Code: Entry and graduation First-Order Code: Second operating system 
[Garage sponsor and founder]: “Very early it came out that pain point, 
external partner, MVP. Basically, that was the only criteria that was very, 
very clearly came up. And then how you pitch in […] then [Head of Telco 
Research] became the first gate keeper to pitch in. […] And then very early, 
thanks to God, we could define a Dragon's Den, with […] the CTO. So, this 
was basically the whole set up. The whole framework was very lightweight 
and then the main elements was that if you start, then you come with a pain 
point, so the idea has to describe the pain point, you have to get an external 
partner and an MVP. Then we had the first stage, basically how you get in or 
how you get [a Telco] Garage project, then it was [the Head of Telco 
Research], then how you exit, that was [the CTO] […] Basically, what you 
had is a framework as I described. What is the three criteria, two gates, still 
you can have [the CTO] as the Dragon's Den”. (IN40) 
[Garage sponsor and founder]: “And from start I was thinking about, and I was also 
advised, and I realized, that I cannot change the culture of Telco. That would be a 
very, very stupid goal, that would fail. So, always from the start, I was talking about 
this as a second operating system. Create something besides what you have and 






 Table 24: Aggregate dimension – Replication across the organization [extended]
Second-Order Category:  Diffusing Key Practices 
First-Order Code: Evangelizing new innovation mindset First-Order Code: Advertising 
the Garage concept and results 
First-Order Code: Educating about new 
practices 
[Presentation to affiliated Garage leaders during meet up, 2017-12-13]: “  
 
Figure 33: Telco Garage key principles (AD) 
[Telco Garage Technology 
Coach]: “They did lots of 
advertisement, so I think 
everyone knew what the 
Garage was, that you could go 
there and develop your ideas” 
(IN57) 
[Innovation Manager, Garage Ottawa]: 
“There are a number of innovation 
workshops, then this innovation coach 
program was introduced. So, here in 
Ottawa myself and few others took that 
training. It was a very good training 
provided by a company in Telco called 
Amplify. So, I think it was remote 
training for about four weeks and then 
we had a full week of face-to-face. And I 
think that was very useful. So, a lot of 
the activities we have here in Ottawa 
are kind of moderated and supported by 






Table 25: Aggregate dimension – Replication across the organization (continued) [extended] 
Second-Order Category: Structural Replication 
First-Order Code: Distill minimum framework and 
principles 
First-Order Code: Creating 
new Garages 
First-Order Code: Assemble 
network of volunteers 
First-Order Code: Facilitating essential 
coordination 
[Garage sponsor and founder]: “So, the sites came out 
to us and said 'we would like to understand more, what 
is this? We would like to have this. Can you broaden it?' 
So, then we realized, and I realized that, 'aha! So, we 
can do something for Telco, internally'. So how you can 
scale that? […] so, then we came up with a franchise 
model. I mean, how you can franchise it. Basically, what 
you had is a framework as I described. What is the three 
criteria, two gates, still you can have [the CTO] as the 
Dragon's Den, so everything can go though there, but 
how you're solving the inflow. There I was thinking about 
and I wanted to make sure that it's empowering. So, I 
didn't want to put lots and lots of control functions. (IN40) 
[Research note based on 
analysis of Monthly Reports]: 
“New Garages were created 
in Silicon Valley (2015-04), 
Budapest (2015-11), Aachen 
(2016-05), Paris (2016-09), 
Gothenburg (2016-10), 
Zagreb (2016-12), Montreal 
(2016-12), Ottawa (2016-
12), Lund (2017-09), Poland 
(2017-10), Linköping (2017-
10), Beijing (2018-01).’ (RN) 
[Garage Leader, Montreal]: 
“Because there are two 
elements, or I would say two 
types of Garages. There is 
Garages that are funded, so 
by funding I mean they have 
dedicated resources or what 
not and then there are 
Garages that are affiliated. 
So, the affiliated Garage 
aren't necessarily sponsored 
by way of dedicated staff, so 
it comes in more as a 
volunteer and people working 
together” (IN67) 
[Second Telco Garage Manager]: “The 
other thing we had as a demand was 
that if you want something that you will 
call Telco Garage then we require that 
we will create a form of community 
between these Garages, so, a higher 
degree of communication is important” 
(IN51) 
 
[Analysis of Monthly Reports]: Starting 
from June 2016 all affiliated Garages 
contributed to the Telco Garage 
monthly reports by providing an update 
of their activities and progress on 
incubated projects. (RN) 
Second-Order Category: Cultural Legitimization 
First-Order Code: Local development of second operating system First-Order Code: Creating distinct identity and brand 
[Garage sponsor and founder]: “And these organizations that are distributed in Telco's 
case there are like 180 different sites, so let's say 10-13 different sites, they have to 
learn a lot by themselves […] To really locally create a second operating system is very 
important. So, this was the whole idea.” (IN40) 
[Garage Leader 1, Aachen]: “It’s called the second operating system, by John Kotter. 
Yes, we really use it like that. Upon demand we take people from the hierarchical model 
of the organization” (IN68) 
[Garage Leader 2, Aachen]: “It’s not easy. I mean it’s a lot of, we try to motivate and 
inspire people, organize events, and support in coaching and connect them. So, it 
requires a lot of activities” (IN68) 
[Researcher observation]: “The Garage was made distinct by creating 
their own logotype, website and communicating without adhering to the 
corporate brand and policies. Informants mentioned that they identified 






Table 26: Aggregate dimension – Coactive vicarious learning [extended] 
Second-Order Category:  Developing Experimentation Capability 
First-Order Code: Developing and validating market 
and business case 
First-Order Code: Developing minimum viable 
product and business model 
First-Order Code: Pivoting 
[Project 2 – Business Driver, Telco Garage]: “I 
needed to understand like the voice of the customer 
directly. […] So, I was actually able to talk to 
somebody who, you know, is an executive of the 
weather company who would purchase this data. So, 
very early on I was like able to capture like the voice 
of the customer. […] if I hadn't had that I think it 
would have been very hard because he even gave 
me price points and things, […] So, he was sort of 
able to articulate for me the value to him in monetary 
dollars. And that was huge, because without that I 
couldn't really have built a business case because 
how else could I have gotten price input?” (IN107) 
”Red fields indicate mandatory business 
model aspects to figure out before the first 
gate. Yellow fields were mandatory on a high 
level and blue just ‘nice to have.’” (RN) 
“An example of pivoting was the change of lead 
customers by Project 2. The project first attempted to 
get a first sale of their real-time and high accuracy 
rain measurement solution to a local municipality 
where initial tests had been performed. When they 
were not able to sell at a reasonable price point, they 
changed direction and started investigating in parallel 
selling their solution to UN military, and to insurers for 
whom the data could potentially have bigger value.” 
(RN) 
 
Second-Order Category:  Collaborating with Experienced Partners 
First-Order Code: Developing collaboration 
procedures for different actors 
First-Order Code: Engaging with accelerators First-Order Code: Engaging with universities 
[Researcher’s notes]: “As indicated by 
-  Figure 13: Standardized customer 
collaboration procedure (AD) 
- Figure 14: Standardized startup acceleration 
program selection and onboarding process 
(AD) 
- Figure 15: Startup acceleration program 
process (AD) 
standardized and codified procedures were 
developed for common forms of collaborations.” (RN) 
[2017-11 Telco Research Monthly Report]: 
“Joined cooperation with biggest startup 
incubator in Croatia 
(http://www.tehnopark.hr/). Official partner and 
mentor for accelerator 
program (smart city solutions, healthcare 
solutions, ...)” (AD 
[2017-12 Telco Research Monthly Report]:  
“As [Telco] Poland, we have established a 
cooperation with Startup Spark accelerator.” 
(AD) 
[2014-02 Telco Research Monthly Report]: “In April 
we continued to build up the network of competence 
support we want to be able to provide to our 
innovation teams. Handelshögskolan (SSE) in 
Stockholm accepted to use our innovation projects as 
course assignments for Masters and MBA students to 
do business analysis. Stanford University in California 
is likely to agree on this too, as the course material 
and teachers are the same. We also spent time to 
detail a similar setup with Uppsala University“ (AD) 
 





 Table 27: Aggregate dimension – Coactive vicarious learning (continued) [extended]
Second-Order Category:  Unlearning Selection Practices 
First-Order Code: Identifying dysfunctional 
selection practices 
First-Order Code: Replacing decision makers First-Order Code: Change structure of authority 
to enhance autonomy 
[Garage Sponsor and Founder]: “And then in the 
beginning we also included everyone in the 
[Telco] Research leadership team, which was not 
good neither. Because then it was lots of 
discussions, you know. I mean people, even 
though they are leaders in Research, but they do 
not have the mindset for innovation.” (IN40)    
 [Second Garage manager]: “But what became 
obvious during the first years, 2015, not to 
mention 2016, was that the pitch procedure to 
enter the Garage didn’t work […] It was that there 
was the entire [Telco] Research Leadership 
Team that didn’t understand innovation […] and 
they ended up in a mode of rather shooting down 
than giving it a chance.” (IN55) 
[Second Garage Manager]: “ But what we did rather 
quickly […] was that we reshaped the Entry Selection 
Board. […] And then it became eight people. So, we 
took two people from Research with the right to vote, 
and that was [the Garage Sponsor] and [the head of 
Telco Research] and then there were two people from 
the IoT side, there was one from [Business Unit Digital 
Services], two from the radio side and one from the 
CTO office.” (IN55) 
[Garage Sponsor and Founder]: “There I was 
thinking about and I wanted to make sure that it's 
empowering. So, I didn't want to put lots and lots 
of control functions. So, I said that for the 
ideation, you have all the freedom. How you're 
collecting the ideas, it's up to the site. We're not 
going to tell you. […] And then after that we said 
that you can have internal, on the garage level, 
you can have projects yourself. So, I don't want 
to be, every time, the gatekeeper.”  (IN40) 
Second-Order Category:  Collaborative Learning-by-Doing 
First-Order Code: Driving pilot project First-Order Code: Testing new practices in ventures First-Order Code: Developing skills through each 
venture 
[Garage sponsor and founder]: “I realized it very 
quickly that slides are not good enough, so to 
have the idea, and talk about the idea and have 
nothing tangible is not going to go. So, very, very 
quickly I pushed to have the first project. So, my 
strategy was that, instead of having work like six 
months on the policies and I don't know the 
description or the framework or whatever you call 
it, or finding a place I really pushed to get a first 
project.” (IN40) 
[2015-04 Project and Portfolio Planning, Monthly 
Report]: “The project is opening the development for 
anyone within [Telco] to contribute in an open source 
style of working, crowd development.” (AD) 
 
[2015-12 Telco Research, Monthly Report]: “…project 
completed workshop 3 in a series of 9 for internal 
convincing with the Entrepreneurship Lab at Uppsala 
University” (AD) 
[Second Telco Garage manager]: “And we 
became much better by time at coaching the 
ones who would come and pitch, about what was 
important. Especially, things such as having a 
clearly articulated problem, talk about who else 






Table 28: Aggregate dimension – Unlearning conflicting corporate practices [extended] 
Second-Order Category: Unlearning Selection Practices 
First-Order Code: Creating Simple Criteria First-Order Code: Bridging between 
Research and business units 
[Documentation of Garage criteria]: 
“ENTRY SELECTION CRITERIA 
-Satisfies a clear need 
   -Verified Problem definition 
-Minimum Viable Product (prototype) 
   -Clearly defined Minimum Viable Product 
   -Feasibility 
-The innovation extends business in new 
areas 
-Understand the competition 
   -Who, what 
-What is new and innovative? 
   Benefit of the approach clearly described 
-External partner onboard 
-Team secured 
   -Resources and expected time 
reasonable 
-What values are expected to be created?” 
(AD) 
[Researcher’s observation]: “By engaging 
business unit members and researchers in 
the projects, as well as offering c-level 
exposure of ventures towards business unit 
leaders in the dragon’s den, Telco Garage 
offered a new bridge for concepts to be 
transferred from Research to the business 
units” (FO) 
Second-Order Category: Unlearning Human Resource Allocation Practices 
First-Order Code: Identifying problems with 
human resource allocation practices 
First-Order Code: Gain support and remove 
obstacles for onboarding volunteers 
[Excerpt from Telco Garage_CEO FollowUp 
– Site Assessment]: 
“The following challenges were reported 
during the interviews by the local Telco 
Garage leads: Fading engagement due to 
lack of slack. Telco Garage activities are 
often on top of an 100% fulltime job. Both 
garage teams and project teams face this 
challenge. […] No dedicated time of money: 
each project and person must negotiate 
with line managers. […]” (AD) 
 
[Excerpt from Telco Garage_CEO FollowUp 
– Site Assessment]:  
“In order to address some of these issues 
we have recently: 
-Engaged with DNEW leadership to 
encourage employees to work on Telco 
Garage projects and disseminate better 
information about how to volunteer. 
-Begun pursuing the use of network 
numbers with MAs/BAs to get better 
visibility into time spent and enable minimal 
budgets.  
-Established an “Telco Garage Volunteer” 
option in O365 so employee can volunteer 
and be matched to projects in need of 
certain competences” (AD) 
Second-Order Category: Unlearning Financial Resource Allocation Practices 
First-Order Code: Creating minimum 
resource pools 
First-Order Code: Gain support of 
innovation activities from line managers 
[Garage Manager, Aachen]: 
“The department will take over the time 
reported, that they spent. I mean we 
finance a small equipment, let's say if they 
join a hackathon like raspberry pies, or 
smaller SD cards or these kinds of things.” 
(IN68) 
[Garage Manager, Aachen]: “There are 
specific people […] that are really focusing 
on the garage. I mean we got support from 
the […] manager […] from the site 
opportunity council, that they are constantly 






Table 29: Aggregate dimension – Proto-capabilities for experimentation [extended] 
 
Second-Order Category: Constituents for Experimentation Capability 
First-Order Code: Cultural 
acceptance of new 
practices 
First-Order Code: Wide awareness and 
engagement with experimentation 
First-Order Code: Relational ties and community First-Order Code: Exercised 
practices and routines 
[Garage sponsor and 
founder]: “So, the sites 
came out to us and said 'we 
would like to (IN40) 
[Researcher’s report based on Garage 
project tracker]: “Meta data about all 
Garage projects and Garage events in 
2017-2018 indicate that there was 
representation from Telco Research, all of 
the business units, several market areas 
and group functions in the projects and 
that 3000 people had attended Telco 
Garage events” (AD) 
[Head of Telco ONE Hub Sweden]: “you can't 
manufacture this grassroots' enthusiasm and 
commitment […] you can launch as many 
campaigns as you want to, to recruit for these 
kinds of people. That's not how it works. But this 
sort of brought them up, gave them a platform. 
They found each other, they amplified their own 
message, which is why it spread so much. And 
so today, for any future innovation activities we 
have a very fertile sort of ground to leverage 
these people again. We activate them, we invite 
them into this conversation. So that's an 
enormous positive and I don't know if we could 
have done it without that.” (IN46) 
[CEO Brief]: “Looking per site, we 
find that older [Telco] Garages tend 
to be more prolific and host more 
events. Gothenburg and Montreal 
are two of our most prolific garages” 
(AD) 
 
Second-Order Category: Cultural Legitimization 
First-Order Code: Declining enthusiasm in 
ventures and venture support due to work overload 
Venturing interruption due to lack of resources and 
time 
First-Order Code: Venturing interruptions due to hand-
over 
[Garage Manager, Lund]: “The resource issue is 
another thing that would be helpful if we could 
solve somehow. We, who works in the Garage 
could perhaps be more dedicated to put our time 
here. Today, it is rather a guilty conscience. 
Something one willingly does because it is fun, but 
it is not sustainable from a personal perspective. 
(IN64) 
[2017-06 Telco Research Monthly Report]: “The 
project is on hold. No resources are available, 
neither internal nor external” (AD) 
 
[Garage Manager, Aachen]: “I see that we have less 
and less slack and buffer for the people, so I see 
these teams working and taking longer to develop 
something.” (IN76) 
[Head of Telco ONE]: “…we have always struggled 
with, what do you do when you have brought 
something up to, from a startup, to ‘now it’s time to 
scale this. Where should this recide?’ That hand-over 
have never been resolved. So, in the early stages 
we’ve had ‘everything looks good in the pipeline’ and 
then when you are to move this new thing, which still is 
only going to cost, into an existing business unit, and 
the first thing that happens in the next financial cycle 





Table 30: Aggregate dimension – Decentralized experimentation with divergent practices [extended] 
 
Second-Order Category: Dispersed Experimentation 
First-Order Code: Large number of 
parallel ventures 
First-Order Code: Inflow of new ideas First-Order Code: Large number of collaboration 
partners for experimentation 
[Researcher’s report based on 
Garage project tracker]: “Meta data 
show the project funnel indicate that 
in April of 2018, at least 44 projects 
were ongoing on a local Garage 
level, without having passed the 
global entry selection panel, and six 
more projects were ongoing and had 
passed the global entry selection” 
(RN) 
[CEO Brief, 2018]: “The goal is to empower employees, 
customers and partners to explore. In light of this, we were happy 
to find that 85 events were hosted during 2017 with over 3000 
participants, resulting in 215 ideas developed. 
Our idea funnel progresses through two stages: local projects and 
global projects. Of the 215 ideas 46 were pitched into local 
garages during the year of 2017. Including ideas that cannot be 
directly traced to the events a total of 74 ideas were pitched into 
local garages.” (AD) 
[Researcher’s report based on Garage project tracker]: 
“Meta data of a total of 89 Garage projects from 
between 2014 and 2018, show the involvement of 
around 130 unique external partners, of which 10 were 
universities and 11 were CSPs, while the rest mostly 
consisted of private firms from various other industries” 
(RN)  
Second-Order Category: Limited Integration and Knowledge Sharing 
First-Order Code: Dispersed double 
work due to lack of horizontal 
coordination and learning 
First-Order Code: Lack of holistic transparency of portfolio and 
progress 
First-Order Code: Lack of inter-venture collaboration 
[CEO Brief, 2018]: “Local staff 
spending too much time on simple 
things because of inexperience. 
More central support and sharing 
best practices would be helpful.” 
(AD) 
[CEO Brief, 2018]: “We have created an excel based tracker 
which will be used to monitor ideas going forward” … 
“Note that project status “unknown” means that we did not get 
answer on the status of the project, i.e. ongoing, stopped, shelved 
or exited. We aim to improve historical data by approaching 
specific project leads, and going forward ensure better population 
of the needed data.“ (AD) 
[Researcher’s notes]: “These quotes indicate that not until 2018 
was systematic tracking attempted in response to a request from 
the CEO, which corresponds to field observations” (RN) 
[Field observation]: “The Telco Garage Manager, 
reported issues of creating collaboration between the 
Garages on similar projects. Disconnected drone 
projects have been observed in Beijing, Montreal, 





Table 31: Aggregate dimension – Decentralized experimentation with divergent practices (continued) [extended] 
 
 
Second-Order Category: Divergence of Practices 
First-Order Code: Heterogeneity of strategic 
intentions and objectives 
First-Order Code: Heterogeneity of 
selection and support 
First-Order Code: Deviations from original intent 
[Head of Telco ONE Hub Sweden]: “When 
we exploded into 13 Garages we didn't have 
a mission […] and if you had asked our 
founder at that time even after 13 Garages of 
which 11 were not Research he would still 
say the mission was to bring experimentation 
back to [Telco] Research. So, you have a 
fraction of the Garages speaking on behalf of 
the majority with a mission that is totally 
ununited. Because if you go to the other 
Garages, their mission was ‘we want to have 
interface with our customer’ or someone 
else's mission was ‘we want to have 
engagement with our staff’”. (IN46) 
[Researcher’s note based on aggregate 
Garage-level meta data]: “The number of 
supporting Garage volunteers and staff 
varied substantially from 10 to 60 manhours 
per week, which was not proportional the 
variation in the number of projects. 
Manhours divided with number of projects 
resulted in a ratio between 5 and 13.33 
manhours per project. This suggest a 
diversity in the support gained by Garage 
projects. Furthermore the acceptance rate 
of Garage applications varied between 18% 
and 100%, which suggest great diversity in 
selection practices.” (RN) 
 
[CEO Brief, 2018]: “Gothenburg and Montreal are two of our most 
prolific garages; however, we see few global projects coming from 
them. The reasons need to be further investigated although one 
explanation provided from Gothenburg was that they had not 
understood the benefits of receiving global status on projects until 
recently and still remained uncertain.” (AD) 
 
[Second Garage Manager]: ”To call themselves a Garage they had 
to drive projects. It could not be an empty facility where people go to 
play but they had to do projects that then were finalized and 
demonstrated. In the end it was a bit so and so at the different 
Garages but overall it was working well. Several Garages were 
pretty bad at finalizing it and move further in some form of phase 





Table 32: Aggregate dimension – Deliberate learning [extended] 
 
Second-Order Category: Systematic Analysis of Prevailing Issues 
First-Order Code: Interviewing Garage leaders and innovation managers First-Order Code: Hosting workshops with Garage teams and other stakeholders 
[Observation of interviews]: “‘Interview about Initiation and Ideation phases, 
Garage Manager Zagreb, 2018-10-15, 30 minutes 
‘Interview about Initiation and Ideation phases, Head of Strategy CU Brazil, 
2018-10-15, 30 minutes 
Focus Group about Initiation and Ideation phases, Garage Team Montreal, 
2018-10-15, 30 minutes 
Interview about Initiation and Ideation phases, Telco ONE Hub leader Silicon 
Valley, 2018-10-15, 30 minutes 
Focus Group about Initiation and Ideation phases, Garage Team Budapest, 
2018-10-16, 30 minutes 
Focus Group about Initiation and Ideation phases, Garage Team 
Gothenburg, 2018-10-16, 30 minutes 
Focus Group about Initiation and Ideation phases, Garage Leader Beijing 
and regional innovation managers from China, 2018-10-16, 30 minutes 
(FO) 
 
[Process description from Telco Garage internal website]: 
 
Figure 35: Picture from workshop, Garage Lund (FO) 
‘Telco Garage Team Lund Sticking Post-It Notes on the whiteboard with issues 
relating to different stages of the innovation process’ (Observation, 2019-02-05) 
‘Design experts from the Telco ONE Team travelled around the world to different 
Garages and innovation sites, collecting data about perceived challenges linked to 
different phases of the innovation journey: 
- Telco ONE Open House: Montreal 2019-03-19, 45 issues collected. 
- Workshop: Montreal, 2019-03-20, 93 issues collected. 
- Telco ONE Open House: Ottawa, 2019-03-21, 15 issues collected. 
- Workshop: Ottawa, 2019-03-22, 57 issues collected. 
- Workshop: Shanghai 2019-03-11, 79 issues collected. 
- Workshop: Yokohama, 2019-03-12, 93 issues collected. 
- Workshop: Seoul, 2019-03-14, 123 issues collected. 
- Telco ONE Open House: Stockholm, 2019-01-23, 46 issues collected. 
- Workshop: Gothenburg, 2019-02-04, 41 issues collected 
- Workshop: Lund, 2019-02-05, 45 issues collected 









Second-Order Category: Systematic Analysis of Prevailing Issues 
First-Order Code: Analyzing innovation journey First-Order Code: Analyzing key issues and root causes 
[Field observation, 2019-02-13]: 
 
Figure 36: Picture from analysis of issues in the innovation process (FO) 
‘Telco ONE team grouping and categorizing issues linked to different phases 
of the innovation process collected in previous workshops’ (FO) 
 
[Archival document, ‘identification of key issues and root causes’]: 
 
   ‘Analysis of key issues identified through interviews with Garage Leaders and 
other Innovation Managers concerned with non-core innovation to identify root 





Table 34: Aggregate dimension – Deliberate learning (continued) [extended] 
Second-Order Category: Reassessing Previously Learnt Practices 
First-Order Code: Discarding dysfunctional 
idea sourcing practices 
First-Order Code: Reconceptualizing 
Garage network to Ambassador network 
[Head of Telco ONE]: ‘“When I joined, I 
swallowed these four streams that we were 
supposed to work with: the intrapreneur 
track or internal track, the startup incubator, 
universities […] and customers. And now 
there is only one left. And that is based on a 
number of insights and outputs that we 
have discovered that took some time to 
render.” (IN48) 
 
[Researcher’s note]: “Telco ONE initially 
adopted the four tracks for startups, 
customers, academia and intrapreneurs 
(See Figure 11: Telco ONE description 
(AD), page 93). While collaborations with 
academia, startups and customers 
remained an alternative for each project, 
there were no overarching intent to drive 
such collaborations as programs” (RN)  
 
[Head of Telco ONE Hub Silicon Valley]: 
“The second one is, we call innovation 
ambassador. Okay? So, what they would 
do, they will become the first line of filtering 
and they also become the first line to 
respond to those ideas through the tool. 
They, we need those folks be very well 
versed in regional and local innovation 
ecosystem. They need to have a lot of 
experience in dealing with innovation 
projects and they have high-level 
knowledge of business case, business of 
Telco knowledge, Telco product portfolio or 
this kind of stuff. But it's very important, we 
want those folks to kind of have some kind 
of local presence in market areas. So right 
now, we're assuming, we're proposing like a 
Telco ONE Garage member or some very, 
very active volunteers from the MANA, from 
the Latin America Market Areas, they take 
this kind of role.” (IN42) 
Second-Order Category: Reassessing Previously Learnt Practices 
First-Order Code: Reconceptualizing entry 
and exit to stage gates 
First-Order Code: Codifying and gamifying 
lean startup approach 
[Field observation of new stage gate]: “As 
Telco ONE started to structure the 
innovation process into distinct phases, the 
view of this as a reconceptualization of the 
previous entry and exit gates was obvious. 
They often referred to the new gates as 
corresponding to prior entry and exit 
procedures to make sense of the new 
process” (FO) 
[Field observation of gamification and 
codification of the 5i process]: “Telco ONE 
has incorporated a point-systems in the 
ideation tool and rank participants based on 
their contribution in terms of ideas 
submitted and comments made on others’ 
ideas. The head of operation have been 
tasked to make a game-like version of the 
5i process by incorporating different work 
packages and check lists per stage, such 
as design thinking workshop, business 





Table 35: Aggregate dimension – Deliberate learning (continued) [extended] 
Second-Order Category: Dissemination of Learning from Venture Success and Failure  
First-Order Code: Publishing 
lessons learned in digital 
idea management tool 
First-Order Code: Arranging 
alumni presentation 
First-Order Code: Case 
studies of success and 
failure 
[Telco ONE team meeting 
protocol 2018-10-24]: 
“Communication between 
decision makers and 
ideators/project team and 
ambassadors: 
- Develop way of evaluating 
what happened to a project, 
why, how to learn from it 
and communicate this to the 
relevant people like the 
project team, idea submitter 
and the evaluators who 




“The idea management tool 
got a repository for project 
that were categorized as 
lessons learned.” (FO) 
[Telco ONE team meeting 
protocol 2018-10-24]: 
Alumni presentations - 
“Develop a framework for 
how we could engage 
alumni who have gone 
through certain stages to 
inspire and support newer 
projects, e.g. inspirational 
talks, coaching, etc. (Could 
be a part of Strategic Design 
teams culture program)” 
(AD) 
[Research observation]: 
Short and simple case 
studies were observed 
including information about 
progress and status, nature 
of the initiative, how it came 
about, what happened with 
it and why, and rational 
behind go or no-go 
decisions” (FO); 
 
[Telco ONE team meeting 
protocol 2018-10-24]: 
“Develop processes from 
learning from each success 
and failure in terms of 
project outcome, e.g. 
systemic evaluation in each 





Table 36: Aggregate dimension – Adaptive replication of corporate practices [extended] 
Second-Order Category: Adapting Structural Separation and Distinct Strategic Focus  
First-Order Code: Creating dedicated business unit to 
ensure commitment to non-core innovation and reduce 
interdependencies  
First-Order Code: Creating clear strategic focus 
[Head of Telco ONE]: “In the early stages we’ve had ‘okay, 
everything looks great in the pipeline!’ and then when 
you’re about to move this thing, that is still only going to 
cost money, into an existing business unit, and the first 
thing that happens in the next funding cycle and the next 
budget period is that it gets shut down. So, now we have 
solved that problem by with a whole dedicated BA, or 
Business Area for New Business, so that we can go from 
start-up mode, which is [Telco] ONE, to scale-up mode á la 
[Project 1], [Project #] and IoT, which still reside with [Head 
of BTEB] and is all about growth, growth, growth.” (IN48) 
[Telco ONE presentation, 2019-01]: 
Figure 38: Telco ONE - exploration practices (AD) 





Table 37: Aggregate dimension – Adaptive replication of corporate practices (continued) [extended] 
 
Second-Order Category: Centralizing and Adapting Hierarchical Organization 
First-Order Code: Organizing hierarchically First-Order Code: Formalizing and harmonizing volunteers’ roles 
[From Telco ONE Strategy Deck 2020]: [From Innovation Ambassador deck]:  
 
Figure 40: Service blueprint of the flow from idea submission to Dragon's Den (AD) 
[Researcher’s note]: “Step 2-6 in this service blueprint of the first phases of 
Telco ONE’s innovation process indicates the formal routines of Telco ONE 
ambassadors” (RN) 
 
First-Order Code: Creating clear and all-encompassing regional responsibilities First-Order Code: Centralizing and standardizing competencies 
[Researcher’s note]: 
“Telco ONE created geographical areas of responsibility similar to how the sales 
organization is organized, which leaves no blind spots as opposed to Telco 
Garage, where sites without a Garage were excluded. This is illustrated in Figure 
10, p. 92. 
 
[Researcher’s notes]: “As illustrated in Figure 39: Telco ONE organizational 
structure (AD)Figure 39: Telco ONE organizational structure (AD), a relatively 
big dedicated team was created with complementary competencies in business 
development, design, marketing, ecosystem enablement, HR, business control 
and management. Each hub also had a very similar setup with a standard set of 
competencies” (RN) 





Table 38: Aggregate dimension – Adaptive replication of corporate practices (continued) [extended] 
  
Second-Order Category: Adapting Corporate Processes and Incentives 
First-Order Code: Creating gates with quantitative KPIs and goals First-Order Code: Creating standardized decision fora for each gate 
[Telco ONE presentation 2018-10-10]:  
 
Figure 41: Telco ONE Stage gate process and expected numbers of projects (AD) 
[Researcher’s notes]: “For each of the gates a there was a chair with the 
ultimate decision-making power, a driver of the event, standing panel members 
and a set of optional panel member depending on the nature of the venture. The 
decision makers were for each gate:  
1) Angel’s Room: Head of ONE Hub; 2) Dragon’s Den: Head of ONE; 3) 
Pioneer’s Nest: Head of Business Unit Technology & Emerging Business; 4) 
Acceleration Board: CEO. (RN) 
First-Order Code: Standardize stage gate duration, support services and budget First-Order Code: Introducing gate-bounded awards for successful intrapreneurs 
[Excerpt from Telco ONE presentation 2019-02-09]: 
 
[Researcher’s notes]: “In the event of creation of an independent operating unit, 
which meant passing through all gates in Telco ONE, team members were 
granted the ‘pioneer award’, a financial compensation of up to 100% of their 
yearly salary depending on role and involvement in the venture’s creation.” (RN)  





Table 39: Aggregate dimension – Capabilities for systematic experimentation [extended] 
Second-Order Category: Centralized End-to-End Process 
First-Order Code: Alignment of 
authority and responsibility for 
experimentation in new business 
areas 
First-Order Code: Progressive escalation of investment decisions First-Order Code: Formalized internal collaboration 
[Field observation]: “With the creation 
of a dedicated business unit for new 
businesses and placing Telco 
Research right under the head of the 
Business unit, the same group that 
was in charge for driving more 
experimentation in new areas also 
had the authority to influence the rest 
of the organization to better cater for 
such activities.” (FO) 
[Researcher’s notes based on synthesis of documentation about 
the stage gate decision process]: “First decision point is Angel’s 
room, the head of the hub makes the decision, the investment 
size is around $15K and the fund is used to verify the problem 
over an average of 4-8 weeks; Second decision point is Dragon’s 
Den, the head of Telco ONE makes the decision, the investment 
size is around $300K and the fund is used to build an MVP and 
test feasibility over an average of 4-6 months; Third decision point 
is Pioneer’s Nest, the head of the business unit makes the 
decision, the investment size is up to $10M and the fund is used 
to industrialize the venture and test its ability to scale. Final 
decision point is IOU Board, the CEO makes the decision (RN) 
[Field Observation]:  
“From the start collaboration between hubs was 
formalized due to the fact they belonged to the same 
organization. They worked closely to align their ways 
of supporting new ventures and spurring innovation 
across the organization. For instance, they launched 
coordinated Telco ONE days around the world. Also, 
day to day activities were coordinated and physical 
visits were paid to the sister hubs.” (FO)  
 
 
Second-Order Category: Venture Level Experimentation Practices 
First-Order Code: Business and 
design coaching and support 
First-Order Code: Systematic lean experimentation First-Order Code: Incentives and rewards to retain 
innovation-minded employees 
[Excerpt from ONE Presentation]: 
“Why build your project with ONE? 
Validate your idea with experienced 
business coaches and industry 
experts; Access to early adopter 
customers and broader ecosystem; 
Build the dream team to grow idea 
into successful venture” (AD) 
[ONE User centered innovation primer]: “ [Excerpt from pioneer award overview document]: 
“RECOGNITION LEVEL (% of Annual Base Salary): 
Dependent on role and level of involvement in 
[Independent Operating Unit] creation. 
Founder:  
- If active in full incubation: 100% 
- If active in only one incubation phase: 50% 
Core Leadership Team: 
- Active LT in full incubation: 50%. 
- Active LT in 1 incubation phase only: 25% 
Other Members: 
- Only Ideation: 10% 
- Only Incubation MVP phase: 20% 
- Any two phases: 40%...” (AD) 





Table 40: Aggregate dimension – Capabilities for systematic experimentation (continued) [extended] 
 
Second-Order Category: Portfolio Level Experimentation Capabilities 
First-Order Code: Balancing strategic focus and diversification First-Order Code: Holistic overview of current portfolio of ventures 
[Exploring focus areas, 2020-01-20]:  
 
Figure 44: Routine activities to explore outside of current focus areas (AD) 
[Screenshot of funnel tracker in ideation tool]:  
 
Figure 45:  Web-based idea tracking tool (AD) 
First-Order Code: Formal selection procedures First-Order Code: Enabling combination and cross venture collaboration 
[Researcher’s notes based on observations scorecards]: The evaluation and 
selection procedure use weighted scorecards developed based on design 
thinking theory. The score card include a set of questions that help determine a 
score for desirability, feasibility and viability. A calculator is used to weight the 
scores based on the phase. Desirability is prioritized at first and the weight of 
feasibility and viability increases successively.” (RN) 
 
[Excerpt from ONE internal presentation 2020-03-31]:  
“Information Sharing and Learnings 
Teams Site for all MVP Projects: to be set up shortly to enhance collaboration 
and sharing of best practices etc.” (AD)  
 
